Ketubot

But since the final clause[deals with a case] where [she sold] at a lower price, [would not] the earlier clause[naturallyrefer to one] where [she did] not [sell] at a lower price; for has [it not] been stated in the final clause, IF HER KETHUBAH WAS FOR FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE SOLD [PLOTS OF LAND] TO [THREE] PERSONSTO EACH FOR ONE MANEH, AND TO A FOURTH[SHE SOLD] WHAT WAS WORTH A MANE HAND A DENAR FOR ONE MANEH, [THE SALE] TO THE LAST PERSON IS VOID BUT [THE SALES] OF ALL THE OTHERS ARE VALID?— No, both the earlier and the final clause [refer to a sale] at a lower price, butit is this that we were informed in the final clause: The reason [why her sale is void is] because [she sold]at a lower price [the property] that belonged to the orphans,but [if thathad been done] with her own,her sale is valid.But is not this already inferred from the first clause: WHOSE KETHUBAH WAS FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ SOLD [A PLOT OF LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ OR ONE THAT WAS WORTH TWO HUNDRED ZUZ FOR ONE MANEH, HER KETHUBAH IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN THEREBY SETTLED?— It might have been assumed [that the rulingwas applicable] there Only because [by her one act] she completely severed her connection with that house,but that here[the sale for] the first maneh [should be deemed invalid] as a preventive measure against [the assumption of the validity of the sale for the] last maneh,' hence we were informed [that the law was not so]. Some there are who say: You have no need to ask [for a ruling] where [a man said to his agent,] 'Go and sell for me a lethek'and [the latter] sold for him a kor, since [in this case the agent] was undoubtedly adding to his instructions.The question, however, arises as to what is the ruling where the man said to the agent, 'Go and sell for me a kor' and he sold for him only one lethek.Do we [in such a case] lay down that [the agent] might tell the man, 'I have done for you that which is more advantageous to you, for [had I sold the full kor, and] you were no longer in need of money you could not have retracted',or is it rather [held that the owner] might retort to him, 'It is no satisfaction to me that many deeds [should be held] against me'? — R. Hanina of Surareplied, Come and hear: If one man gave to another a gold denarand told him, 'Bring me a shirt', and the other brought him a shirt for three sela's and a cloak for three sela's, both are guilty of trespass.Now if you admit that an agent in similar circumstanceshas performed his mission and was only adding to his instructions, one can well see why the owneris guilty of trespass.If, however, you should maintain that [the agent in such circumstances] was transgressing his instructions, why should [the owner] be guilty of trespass?— Here we are dealing with a case where [the agent] brought him [a shirt that was] worth six sela's for three.If sowhy should the agent be guilty of trespass? — On account of the cloak.But if that were so,read the final clause: R. Judah ruled, Even in this casethe owner is not guilty of trespass because he might say [to the agent,] 'I wanted a big shirt and you brought me one that is small and bad'!— 'Bad' means'bad in respect of the price', for[the owner can] tell him, 'Had you brought me one for six sela's [my gain would have been] even greater since it would have been worth twelve sela's.'Thismay also be proved by an inference. For it was stated:R. Judah admits [that if the transaction was] in pulse bothare guilty of trespass