Gittin

If again you point [to the rule] that if a man prepares to do work during the half-festival  and then dies, his son is not penalised after him, the reason may be because he did not actually do anything forbidden. What do we say here?  Did the Rabbis penalise only the man but he no longer exists, or did they penalise his money and this does exist?  — He replied: [The answer is to be found in] what you have already learnt: 'If a field has been cleared of thorns in the seventh year it can be sown on the expiration of the seventh year. If it has been manured or if cattle have been turned out  there in the seventh year, it must not be sown at the expiration of the seventh year';  and [commenting on this] R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: We lay down that if he manured it and then died, his son may sow it. From this [we may infer] that the Rabbis penalised him but not his son. Abaye said: We have it on tradition that if a man renders unclean stuff belonging to another which he desired to keep ritually clean, and then dies, [the Rabbis] have not penalised his son after him. What is the reason? Damage which is not perceptible  is not legally counted as damage [according to the Torah], and the penalty for it is Rabbinical in origin, and the Rabbis penalised the man who does the damage, but they did not penalise his son. OR ABROAD. Our Rabbis taught: 'If a man sells his slave abroad, he becomes free but he requires a deed of emancipation from his second master. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says: Sometimes he becomes free and sometimes he does not become free. For instance, if the master says, I have sold my slave So-and-so to So-and-so an Antiochian, he does not become free.  If he says, To an Antiochian in Antioch, he does become free'. But has it not been taught: '[If a man says,] I have sold him to an Antiochian, he becomes free, but if he says, to an Antiochian living in Lydda,  he does not become free'? — There is no contradiction: in the one case we suppose he has a house in Eretz Israel, in the other that he has only a place of stay in Eretz Israel. R. Jeremiah put the question: If a Babylonian [Jew] marries a woman from Eretz Yisrael and she brings him in  male and female slaves and his intention is to return [to Babylon], what is the rule?  We have to ask this whether we accept the view that the husband has the right, or whether we accept the view that the wife has the right.  We have to ask it on the view that the wife has the right. Shall we say that since she has the right they are regarded as hers,  or perhaps since they are made over to him as far as the increment  is concerned they are regarded as his?  The question has equally to be asked on the view that the husband has the right. Seeing that he has the right, are they to be regarded as his, or since he does not acquire the body  are they still regarded as hers? — This must stand over. R. Abbahu said: R. Johanan taught me, If a servant accompanies  his master to Syria  and his master sells him there, he becomes free. But R. Hiyya teaches that he loses his right?  There is no contradiction: in the one case we presume that his master intended to return,  in the other that he did not intend to return, as it has been taught: 'A slave must leave Eretz Israel with his master for Syria … Must leave, you say? Assuredly he need not leave, seeing that we have learnt, 'Not all may take out.'  What [you mean is]: 'if a slave accompanies his master  from Eretz Israel to Syria and his master sells him there, if it was his master's intention to return he is compelled to emancipate him,  but if it was not his intention to return, he is not compelled.' R. 'Anan said: I was told by Mar Samuel two things, one in relation to this point,  and one in relation to the statement, If a man sells his field in the Jubilee year, Rab says that it is sold but must be immediately returned,  whereas Samuel says that it is not sold in the first instance. In one case [he said] the purchase money is returned and in the other case it is not returned,  and I do not know which is which. Said R. Joseph: Let us see.  Since it is stated in the Baraitha that if a man sells his slave abroad he becomes free and requires a deed of emancipation from his second master, we infer that the second master became his legal owner and that the purchase money is not to be returned,  and therefore that when Samuel said in the other case [of the field] that the field is not sold in the first instance, the money is returned.