Ketubot

their dispute, however, might relate to the view of R. Ishmael. R. Johanan is, [of course,] in agreement with R. Ishmael, while Resh Lakish [might argue:] R. Ishmael maintains his view there  only  because a pentateuchal responsibility is involved  but [not] here where no pentateuchal responsibility is involved. The [above] text [stated]: 'R. Giddal has laid down in the name of Rab: [If one man said to another,] "How much are you giving to your son?" [and the other replied,] "Such and such a sun,", and [when the other asks,] "How much are you giving to your daughter?" [the first replies,] "Such and such a sum", [and on the basis of this talk] betrothal was effected, kinyan is deemed to have been executed, these being matters concerning which kinyan is effected by a mere verbal arrangement'.  Said Raba: It stands to reason that Rab's ruling should apply [only] to the case of a man whose daughter was  a na'arah,  since the benefit [of her betrothal]  goes to him,  but not to that of a bogereth,  since the benefit [of the betrothal of the latter]' does not go to him; but, by God! Rab meant [his ruling to include] even one who is a bogereth. For, should you not concede this, [the objection could be put:] What benefit does the son's  father derive?  The reason consequently must be that  owing to the pleasure of the formation of a mutual family tie they decide to allow one another the full rights of kinyan. Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Are those verbal arrangements,  allowed to be recorded  or are they not allowed to be recorded?  — They, the other replied, may not be recorded.  He  raised an objection against him:  PRUDENT MEN USED TO WRITE,  ON CONDITION THAT I SHALL MAINTAIN YOUR DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS WHILE YOU [CONTINUE TO LIVE] WITH ME'?  — The meaning of  'WRITE' [in this context] is 'say'. Could 'saying', however, be described as 'writing'? — Yes, for so we learned: If a husband gives to his wife a written undertaking,  'I have no claim whatsoever upon your estates',  and R. Hiyya taught:  If a husband said  to his wife. Come and hear: Deeds of betrothal  and marriage  may not be written except with the consent of both parties,  but, [it follows, that] with the consent of both parties they may be written. Does not this refer to  deeds based on verbal agreements?  — No; deeds of actual betrothal,  [the ruling  being] in agreement with R. papa and R. Sherabya; for it was stated: If a man wrote it  in her name  but without her consent she is, said Rabbah  and Rabina, betrothed, but R. Papa and R. Sherabya aid, She is not betrothed. Come and hear: SHOULD THEY DIE, THEIR OWN DAUGHTERS ARE TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THEIR FREE PROPERTY ONLY BUT SHE MUST BE MAINTAINED EVEN OUT OF ASSIGNED PROPERTY, BECAUSE SHE [HAS THE SAME LEGAL STATUS] AS A CREDITOR!  Here we are dealing with a case where the man was made to confirm his obligation  by a kinyan.  If so,  [the same right  should be enjoyed, should it not, by one's own] daughters also? — [This is a case] where kinyan was executed in favour of the ones but not in favour of the others.  Whence this certainty?  — Since she was in existence at the time the kinyan was executed, the kinyan in her favour is effective; the other daughters,  however, since they were not in existence at the time the kinyan was executed, the kinyan in their favour is not effective. But do we not also deal with the case where they  were in existence at the time of the kinyan, this being possible where,  for instance, the man had divorced his wife and then remarried her? — [This] however, [is the explanation:] Since she is not covered by the provision of Beth din  kinyan in her case is effective; in the case of the other daughters, however, who are protected by the provision of Beth din,  kinyan is not effective. Are they, on that account, worse off?  — This, however, is the reason: In the case of his own daughters, since they are protected by the provision of Beth din,  it might be assumed that he entrusted them  with some bundles [of money]. THE FIRST HUSBAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO PLEAD [etc.] R. Hisda stated: This  implies that [the place of] a daughter must be with her mother.  Whence, [however, the proof] that we are dealing here  with one who is of age; is it not possible that  we are dealing only with a minor [whose custody must be entrusted to her mother] on account of what had once happened? For it was taught: If a man died and left a young son with his mother,  [and while] the father's heirs demand, 'Let him be brought up with us' his mother claims, 'My son should be brought up by me', [the son] must be left with his mother, but may not be left with anyone who is entitled to be his heir.  Such a case  once occurred and [the heirs] killed him on the eve of passover!  — If that were so  it should have been stated,  'To wherever she is,'