Gittin

entered in heathen courts, even if the signatures in them are those of heathens, are valid, except writs of divorce and of emancipation. According to R. Meir there are four points [the fourth being this]: If a man says, Give this Get to my wife and this writ of emancipation to my slave, he is at liberty, if he wishes, to retract from both. So says R. Meir'.  We can understand the Rabbis [specifying the number] three, [because they desired] to except the point stated by R. Meir. But what did R. Meir desire to except by specifying the number [four]? — [He desired] to except the following case which has been taught: If the witnesses are not able to sign their names, we make dents on the sheet and they fill them in with ink. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says: This applies only to writs of divorce. With writs of emancipation and all other documents, if the witnesses are able to read and to sign their names, they sign, and if not, they do not sign. How does 'reading' come in here? — There is something omitted, and the passage should run thus: 'If the witnesses cannot read, the document is read to them and they then sign, and if they are unable to sign, dents are made for them.' Are there no more points [of resemblance]? Is there not [for example this one]: 'If a man says, Give this Get to my wife and this writ of emancipation to my slave and he dies [before they were given], they should not be given after his death. If, however, he said, Give a maneh to So-and-so, it should be given after his death'?  — [The passage above was] dealing only with points which do not apply to documents in general,  not with such as apply to all documents. [And this is such a point;] for Rabin sent [the following message] in the name of R. Abbahu: 'Be it known to you that R. Eleazar sent to the Diaspora  in the name of Our Master  the following instruction: If a dying man said, Write down and give a maneh to So-and-so, and then died, his words are not committed to writing nor is the gift made, since perhaps he intended only to make the gift through the instrumentality of the document, and a document does not confer possession after the death [of the author].' But is there not the point of 'special intention' [in which writs of divorce and of emancipation are on a par]? For Rabbah, indeed, this raises no difficulty, since it is identical with the point of bringing to and from [Eretz Israel],  but for Raba it does raise a difficulty. And again, whether we accept Rabbah's view or Raba's, there is the law of mehubar?  — [The passage above] reckoned only the flaws laid down by the Rabbis  [on their own authority], not those deriving from the Torah. But [the fact of originating in] a Gentile court is a flaw [in the Get] according to the Torah, and yet this point is also reckoned above? — [We are dealing there with the case where there are] witnesses to the delivery [of the document], and the passage follows the opinion of R. Eleazar, who said that it is the witnesses to the delivery [of the Get] who really make it effective.  [Is that so?] It says later in the passage:  R. Simeon says that these also [writs of divorce signed by non-Jews] are valid; and [commenting on this] R. Zera said that R. Simeon was here following the view of R. Eleazar, who said that the witnesses to the delivery [of the Get] make it effective; from which we gather that the first Tanna  was not [of this opinion]?