Keritot

GEMARA. It has been taught: The expression And if any one1 intimates that one is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubtful sacrilege; thus the view of R. Akiba. The Sages declare him exempt.2 May we assume that they differ in the following point: R. Akiba holds, we may derive the law above3 from the law below, while the [other] Rabbis hold, we may not derive the law above from the law below? — Said R. Papa: All agree that we may derive the law above from the law below, otherwise we should not find [a basis for the law] that a bullock has to be slaughtered on the north side of the altar;4 but the reason why the Rabbis here declare him exempt, lies in the textual analogy to a sin-offering based on the common term mitzwoth:5 as [that text] there6 speaks of an offence for which one is liable to kareth in the case of wilful transgression, to a sin-offering in the case of erroneous transgression, and to a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubt, so for all other offences, for which one is liable to kareth in the case of wilful transgression, and to a sin-offering in the case of erroneous transgression, one is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubt; this excludes sacrilege, since for the wilful transgression thereof one is not liable to kareth, as has been taught: If one committed sacrilege wilfully, Rabbi says, He is liable to the death penalty;7 the Sages say, [He has merely transgressed] a prohibition. And R. Akiba? — He maintains that the textual analogy regarding the sin-offering for heleb,8 based upon the common term mitzwoth, is to be applied only for the following purpose: as that text relates to a fixed sacrifice, so must all be fixed sacrifices, thus excluding sacrifices of higher or lesser value.9 And the Rabbis? — They hold, a gezerah shawah cannot be applied partially.10 Are we, then, to conclude that R. Akiba holds that one may apply a gezerah shawah partially?11 — Say, rather, all agree that a gezerah shawah cannot be applied partially; but this is the reason of R. Akiba. The text says, And if any one: ‘And’ implies an addition to the foregoing, so we therefore derive the law above from the law below.12 And the Rabbis? — They hold [that the inference is in the reverse direction], and we must derive the law below from the law above regarding silver shekels for guilt-offerings.13 And R. Akiba? — He holds, a hekkesh cannot be applied partially.14 Are we, then, to conclude that the Rabbis hold that a hekkesh can be applied partially? Is it not definitely established that a hekkesh cannot be applied partially? — All agree that a hekkesh cannot be applied partially, but here the Rabbis maintain that the textual analogy founded upon the common term ‘mitzwoth’ supersedes the hekkesh. And R. Akiba? — The law regarding silver shekels for guilt-offerings he derives from: This is the law of the guilt-offering:15 there is one law for all guilt-offerings, which includes the silver shekels. And the Rabbis?16 — Although it is written, ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’, there is still need for the phrase, ‘and if any one’, the ‘and’ implying an addition to the foregoing, and thereby deriving the law below from the law above. For as to [the passage], ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’, from which is derived that one law rules all guilt-offerings, it might be said to apply to unconditional guilt-offerings only [and not to suspensive guilt-offerings]; for since the suspensive guilt-offering is brought [e.g.] for [the eating of] doubtful heleb, I might have argued that doubtful transgression should not be more stringent than certain transgression; and as in the case of certain transgression a sin-offering of the value of a danka17 suffices, so also in the case of doubtful transgression a guilt-offering of the value of a danka should suffice. It is for this reason that the Divine Law wrote, ‘And if any one’, the ‘and’ implying an addition to the foregoing.18 The above [conclusion of R. Akiba] is valid according to him who holds19 that an inference may be made from [the text], ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’; but according to him who holds that one cannot make any inference from, ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’, what can be said? — The law20 will then be derived from that relating to the guilt-offering of sacrilege by a textual analogy based upon the common term be'erkeka;21 whilst regarding the guilt-offering of the designated bondmaid,22 in connection with which be'erkeka is not mentioned, the law will be derived by an analogy based upon the common term ayil.23 R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, ADMITS etc. What is the meaning of AND IF THE SACRILEGE WAS DOUBTFUL?24 — Said Raba: Read, ‘And if the doubt remains for ever, it shall be a suspensive guilt-offering, since that which is offered for a known [trespass] is of the same kind as that offered for a doubtful one’. But has he not, after all, to bring an unconditional guilt-offering when he becomes aware of the transgression?25 — Said Raba: From this ruling of both26 we learn that knowledge at the outset is not essential with regard to an unconditional guilt-offering. 27 MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN BROUGHT A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD BY REASON OF A DOUBT,28 AND PRIOR TO THE PINCHING OF ITS NECK SHE LEARNT THAT THE BIRTH WAS A CERTAINTY, SHE SHALL OFFER IT AS FOR A CERTAINTY,29 FOR THAT WHICH SHE OFFERS IN THE CASE OF CERTAINTY IS OF THE SAME KIND AS THAT WHICH SHE OFFERS IN THE CASE OF DOUBT.30 [IF THERE WAS] A PIECE OF UNCONSECRATED FOOD AND A PIECE OF CONSECRATED FOOD, AND A PERSON ATE ONE OF THEM AND DOES NOT KNOW WHICH OF THEM HE ATE, HE IS EXEMPT. R. AKIBA DECLARES HIM LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING.31 IF HE THEN ATE THE SECOND [PIECE], HE IS LIABLE TO AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILT-OFFERING.32 IF HE ATE THE ONE [PIECE] AND ANOTHER CAME AND ATE THE OTHER, EACH OF THEM IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; THIS IS THE VIEW OF R. AKIBA. R. SIMEON SAYS: THEY TOGETHER BRING ONE GUILT-OFFERING.33 SAID R. JOSE taken to indicate that also this transgression is to be included in the law relating to doubtful sins. that relating to small cattle (ibid. 10f) which explicitly mentions the north side as the place of slaughtering. the suspensive guilt-offering (ibid. V, 27). Such an analogy is known as a gezerah shawah. law relating to it (Lev. III, 27) immediately precedes the chapter containing the laws of the sin-offering. fact of the fixed sacrifice and disregards the fact of the penalty of kareth. gezerah shawah to the contrary. This analogy based on the inner or logical connection between laws is known as a hekkesh. just as the sacrifice of the preceding paragraph, where this is expressly indicated in Lev. V, 15. Rashi omits the following four passages and continues here: And whence does It. Akiba derive the law concerning silver shekels for guilt-offerings? — From ‘this is the law of the guilt-offering, etc.’. the hekkesh based upon ‘and if any one’ would be superfluous. be two sela's. same as in our text. afterwards becomes certain. when the sin becomes known. there is doubt whether a normal birth took place (cf. Nid. III) she offers the burnt-offering with the stipulation that it shall be a freewill-offering in case of her being exempt, and the sin-offering she offers out of doubt without any stipulation. For the sin-offering of a bird the form of slaughter is the pinching of its neck, cf. Lev. V, 8. Mishnah as to whether a suspensive guilt-offering is brought in case of doubtful sacrilege.