Ketubot

on the silver [coloured] cloths  or on the gold [coloured] ones?'  'It is in view of such cases' [R. Hanina] remarked, 'that R. Eleazar said: Come let us be grateful to the rogues for were it not for then, we  would have been sinning every day, for it is said in Scripture, And he cry unto to the Lord against thee, and it be sill unto thee.  Furthermore, R. Hiyya b. Rab of Difti  taught: R. Joshua b. Korha said, Any one who shuts his eye against charity is like one who worships idols, for here  it is written, Beware that there be not a base  thought in thy heart etc. [and thine eye will be evil against thy poor brother]  and there  it is written, Certain base  fellows are gone out,  as there  [the crime is that of] idolatry, so here also [the crime is like that of] idolatry'. Our Rabbis taught: If a man pretends to have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a shrunken leg,  he will not pass out from this world before actually coming into such a condition. If a man accepts charity and is not in need of it his end [will be that] he will not pass out of the world before he comes to such a condition. We learned elsewhere: He  may not be compelled to sell his house or his articles of service'.  May he not indeed?  Was it not taught: If he was in the habit of using gold articles he shall now use copper ones?  — R. Zebid replied. This is no difficulty. The one  refers to the bed and table: the other to cups and dishes. What difference is there in the case of the cups and dishes that they are not [to be sold]? Obviously because he can say, '[The inferior quality] is repulsive to me', [but then, in respect of] a bed and table also, he might say [the cheaper article] is unacceptable to me! — Raba the son of Rabbah replied: [This  refers] to a silver strigil.  R. Papa replied: There is no difficulty: one  [refers to a man] before he came under the obligation of repayment,  and the other refers to a man  after he had come under the obligation of repayment. MISHNAH. IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT  AND THEY ASSIGNED  TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ,  SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY,  RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER.  R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND  MUST RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID: SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR.  THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE  BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. GEMARA. Samuel stated: In respect of the marriage outfit  the assessment  is to be determined by [the disposition of] the father. All objection was raised: 'The daughters are to be maintained and provided for  out of the estate of their father. In what manner? It is not to be said, "Had her father been alive he would have given her such and such a sum" but the estate is valued and she is given [her due share]'. Does not ['provided for' refer to] the marriage  outfit?  — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: No; [it refers to] her own maintenance.  But, surely, it was stated: 'Are to be maintained and provided for'; does not one [of the expressions]  refer to the marriage  outfit and the other to her own maintenance?  — No; the one as well as the other refers to her own maintenance,  and yet there is no real difficulty, for one of the expressions  refers  to food and drink and the other  to clothing and bedding. We learned: THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID, SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR. THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. Now what is meant by POOR and RICH? If it be suggested that POOR means poor in material possessions, and RICH means rich in such possessions, the inference [should consequently be] that the first Tanna holds the opinion that even when a man was rich and became poor she is given as much as before; but, surely, [it may be objected] he has none [to give]. Must it not then [be concluded that] POOR means poor in mind  and RICH means rich in mind,  and yet it was stated, THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. from which it clearly follows that we are not guided by the assumed disposition [of her father], and this presents an objection against Samuel!  He  holds the same view as R. Judah. For we learned, R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND SHOULD RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. [Why], then, [did he not] say, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah'?  — If he had said, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah', it might have been assumed [to apply] only [where her father had actually] given her  in marriage, since [in that case] he has revealed his disposition, but not [to a case where] he had not given her  in marriage,  hence he  taught us  that R. Judah's reason is that we are guided by our assumption [as to whit was her father's disposition], there being no difference whether he had already given her  in marriage or whether he had not given her in marriage; the only object he  had  in mentioning [the case where a father] gave her  in marriage was to let you know the extent of the ruling  of the Rabbis  [who maintain] that although he had already given her  in marriage and had thereby revealed his disposition, we are nevertheless not to be guided by the assumption [as to what may have been the father's disposition]. Said Raba to R. Hisda: In our discourse we stated  in your name, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. The other replied: May it be the will [of Providence] that you may report in your discourses all such beautiful sayings in my name. But could Raba, however, have made such a statement?  Surely, it was taught: Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive  a tenth of [her father's] estate;  and Raba stated that the law is in agreement with Rabbi!  — This is no difficulty. The former  [is a case] where we have formed some opinion about him;  the latter  is one where we have not formed any opinion about him.  This explanation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For R. Adda b. Ahaba stated: It once happened that Rabbi gave her  a twelfth of [her father's] estate. Are not the two statements contradictory?  Consequently  it must be inferred that the one  [refers to a father of whom] some opinion had been formed while the other  [refers to one of whom] we have formed no opinion. This is conclusive proof. [To turn to] the main text.  Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate. They  said to Rabbi: According to your statement, if a man had ten daughters and one son the sons should receive no share at all on account of  the daughters? He replied: What I mean is this: The first  [daughter] receives a tenth of the estate, the second [receives a tenth] of what [the first] had left, and the third [gets a tenth] of what [the second] had left, and then they divide again [all that they had received] into equal shares.