Ketubot

SHE MUST TAKE AN OATH  AT THE END  BUT NOT AT THE BEGINNING.  THE SONS OF THE HIGH PRIESTS,  HOWEVER, DIFFERED FROM HIM AND RULED THAT SHE MUST TAKE AN OATH BOTH AT THE BEGINNING  AND AT THE END.  R. DOSA B. HARKINAS AGREED WITH THEIR RULING. R. JOHANAN B. ZAKKAI SAID: HANAN HAS SPOKEN WELL; SHE NEED TAKE AN OATH ONLY AT THE END. GEMARA. I Would point out an Inconsistency: 'Three judges in cases of robbery  were [administering justice] in Jerusalem. Admon b. Gadai,  Hanan the Egyptian and Hanan b. Abishalom'. Is there not an inconsistency between 'three'  and 'TWO', and an inconsistency between 'CIVIL'  and 'robbery'?  One might well admit that there is no [real] inconsistency between the 'three' and the 'TWO' since he  may be enumerating [only those] whom he con siders important  and omitting  [the one] whom he does not consider important. Does not, however, the inconsistency between 'CIVIL' and 'robbery' remain? — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: [Both terms may be justified on the grounds] that they  imposed fines  for acts of robbery;  as it was taught: If [a beast] nipped off a plant, said R. Jose. the Judges of Civil Law in Jerusalem ruled that if the plant was in its first year [the owner of the beast pays as compensation] two silver pieces.  if it was in its second year [he pays as compensation] four silver pieces. I point out [another] contradiction: Three judges of Civil Law were [administering justice] in Jerusalem. Admon, and Hanan and Nahum?  — R. Papa replied: He who mentioned Nahum was R. Nathan;  for it was taught: R. Nathan stated, 'Nahum the Mede also was one of the Judges of Civil Law in Jerusalem', but the Sages did not agree with him. Were there, however, no more [judges]? [Did not] R. Phinehas. in fact, state on the authority of R. Oshaia that there were three hundred and ninety four courts of law  in Jerusalem, and an equal number of Synagogues. of Houses of Study  and of schools?  — Judges there were many, but we were speaking of Judges of Civil Law only. Rab Judah stated in the name of R. Assi: The Judges of Civil Law in Jerusalem received their salaries out of the Temple funds  [at the rate of] ninety-nine maneh.  If they were not satisfied is they were given an increase. [You say] 'They were not satisfied'?  Are we dealing with wicked men?  The reading in fact is,  [If the amount was] not Sufficient  an increase was granted to them even if they objected. Karna  used to take one istira  from the innocent  party and one istira from the guilty party and then informed them of his decision.  But how could he  act in such a manner? Is it not written in Scripture, And thou shalt take no gift?  And should you reply that this applies only where he does not take from both [litigants] since he might [in consequence] wrest judgment, but Karna, since he took [the same amount] from both parties, would not come to wrest judgment, [it can be retorted:] Is this permitted even where one would not come to wrest judgment? Was it not in fact taught: What was the purpose of the statement And thou shalt take no gift?  If to teach that one must not acquit the guilty or that one must not condemn the innocent [the objection Surely could be raised]. It was already specifically stated elsewhere in Scripture, Thou shalt not wrest judgement.  Consequently it must be concluded that even [where the intention is] to acquit the innocent or to condemn the guilty the Torah laid down, And thou shalt take no gift?  — This  applies only where [the judge] takes [the gift] as a bribe,  but Karna took [the two istira] as a fee.  But is it permissible [for a judge to take money] as a fee.  Have we not in fact learned: The legal decisions of one who takes a fee for acting as judge are null and void?  — This  applies only to a fee for pronouncing judgment, while Karna was only taking compensation for loss of work. But [is a judge] permitted to take compensation for loss of work? Was it not in fact taught: Contemptible is the judge who takes a fee for pronouncing judgment; but his decision is valid?  Now, what is to be understood [by fee]. If it be suggested [that it means] a fee for acting as judge [the objection would arise: How could be said,] 'his decision is valid', when in fact we have learned:  The legal decisions of one who takes a fee for acting as judge are null and void? Consequently it must mean  a fee for loss of work,  and yet it was stated, was it not, 'Contemptible is the judge etc.'? — This applies only to a loss of work that cannot be proved, but Karna received [compensation for] loss of work that could be proved. for he was [regularly occupied in] smelling tests  at a wine store,  and for this he was paid a fee.  This is similar to the case  of R. Huna. When a lawsuit was brought to him, he used to say to the [litigants]. 'Provide me with a man who will draw the water  in my place  and I will pronounce judgment for you'. Said R. Abbahu: Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who take a bribe. If a man has pain in his eyes he pays away money to a medical man and he may be cured or he nay not be cured, yet these take what is only worth one perutah  and blind their eyes [therewith]. for it is said in Scripture. For a gift blindeth them that have sight. Our Rabbis taught: For a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise,  and much more so those of the foolish; And pervert the words of the righteous,  and much more so those of the wicked. Are then fools and wicked men capable of acting as judges?  — But it is this that is meant: 'For a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise', even a great Sage who takes bribes will not depart from the world without [the affliction of] a dullness of the mind,  'And pervert the words of the righteous',