Ketubot

Raba in the name of R. Nahman replied: An agent [has the same status] as judges,  but R. Samuel b. Bisna replied in the name of R. Nahman: As a widow.  'Raba in the name of R. Nahman replied: An agent [has the same status] as judges', for as judges do not act in their [personal interests] so does an agent not act in his [personal interests], thus excluding a widow who acts in her [own personal interests]. 'R. Samuel b. Bisna replied in the name of R. Nahman: As a widow', for as the widow is a single individual so is an agent a single individual; thus excluding members of a court, who are many. — And the law is that an agent [has the same legal status] as a widow. But why [should this case be] different from that concerning which we learned: If a man tells his agent, 'Go and give terumah' the latter must give the terumah in accordance with the disposition of the owner, and if he does not know the owner's disposition, he should separate terumah in a moderate manner, viz. one fiftieth. If he reduced [the denominator by] ten or added ten to it his terumah is, nevertheless, valid?  — There  [the circumstances are different], for, since someone might give his terumah in a niggardly manner while some other might give it liberally, [the agent]  might tell the owner, 'I deemed  you to be of such [a disposition]';  but here, since it was clearly an error, [the owner] might well say, 'You should have made no error'. R. Huna b. Hanina stated in the name of R. Nahman: The halachah is in agreement with the ruling of the Sages.  [Can it be said,] however, that R. Nahman does not hold [that the act of a court is invariably valid since, otherwise,] of what advantage would the power of a court be,  when R. Nahman, in fact, ruled in the name of Samuel:  If orphans came to take their shares in their father's estate, the court must appoint for [each of] them a guardian and [these guardians] choose for [each of] them a proper share, and when [the orphans] grow up they may enter a protest [against the settlement]; but R. Nahman in his own name, laid down: Even when they grow up they may enter no protest since, otherwise, of what advantage would the power of a court be? — This is no difficulty, the former  [referring to a case] where the guardians made a mistake while the latter  [deals with one] where no error was made. If no error was made, on what grounds could [the orphans] enter their protest? — On that of the adjacent fields. When R. Dimi came  he stated: It once happened that Rabbi  acted in agreement with the ruling of the Sages  when Perata, the son of R. Eleazar b. Perata, grandson of R. Perata the Great, asked him, 'If so, of what advantage would the power of a court be?'  And [as a result] Rabbi reversed his decision. Thus it was taught by R. Dimi. R. Safra, however, taught as follows: It once happened that Rabbi  desired to act in agreement with the ruling of the Sages,  when Perata, the son of R. Eleazar b. Perata, grandson of R. Perata the Great, said to him, 'If so, of what advantage is the power of a court?' And  [as a result] Rabbi did not act as he intended.  Must it be assumed that they  differ on this principle: One master  holds the view that if [in giving a decision] a law cited in a Mishnah  has been overlooked the decision must be reversed, and the other Master  upholds the view  that it cannot be reversed?  — No; all  agree that if [in giving a decision] a law cited in a Mishnah has been overlooked the decision must be reversed, but one Master holds that the incident occurred in one way  while the other holds that it occurred in the other way. R. Joseph stated: If a widow sold [any of her deceased husband's estate]  the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans,  and if the court sold [any such property]  the responsibility for the indemnity again falls upon the orphans.  [Is not this ruling] obvious?  — It was not necessary [indeed in respect of] the widow,  but was required [in respect of] the court; for it might have been assumed