כריתות 16:2 — Soncino English Talmud

It is reasonable to assume that in the case of the act being performed in ignorance of the Sabbaths and with knowledge of its prohibition he had no doubt at all that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with the knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition, [the point in doubt being] whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not. His reply was that in the case of the act being done with knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition the different Sabbaths were like different objects. This reply, however, he [R. Akiba] did not accept. He then proved that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this too he rejected. Said Rabbah: Whence do I derive this? From that which we have learnt: ‘A great general rule has been laid down with regard to Sabbath: He who was altogether oblivious of the principle of Sabbath and performed many acts of work on many Sabbaths, is liable to one offering only. If he knew the principle of Sabbath and did many acts of work on many Sabbaths, he is liable for each Sabbath. If he knew each time that the day was Sabbath, and did many acts of work on many Sabbaths, he is liable for each principal act of work’. Now, it does not say, ‘he is liable for each principal act of work and for each Sabbath’. Whom does [the Mishnah] follow? Shall I say R. Eliezer? Read then the latter clause: ‘If he did many [secondary] acts of work of the same [principal] class, he is liable only to one offering’; but according to R. Eliezer he should be liable for each of the secondary acts of work as if they were principal acts of work! Hence it is clear [that this Mishnah, then, represents] R. Akiba's view, and it is hereby proved that he had no doubt at all that in the case of an act being done in ignorance of the Sabbath and with knowledge of its prohibition the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition, the point being whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not. The other's solution was that they were like different objects, and that secondary acts were on a par with principal acts of work; but both answers were rejected by him. Said Abaye to him: Indeed I maintain that R. Akiba had no doubt that different Sabbaths were not comparable to different objects in the case where an act was done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition; and his question was only in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition, [the query being] whether the intervening week-days effected separateness or not. The solution offered was that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and this was accepted by him; he also ruled that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this was rejected by him. Rab Hisda said: In the case of an act being done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R. Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects; but his query was whether the intervening week-days effected separateness in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition. The other's solution was that the intervening week-days effected separateness; and this was accepted by him. He also ruled that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this was rejected by him. Said Rab Hisda: Whence do I derive this? From that which has been taught: ‘If one wrote [on Sabbath] two letters in one spell of unawareness, he is liable [to an offering]; if in separate spells of unawareness, Rabban Gamaliel says: He is liable; and the Sages say: He is not. Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits that if he wrote one letter on one Sabbath and the other on another, he is exempt’. Whereas in another [Baraitha] it has been taught: ‘If one wrote two letters on two different Sabbaths, one on one Sabbath and the other on another, Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable, and the Sages declare him not liable’. On the assumption that Rabban Gamaliel followed R. Akiba's opinion, [Rab Hisda argued thus:] According to me, who hold that in the case of an act being performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R. Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects, there is no contradiction, for that which taught that he is exempt refers to a case where the letters were written with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of the prohibition, in which case the different Sabbaths are like different objects 21^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ

^ᵃnote:Viz., R. Eliezer's reply in the Mishnah.
^ᵇnote:Viz., that R. Akiba's query is to be understood in the first alternative as Rabbah suggested above.
^ᶜnote:Shab. 67b.
^ᵈnote:But was unconscious that that day was Sabbath.
^ᵉnote:But not that those works were forbidden.
^ᶠnote:Viz., in the third instance.
^ᵍnote:The fact that he is not declared liable in this instance for each Sabbath separately proves that this Mishnah, which, it is argued, follows R. Akiba's view, maintains either that work repeatedly performed on different Sabbaths in uninterrupted unawareness is not to be regarded as if several acts of work of different classes were performed, and therefore involving several offerings; or at least that there is doubt on this point. The second alternative is assumed by Rabbah to be the case; this being the very point of R. Akiba's query. The second clause of the quoted Mishnah, on the other hand, unmistakably states that if the error has been caused by the ignorance of the Sabbath, he is liable for each Sabbath, presumably because the intervening week-days effect a division. We thus see that Rabbah's interpretation of R. Akiba's query is borne out by that Mishnah.
^ʰnote:This is the very last clause of that Mishnah, not quoted above.
^ⁱnote:I.e., R. Eliezer's answer.
^ʲnote:I.e., to Rabbah.
^ᵏnote:As is indeed proved by the third clause of the Mishnah, where he is not liable for each Sabbath, which Abaye considers an absolute statement and not one about which there is doubt.
^ˡnote:The second clause of that Mishnah from Sabbath indicates the acceptance by R. Akiba of R. Eliezer's reply.
^ᵐnote:Rab Hisda differs from Abaye and Rabbah in that he maintains that in the end R. Akiba decided that different Sabbath days were comparable to different objects. The third clause of the quoted Mishnah, which seemingly contradicts him in that it does not state that the transgressor is also liable for each Sabbath, is indeed interpreted by him as implying that there is liability for each Sabbath.
^ⁿnote:This quotation is a combination from two Mishnahs, Shab 104b and 105a.
^ᵒnote:The writing of a word of two characters is one of the principal labours.
^ᵖnote:E.g., one character in the morning, the other in the afternoon of the same Sabbath day.
^ᵠnote:The latter sentence seems to be an inference rather than a quotation, for it is not found in connection with the quoted Mishnahs.
^ʳnote:There is thus a seeming contradiction in the two Baraithas with regard to R. Gamaliel's opinion.
^ˢnote:According to R. Gamaliel.
^ᵗnote:That writing is forbidden on the Sabbath.
^ᵘnote:I.e., the two letters can therefore not combine. It is as if one did on two different Sabbaths each time a portion of a different act.