Ketubot

Now if it could be assumed that a kethubah is payable during the lifetime [of the levir] why should he not set aside exclusively for her some property equal in value to the amount of the kethubah, and then sell the rest?  'But according to your argument  [it might be asked] why should not the same objection  be raised from our Mishnah [where it was stated,] HE CANNOT SAY TO HER, "BEHOLD YOUR KETHUBAH LIES ON THE TABLE", BUT ALL HIS PROPERTY IS PLEDGED FOR HER KETHUBAH?' — 'There  we might merely have been given a piece of good advice;  for, were you not to admit this, [how would you] read the final clause where it is stated, So, TOO, A MAN MUST NOT SAY TO HIS WIFE, "BEHOLD YOUR KETHUBAH LIES ON THE TABLE", BUT ALL HIS PROPERTY IS PLEDGED FOR HER KETHUBAH, would he here also [it may be asked] not be able to sell if he wished to do so?  Consequently [it must be agreed that] he was there merely giving a piece of good advice;  and similarly here also we might merely be given a piece of good advice;  the statement of R. Abba, however, does present an objection!'  — 'R. Abba's statement also does not give rise to any objection [because the restrictions on the man's liberty to sell] are due to [the desire of avoiding] hatred.' A sister-in-law once fell to the lot of a man  at Pumbeditha, and his [younger] brother wanted to cause her to be forbidden to marry him  by [forcing upon her] a letter of divorce.  'What is it', [the eldest brother] said to him, 'that you have in your mind? [Are you troubled] because of the property  [that I all, to inherit]?  I will share the property with you'. R. Joseph [in considering this case] said: Since the Rabbis have laid down that he  may not sell,  his sale is invalid even if he had already sold it.  For it was taught:  If a man died  and left a widow who was awaiting the decision of a levir  and also left a bequest of property of the value of a hundred maneh,  [the levir] must not sell the property although the widow's kethubah amounts only to one maneh, because all his property is pledged to her kethubah.  Said Abaye to him:  Is it so that wherever the Rabbis ruled that one must not sell, the sale is invalid, even after it had taken place? Did we not, in fact, learn: Beth Shammai said, She  may sell it, and Beth Hillel said, She may not sell it; but both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid?  The case was sent to R. Hanina b. Papi who sent [the same reply] as that of R. Joseph. On this Abaye remarked: Has R. Hanina b. Papi, forsooth, hung jewels  upon it?  It was then sent to R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumai who sent [the same reply] as Abaye  [and added:]  'Should R. Joseph give a new reason report it to me. R. Joseph thereupon went out, investigated, and discovered that it was taught: If a man who had a monetary claim against his brother died,  and left a widow who had to await the decision of a levir, [the latter]  is not entitled to plead, 'Since I am the heir I have acquired [the amount of the debt]', but it must be taken from the levir and spent on the purchase of land and he is only entitled to its usufruct.  But 'is it not possible', said Abaye to him, 'that provision was made in his own interests?'  — 'The Tanna stated', the other replied, 'that it must be "taken" from him,  and you say that "provision was made in his own interests"'! The case was again sent to R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumai who said to then: Thus said R. Joseph b. Minyomi in the name of R. Nahman, 'This  is not an authentic teaching'.  What is the reason?  If it be Suggested, 'Because money is a movable thing and movables are not pledged to a kethubah',  is it not possible [it might be retorted] that the statement represents the view of R. Meir who holds that movables are pledged to a kethubah?  [Should it be suggested,] however,  'Because he  could say to her: You are not the party I have to deal with',