Gittin

is practically the same as mixing terumah. What says the other [to this]? — [He says that the penalty for this is of the nature of] a fine,  and we do not base rules for imposing fines on mere inference.  But those who hold that the imposition of fines can be based on mere inference — why do they require all the items to be specified? They are all necessary. For if [the Mishnah] had mentioned only one who renders foodstuffs unclean, then, supposing the food was terumah, I would say that the reason [why compensation has to be made] is because he spoils it completely,  and if the food was non-sacred, because it is forbidden to cause uncleanness to non-sacred food in Eretz Israel,  but one who mixes ordinary food with terumah I should say need not make compensation. Again, if one who mixes ordinary food with terumah had been mentioned I should say the reason is because this is a common occurrence,  but in the case of one who renders foodstuffs unclean, which is not a common occurrence, I should say the rule does not apply. If again both one who renders unclean and one who mixes had been specified, I should say the reason with them [for requiring compensation] is that no heavier penalty is involved, but I should not apply this rule to one who makes a libation, where a heavier penalty is involved. Therefore we are told [that we apply here] the principle of R. Jeremiah. But if we accept [the teaching] learnt by the father of R. Abin, 'At first they said, The one who renders unclean and the one who makes a libation, but later they added also the one who mixes,' why do I require all the items?  — They are still necessary. For if only the one who renders unclean had been mentioned, I should have said that the reason is because no greater penalty is involved, but I should not have applied the rule to one who makes a libation, where a greater penalty is involved. If again the one who makes a libation had been mentioned, I should have said this was because the stuff is spoilt entirely, but I should not have applied the rule to one who renders unclean, where the stuff is not spoilt entirely. If again these two had been mentioned, I should say the reason is because the loss involved is considerable, but I should not apply the rule to one who mixes, where the loss involved is small.  Hence all were necessary. Hezekiah said: The rule of the Torah is that one who commits these offences whether inadvertently or deliberately is liable to pay compensation. The reason is that damage of which there is no visible sign  is legally accounted as damage.  Why then did the Rabbis lay down that [if one does these things] inadvertently he is not liable? So that they should tell [the victims].  If that is the reason, then one who does these things presumptuously should also be quit? — How can you think so? Seeing that he deliberately tries to injure him, will he not certainly tell him?  R. Johanan said that the rule of the Torah is that whether one commits these offences innocently or deliberately he is not liable, the reason being that damage of which there is no visible sign is not legally accounted damage. Why then did the Rabbis ordain that [one who does them] presumptuously is liable? So that it should not become a common thing for a man to go and render unclean the foodstuffs of his neighbour and say, I have no liability. We have learnt: 'If priests render the sacrifice piggul  in the Sanctuary, if they did so presumptuously they are liable [to make compensation];'  and in connection therewith it was taught: 'To prevent abuses.'  Now if you hold that damage which is not visible is legally accounted damage, then it should say, 'if they did so innocently they are not liable, to prevent abuses'?  — This in fact is what is meant: 'If they act presumptuously they are liable; from which we infer that if they acted innocently they are not liable, to prevent abuses.' R. Eleazar [raised the following as] an objection: 'If one does work with the waters of purification and with the heifer of purification,  he is exempt before the earthly court but liable before the heavenly court.'  Now if you maintain that damage which is invisible is legally accounted as damage, then he should be liable also before the earthly court? — He raised the objection and he himself answered it, thus: [The work referred to in the case of] the heifer [was] that he brought it into the stall with the intention of letting it suck and then threshing with it;  in the case of the water [the work referred to was] that he balanced weights against it.  But has not Raba said that water of purification