Kiddushin

yet when he [the master] leaves her a perutah's worth [of her labour] and designates [her therewith], it is kiddushin; so here too, It is not different. Our Rabbis taught: How is the law of designation [carried out]? He [her master] declares to her in the presence of two people, ‘Behold, thou art designated unto me,’1 [or] ‘Behold, thou art betrothed unto me,’[or] ‘Behold, thou art become an arusah unto me: even at the end of the six [years] ,2 even just before sunset. He must then treat her as a wife, not as a bondmaid. R. Jose son of R. Judah said: If there is sufficient time In that day for her to do work to the value of a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. This may be compared to a man who says to a woman, ‘Be thou betrothed unto me from now and after thirty days,’3 and then another man comes and betroths her within the thirty days: [the law of designation teaches] that she is betrothed to the first. On whose view is this analogous? Shall we say, on R. Jose son of R. Judah's? But [he maintained:] If there is sufficient time in that day for her to do work to the value of a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed!4 — Said R. Aha the son of Raba: It is analogous on the view of the Rabbis.5 But that is obvious?6 — I might have thought, But he [her master] did not say ‘from now’;7 hence we are informed [that it is not so].8 Another [Baraitha] taught: If a man sells his daughter and then goes and betroths her to another man, her master is powerless,9 and she is betrothed to the second: this is R. Jose son of R. Judah's view. But the Sages maintain: If he wishes to designate her, he can do so. This may be compared to a man who declares to a woman, ‘Behold, thou art betrothed unto me after thirty days,’ and another man comes and betroths her within the thirty days, then she is betrothed to the second.10 On whose view is this analogous? Shall we say, on the Rabbis’? But they maintain: If he wishes to designate her, he can do so! — But, said R. Aha the son of Raba, it is analogous on the view of R. Jose son of R. Judah.11 But that is obvious? — I might have argued, But he did not say to her, ‘After thirty days’;12 hence we are informed otherwise.13 Another [Baraitha] taught: If a man sells his daughter and stipulates,’ on condition that he [her master] shall not designate [her],’ the condition is binding:14 this is R. Meir's opinion. But the Sages maintain: If he wishes to designate her, he can do so, because he [her father] has stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah, and he who makes a stipulation contrary to what is decreed in the Torah, his stipulation is null. Does then R. Meir hold that this stipulation is valid? But it was taught: If a man says to a woman, ‘Behold, thou art betrothed unto me on condition that thou hast no claims upon me of sustenance, raiment, and conjugal rights’ — she is betrothed, but the condition is null: this is R. Meir ðs view. R. Judah said: In respect of financial matters,15 his condition is binding. — Said Hezekiah: Here it is different, because the Writ saith, [and if a man sell his daughter] to be a bondwoman:16 sometimes he can sell her to be only a bondwoman.17 And the Rabbis? How do they utilize this, ‘to be a bondwoman’! — They employ it, even as was taught: ‘To be a bondwoman’: this teaches that he can sell her to unfit persons.18 But does this not follow a fortiori: if he can betroth her to unfit persons,19 shall he not sell her to unfit persons?20 — As for betrothing her to unfit persons, that may be because a man can betroth his daughter as a na'arah: shall he then sell her to unfit persons, seeing that a man cannot sell his daughter as a na'arah?21 Therefore Scripture states: ‘to be a bondmaid’, teaching that he can sell her to unfit persons. R. Eliezer said: If it is to teach that he can sell her to unfit persons — behold, it was already said: ‘if she displease her master [so that he hath not espoused her],’ which means, she was displeasing in respect of marriage.22 What then is taught by, ‘to be a bondwoman’? It teaches that he may sell her requiring all this time. here too, kiddushin commence at the end of the thirty days, and therefore if another man betroths her in the meantime, she is betrothed to the second. must have commenced as soon as she was sold: otherwise, what effects her betrothal now? Hence the same applies to this. betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the first. if another man betroths her before her master designates her, she is not betrothed to the second, and the subsequent designation of her master takes effect, because the original money was given for kiddushin. ‘On whose . . . she is not betrothed’: which proves that he must actually give her something (sc. her labour, which is worth a perutah) at the end, when he designates her; therefore another man's intervention is valid, and she is betrothed to the second. ‘Said R. Aha . . . the Rabbis:’ just as there, so here too, and the intervention of another man before the master's designation is not valid. The rest is similar to Rashi's explanation. her, so here too. Tosaf. reverses the premise and the conclusion. betrothal is valid. But if one says: ‘Be betrothed to me after thirty days,’ I might have thought that she is betrothed to him, and the second man's betrothal is invalid. Tosaf.: her master did not state that he would designate her only after a certain period, and therefore I would have thought that the designation commences immediately, and the second man's betrothal is invalid. he would subsequently designate her; therefore the cases are entirely analogous. Tosaf.: Since he did not explicitly state, ‘from now,’ the designation commences only later; hence she is betrothed to the second. for servitude and not designation. performed, we desire to prove now that one may at the very outset sell his daughter to an unfit person, and this vitiates the argument. But this rebuttal is fallacious: it is logical to distinguish in marriage between what is permitted at the very outset and what is valid only if done in defiance of the law; but there are no grounds for drawing this distinction in respect to a sale, and if the sale is valid when done, there is no reason for saying that it is not permitted in the first place (Maharsha). S. Strashun explains it differently.