Keritot

If one slaughtered an animal together with its young's calf, and then the young itself,1 he is liable to forty lashes. Symmachus said in the name of R. Meir: To eighty.2 Said Raba: There is, perhaps, no comparison. Maybe R. Johanan b. Nuri maintains his view only in the instance of our Mishnah, because the prohibitions are at least of different designations; for she may be described as his mother-in-law and also as the mother of his mother-in-law and the mother of his father-in-law. In the instance, however, concerning the killing of a mother-animal and its young, where there is only one designation, and all such cases are known by the one name, maybe his ruling will not hold good. R. Nahman b. Isaac raised his doubt [in the opposite direction]. Maybe Symmachus maintains his view only in the case of the law concerning the killing of mother and young, because the objects are different;3 in the instance of our Mishnah, however, where there is only one object,4 I might perhaps argue that he [Symmachus] held with the ruling of R. Abbahu delivered in the name of R. Johanan. For R. Abbahu said in the name of R. Johanan: In the expression, They are near kinswomen; it is wickedness,5 Scripture indicates that they are all one kind of wickedness. MISHNAH. SAID R. AKIBA: I ASKED RABBAN GAMALIEL AND R. JOSHUA AT THE MEAT-MARKET OF EMMAUS, WHITHER THEY WENT TO BUY A BEAST FOR THE WEDDING FEAST OF RABBAN GAMALIEL'S SON, WHAT [IS THE LAW] IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE [INADVERTENTLY] WITH HIS SISTER, HIS FATHER'S SISTER AND HIS MOTHER'S SISTER;6 IS HE LIABLE TO ONE OFFERING FOR ALL THE TRESPASSES, OR TO ONE [SEPARATE OFFERING] FOR EACH OF THEM? THEY REPLIED: WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING [ABOUT THIS], BUT WE HAVE HEARD THAT IF ONE HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HIS FIVE WIVES, WHILE THEY WERE MENSTRUANT, IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, HE IS LIABLE TO A SACRIFICE FOR EACH [ACT], AND IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE CASE [YOU STATE] MAY BE DERIVED THEREFROM BY AN A FORTIORI CONCLUSION.7 GEMARA. How is the query to be understood? If as is stated,8 what question is there, seeing that the prohibitions as well as the persons involved are distinct!9 — This is rather what it means to state: What [is the law] if one had intercourse with a sister who is at the same time his father's sister and his mother's sister; is he liable to one sacrifice for all the trespasses, or to one [separate] sacrifice for each of them? Do we argue that here are diverse prohibitions,10 or do we argue [from the fact] that the persons are not diverse?11 They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard that if one had intercourse together12 with his five wives, while they were menstruant, whereby only one prohibition has been transgressed, he is liable to a sacrifice for each act of transgressing the law concerning menstruant women; and it seems to us that the case [you state] may be derived therefrom by an a fortiori conclusion [thus]: If one is liable to separate offerings in the case of intercourse together with his five menstruant wives, whereby only one prohibition has been transgressed, how much more should one be liable to separate offerings in the case of the sister who is at the same time his father's sister and his mother's sister, whereby three different prohibitions have been transgressed! But [against this conclusion] one may object: the case of the five menstruant women [is rightly more stringent] because several persons [are involved]?[The ruling13 must] rather be derived from the Scriptural verse which says, He has uncovered the nakedness of his sister,14 indicating that one is liable [to separate offerings] in the case of a sister who is at the same time his father's sister and his mother's sister. Said R. Adda b. Ahaba: This15 can arise in the case of a wicked man the son of a wicked man;16 [viz.] if a man had connection with his mother who bore him two daughters, and then had connection with one of these [daughters] who bore him a son; this son17 then had connection with his mother's sister who is at the same time his sister and his father's sister. He is indeed a wicked man the son of a wicked man. Our Rabbis taught: If one had intercourse [inadvertently with one of the incestuous relations] and then again and then again,18 he is liable [to an offering] for each act. These are the words of R. Eliezer. But the Sages say, He is liable only once. The Sages, however, agree with R. Eliezer that