Keritot

Now [in the last instance] it does not continue, ‘And in case of doubt, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering’! Now whose view does this statement1 follow? Shall I say R. Akiba's? Then it should have stated in the latter clause, ‘And in case of doubt,he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering’; for we have learnt: ‘R. Akiba prescribes a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubtful sacrilege’.2 It must therefore follow R. Joshua's view, and yet we read, ‘If . . . in five different spells of unawareness, he is liable to five sin-offerings’.3 We thus learn that R. Joshua gave way to his [R. Akiba's] objection. But cannot the opposite also be proved from one of the latter clauses which reads, ‘If the portions were from five offerings,4 though consumed in one spell of unawareness, he is liable for each of them’; thus proving that he did not accept his objection? Hence you are compelled [to assume] that we have [here the views of two different] Tannaim:5 according to one Tanna, he [R. Joshua] gave way; according to another he did not give way [to R. Akiba's objection]; then you might also answer that R. Akiba's view is followed,6 but that the [anonymous] Tanna accepts his one opinion and rejects the other; thus, he agrees with him [R. Akiba] in the rules relating to unawareness of sin, but disagrees with regard to sacrilege. How is one guilty fivefold of the law of sacrilege?7 — Said Samuel: As we have learnt,8 ‘Five things in a burnt-offering can combine one with the other:9 the meat, the fat, the wine, the fine flour and the oil’.10 Hezekiah said, If he ate of five different limbs. Resh Lakish said, You may even say [that he ate] of one limb, yet [the fivefold sacrilege] can arise in the case of the fore-limb.11 R. Isaac the Smith said, If he ate it with five different dishes.12 R. Johanan said,If he ate it in five different preparations.13 MISHNAH. SAID R. AKIBA:I ASKED R. ELIEZER, IF ONE PERFORMED MANY ACTS OF WORK OF THE SAME CATEGORY14 ON DIFFERENT SABBATHS15 BUT IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, WHAT IS THE LAW? IS HE LIABLE TO ONE [OFFERING] ONLY FOR ALL OF THEM, OR TO A SEPARATE ONE FOR EACH OF THEM? HE REPLIED TO ME: HE IS LIABLE FOR EACH OF THEM; AND THIS CAN BE DERIVED BY AN A FORTIORI CONCLUSION: IF FOR INTERCOURSE WITH MENSTRUANT WOMEN,16 IN WHICH PROHIBITION THERE ARE NEITHER MANY CATEGORIES NOR MANY WAYS OF SINNING,17 ONE IS LIABLE FOR EACH ACT, HOW MUCH MORE MUST ONE BE LIABLE TO SEPARATE OFFERINGS IN THE CASE OF THE SABBATH, IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH THERE ARE MANY CATEGORIES [OF WORK] AND MANY WAYS OF SINNING!18 I RETORTED TO HIM: NO, YOU MAY HOLD THIS VIEW19 IN THE CASE OF THE MENSTRUANT WOMEN, SINCE THEREIN THERE IS A TWOFOLD PROHIBITION: THE MAN IS CAUTIONED AGAINST CONNECTION WITH A MENSTRUANT WOMAN, AND THE MENSTRUANT WOMAN IS CAUTIONED AGAINST CONNECTION WITH A MAN;20 BUT CAN YOU HOLD THE SAME IN THE CASE OF THE SABBATH WHERE THERE IS ONLY ONE PROHIBITION? HE SAID TO ME: LET THEN THE CASE OF INTERCOURSE WITH [MENSTRUANT] MINORS SERVE AS YOUR PREMISE, WHERE THERE IS BUT ONE PROHIBITION,21 AND YET ONE IS LIABLE FOR EACH ACT. I RETORTED TO HIM: YOU MAY HOLD THIS VIEW IN THE CASE OF MINORS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH NO PROHIBITION NOW APPLIES, IT WILL APPLY AFTER A TIME;22 BUT CAN YOU HOLD THE SAME OF THE SABBATH WHERE NEITHER NOW NOR AFTER A TIME [IS THE PROHIBITION WAIVED]? HE SAID TO ME: THEN LET THE LAW CONCERNING COPULATION WITH A BEAST SERVE AS YOUR PREMISE.23 I REPLIED TO HIM: THE LAW CONCERNING COPULATION WITH A BEAST IS INDEED COMPARABLE TO [THAT CONCERNING] SABBATH.24 GEMARA. What was his25 query? If his query was whether separate Sabbaths were comparable to separate objects,26 then he should have put the question thus: [What is the law] if one performed the same act of work on different Sabbaths?27 And if his query was whether secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work,28 then he should have put the question thus: [What is the law] if one performed on one Sabbath several [secondary] acts of the same [principal] class? — Replied Raba: In the school of Rab they explained that the two questions were put. He asked whether [different] Sabbaths were comparable to different objects, and he also asked whether secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work. Now as to the Sabbaths what was his query?29 [Are we to say that, where a man performed an act of work on several Sabbaths] in ignorance of the Sabbath, though knowing full well that that act was prohibited, [Rabbi Akiba] had no doubt at all that the intervening week-days effected a knowledge to separate [the occasions];30 and his question was only where [he performed the act] knowing full well [on each occasion] that it was Sabbath but not knowing that it was a prohibited act, [the query being] whether different Sabbaths were comparable to different objects or not?31 Or [rather that, where a man performed an act of work on several Sabbaths] with knowledge of the Sabbath [on each occasion] but in ignorance of its prohibition, [R. Akiba] had no doubt at all that the different Sabbaths were comparable to different objects; and his question was only where [he performed the act] in ignorance of the Sabbaths, though knowing full well that that act was prohibited, [his query being] whether the intervening week-days effected a knowledge to separate the occasions or not? — Said Rabbah: involves separate offerings. We thus learn that R. Joshua, whose view is represented and accepted in the Baraitha, agrees that the multiplicity of dishes does not involve separate sacrifices in the instance of nothar. maintains his view regarding nothar. conclusions have just been derived, follow different teachers. guilt-offerings for doubtful sins, which, ac cording to an utterance from R. Akiba elsewhere, should have been added. requisite value of a perutah in the case of sacrilege. sin-offering is brought always for the same act, viz., sexual intercourse. transgressor. fact that it was the cause of a man's downfall and would be pointed at by people. cf. Sanh. 54a. offerings, just as though he had committed different acts on the Sabbath or not? ‘MANY ACTS OF WORK’, involving principal and secondary acts is thus an unnecessary complication. category. whether separate Sabbaths render one liable to separate offerings may, as it were, be conceived in two ways: firstly with reference to the error that caused the transgression and secondly with regard to the forbidden act: i.e., the question may be whether the fact that the error was made on different Sabbaths causes us to regard it as if several errors were made, or whether the fact that the work was done on separate Sabbaths causes us to consider it as if different kinds of work were performed. In the first instance the error must necessarily lie in unawareness of the Sabbath, though the fact that the labours were forbidden was known to the transgressor; in the second instance the mistake lies in his ignorance that the works he did were forbidden on the Sabbath, but knowing that that day was Sabbath. repeated unawareness of the Sabbath is, therefore, to be regarded each time as a new error involving a separate offering. transgression in error and involve but one sacrifice; but in the case of Sabbath it may be said that each day is a separate entity, and therefore acts of work done on different Sabbaths are not regarded as one protracted transgression.