Ketubot

her worn out articles that are still in existence. A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: [A wife who] played the harlot forfeits in consequence her worn out articles [though they are still] in existence. 'If she', the other said to him, 'has played the harlot, have her chattels also played the harlot?  Recite rather: She does not forfeit her worn out articles [that are still] in existence' — Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Johanan: This  is the view of the unnamed R. Menahem,  but the Sages ruled: [A wife who] played the harlot does not thereby forfeit her worn out articles that are still in existence. IF THE MAN, HOWEVER, HAD MARRIED HER etc. Said R. Huna: A woman incapable of procreation [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she has] no such status;  a widow  [has always the status of] a proper wife. 'A woman incapable of procreation [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she] has no such status'; if the husband knew of her [defect]  she is entitled to a kethubah  and if he did not know of her [defect] she is not entitled to a kethubah. 'A widows [has always the status of] a proper wife', for, whether her husband was aware of her [widowhood] or whether he was not aware of it, she is always entitled to a kethubah. Rab Judah, however, said: The one  as well as the other  [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she has] no such status,  for [in either case] if her husband was aware of her [condition or status] she is entitled to a kethubah and if he was not aware of it she is not entitled to a kethubah. An objection was raised: If [a High Priest] married on the presumption that [the woman] was in her widowhood  and it was found that she had been in such a condition,  she is entitled to her kethubah. Does not this imply that if  there was no presumption  she is not entitled to a kethubah?  — Do not infer 'that  if there was no such presumption' but infer [this:] If he married her on the presumption that she was not in her widowhood  and it was found that she had been in such a condition,  she is not entitled to a kethubah. What, however, [is the ruling where he married her] with no assumption? Is she entitled [to a kethubah]? Then instead of stating, 'On the presumption that [the woman] was in her widowhood  and it was found that she had been in such a condition,  she is entitled to her kethubah', should it not rather have been stated, 'With no assumption she is entitled to her kethubah'  and [it would have been obvious that this  applied] with even greater force to the former?  Furthermore, it was explicitly taught: If he  married her in the belief  [that she was a widow] and it was found that his belief was justified,  she is entitled to a kethubah, but if he married her with no assumption she is not entitled to a kethubah. [Does not this present] an 'objection against R. Huna? — It was our Mishnah that caused R. Huna to err. He thought that, since a distinction was drawn in the case of a woman incapable of procreation  and no distinction was drawn in respect of a widow, it must be inferred that a widow is entitled [to a kethubah even if she was married] with no assumption of her status. [In fact, however] this is no [proper conclusion], for in stating the case of a widow the author intended to apply to it  the distinction drawn in the case of the woman who was incapable of procreation. MISHNAH. IF A MAN MARRIED A WIFE AND SHE MADE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH HIM THAT HE SHOULD MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER  FOR FIVE YEARS, HE MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY]  MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND ARRANGED WITH HIM ALSO THAT HE SHOULD MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER  FOR FIVE YEARS, HE, TOO, MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. THE FIRST HUSBAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO PLEAD, 'IF SHE WILL. COME TO ME I WILL MAINTAIN HER',  BUT HE MUST FORWARD HER MAINTENANCE TO HER AT THE PLACE WHERE HER MOTHER [LIVES].  SIMILARLY, THE TWO HUSBANDS CANNOT PLEAD, 'WE WILL MAINTAIN HER JOINTLY', BUT ONE MUST MAINTAIN HER AND THE OTHER ALLOW HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE. IF SHE  MARRIED  HER HUSBAND MUST SUPPLY HER WITH MAINTENANCE AND THEY  ALLOW HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE. SHOULD THEY  DIE, THEIR OWN DAUGHTERS ARE TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THEIR FREE ASSETS ONLY  BUT SHE  MUST BE MAINTAINED EVEN OUT OF ASSIGNED PROPERTY, BECAUSE SHE  [HAS THE SAME LEGAL STATUS] AS A CREDITOR. PRUDENT MEN USED TO WRITE,  'ON CONDITION THAT I SHALL MAINTAIN YOUR DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS WHILE YOU [CONTINUE TO LIVE] WITH ME'. GEMARA. It was stated: A man who said to his fellow, 'I owe you a maneh'  is, R. Johanan ruled, liable; but Resh Lakish ruled: He is free. How is one to understand [this dispute]? If [it refers to a case] where the man said to them  'You are my witnesses', what [it might be objected] is the reason of Resh Lakish who holds him to be free?  If [it is a case] where he did not say to them,  'You are my witnesses, what [it might equally be objected] can be the reason of R. Johanan who holds him liable?  The fact is  that [the dispute relates to a case] where he did not tell them, 'You are my witnesses', but here we are  dealing [with the case of a person] who said to another, 'I owe you a maneh'  by [handing to him]  a note of indebtedness.  R. Johanan ruled: He is liable, because the contents  of a bond  has the same force as if the man [who delivered it] said, 'You are my witnesses'; but Resh Lakish ruled: He is free, because the contents  of a bond has no binding force. We learned: IF A MAN MARRIED A WIFE AND SHE MADE AN AGREEMENT WITH HIM THAT HE SHALL MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS, HE MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. Does not this refer to,  a case like this?