if a man had intercourse at the same time19 with his five menstruant wives, that he is liable for each act, since he caused them liability to separate offerings.20 Raba said to R. Nahman: Do we say [as an argument] since he caused them [liability to separate offerings]; surely it has been taught: ‘If the man [committed several acts]21 in one spell of unawareness, and she in five separate spells of unawareness,22 he is liable to one offering only and she to one for each act’?23 — Say rather: Since the persons24 were different. The query was raised: If one cut plants25 [on the Sabbath] and then cut again, what would be the law according to R. Eliezer?26 Is R. Eliezer's reason in the previous case because two acts were committed, and that was why he ruled that he was liable for each act, so here also since he committed two acts [he is liable for each act]; or perhaps R. Eliezer's reason in the previous case is because the acts could not be united,27 and therefore R. Eliezer said that he was liable for each act; in the instance, however, of a man cutting a plant of the size of a dried fig28 and then cutting again a plant of the size of a dried fig, both in one spell of unawareness, since the two dried fig-sizes could have been united in one act of cutting, he should be liable to one sacrifice only? How is it? — Rabbah answered: R. Eliezer's reason is because two acts were performed, and here also two acts were performed. R. Joseph said: R. Eliezer's reason is because the acts could not be united, but whenever the acts could have been united one is liable to one offering only. Abaye raised an objection against Rabbah: [It has been taught:] R. Eliezer declares one culpable for derivatives29 even when performed together with their respective principal acts [of work]. [From this we infer that if,] however, the same principal act was performed twice in one spell of unawareness, he is exempt.30 Now, should you be right in saying that R. Eliezer's reason is because two acts were performed, why should he be exempt here! — Said Mar the son of Rabana: I and Rab Nihumi b. Zechariah have explained this: Here31 we deal with a branch of a vine which was overhanging a fig-tree, and he cut off both [branches] at one time.32 R. Eliezer therefore declares him culpable, since both the denominations33 and the objects34 were different. In what circumstances, then, would a man be exempt [according to R. Eliezer] when cutting a plant twice? — Only if he cut off two plants of a dried fig's size in one stroke. But if he cut off one plant of a dried fig's size and then another of a dried fig's size, he is indeed liable [to two offerings].35 MISHNAH. R. AKIBA FURTHER ASKED: IF A LIMB HANGS LOOSE FROM THE BODY OF A LIVING BEAST, WHAT IS THE LAW?36 THEY REPLIED: WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THIS, BUT WE HAVE HEARD ABOUT A LIMB HANGING LOOSE FROM THE BODY OF A MAN THAT IT IS CLEAN. AND THUS killing a beast after its mother as well as its own young had previously been slaughtered on the same day, an act not yet punishable, he committed a double sin, or rather he transgressed the prohibition twice in one act. Eighty lashes means twofold flagellation. she is still a kinswoman singly, and subject to one sacrifice only. women; v. Gemara. committed in one spell of unawareness. connections this woman as well as the man resulted. has thus been established between the acts. similarly liable. five separate offerings. the Sabbath; Shab. VII, 2. series of acts of work similar to it and derived from it — the derivatives. If a principal act has been performed together with some of its derivatives in one spell of unawareness, he is liable, according to R. Eliezer, for each act. From the fact that R. Eliezer did not go a step further in stating that even if the same principal act had been performed several times he is liable for each act, we derive that in the latter case he is only liable to one sacrifice. wanted for its fruit. The first act is a derivative, since it was not done for the sake of its fruit; the second is a principal act. R. Eliezer holds that he is liable to two offerings even though one action only was performed. The inference made above, that R. Eliezer would not declare him guilty twice if the same principal act of work was performed twice on separate occasions but under one spell of unawareness, is no longer logical, for in this instance two different actions were done. of nebelah (see Glos.) and is unclean. In our instance it was not wholly detached from the body, but its connections were mainly severed.