Ketubot

what, however, is the reason  [for conferring this privilege  upon one widowed] after betrothal?  — 'Ulla replied: In order to [enhance the] attractions  [of matrimony].  R. Johanan replied: Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court. What is the practical difference between them?  — The practical difference between them is the case of a divorced woman. For according to him who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractiveness [of matrimony]' a divorced woman also may  claim [the privilege  of the provision for matrimonial] attractiveness; but according to him who replied, 'Because no man Wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' a divorced woman [is not entitled to the privilege since] the man does not care [for her dignity]. We learned: And a divorced woman may not sell [of her former husband's estate]  except with the sanction of Beth din.  Now, according to him who replied, 'Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' the ruling is well justified since for a divorced wife one does not care; but according to him who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractions [of matrimony'. why should not] a divorced woman  also be entitled to claim [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attractiveness? — This represents the view of R. Simeon.  If [this represents the view of] R. Simeon [the objection arises: Was not this principle] already laid down in the earlier clause, AFTER HER BETROTHAL SHE MAY NOT SELL etc.?  — It might have been presumed [that his ruling applied] Only to a woman widowed after [her] betrothal, since in her case there was not much affection,  but that a divorced woman, in whose case there was much affection,  may  demand [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attraction.  But have we not learned this  also: WHO IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE which includes,  does it not, a divorced woman?  — No, [it includes one who is both] divorced  and' not divorced,  as [the one spoken of by] R. Zera who stated: Wherever the Sages described a woman as both divorced and not divorced  her husband is responsible for her maintenance. Come and hear: As she  may sell [of her deceased husband's estate] without [the sanction of] Beth din so may her heirs, those who inherit her kethubah, sell [such property] without [the sanction of] Beth din. Now, according to him who replied, 'Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' one can well see the reason for this ruling;  for as it is disagreeable to him  that she should suffer indignity so it is also disagreeable to him that her heirs should suffer indignity. According to him, however, who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractiveness [of matrimony]', what [consideration for] attractiveness [it may be objected] could there be in respect of her heirs?  — 'Ulla interpreted this [to be a case where] her daughter, for instance, or her sister, Was her heir. MISHNAH. [A WIDOW WHO] SOLD HER KETHUBAH OR PART OF IT, OR PLEDGED IT OR PART OF IT, OR PRESENTED IT OR PART OF IT, TO A STRANGER, MAY NOT SELL THE RESIDUE [OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE]  EXCEPT WITH (THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.  THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: SHE MAY SELL [THE LAND PLEDGED FOR HER KETHUBAH] EVEN IN FOUR OR FIVE INSTALMENTS  AND [IN THE MEANTIME]  SHE MAY SELL [OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE TO PROVIDE] FOR HER MAINTENANCE WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN, ENTERING, [HOWEVER, IN THE DEED OF SALE,] 'I SOLD [THE LAND TO PROVIDE] FOR MY MAINTENANCE'.  A DIVORCED WOMAN, HOWEVER, MUST NOT SELL [SUCH PROPERTY] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN. GEMARA. Who [is the author of the first ruling in] our Mishnah?  — It is R. Simeon. For it was taught: If a woman sold [all] her kethubah or pledged it, or mortgaged [the land that was pledged for] her kethubah to a stranger, she is not entitled to maintenance.  R. Simeon ruled: Even if she did not sell or pledge [all] her kethubah, but half of it only, she loses her maintenance.  Does this  then imply that R. Simeon holds the view that we do not regard part of the amount  as being legally equal to the full amount, while the Rabbis maintain that part of the amount is legally regarded as the full amount? But, [it may be objected], have we not in fact heard the reverse? For was It not taught: And he  shall take a wife its her virginity  excludes one who is adolescent  [some of whose] virginity is ended; so R. Meir. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon permit  [the marriage] of one who is adolescent?  — There  they differ [on the interpretation] of Scriptural texts,  R. Meir being of the opinion that 'virgin'  implies even [one who retains] some of her virginity; 'her virginity'  implies only one who retains all her virginity;  'in her virginity'  implies only  [when previous intercourse with her took place] in a natural manner,  but not when in an unnatural manner.  R. Eleazar and R. Simeon, however, are of the opinion that 'virgin' would have implied a perfect virgin; 'her virginity' implies even [one who retains] only part of her virginity;