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עירובין 71

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1 even though another Israelite had taken possession of his estate, [the latter] imposes restrictions; [but if he died] after dusk no restrictions are imposed even though no other Israelite took Possession of his estate. Now is not this statement self-contradictory? You first stated: ‘While it was yet day, even though another Israelite had taken possession [the latter] imposes restrictions’ and, much more so if one did not take possession of it; [but is not the law just] the reverse, viz., that where no one took possession no restrictions are imposed? _ R. Papa replied. Read: ‘Although he had not taken possession’. But was it not stated: ‘Though he had taken possession’? — It is this that was meant: Though he did not take possession while it was yet day and did so only after dusk he imposes restrictions, since he could have taken possession while it was yet day. ‘After dusk, no restrictions are imposed even though no other Israelite took possession of his estate’. You Say, ‘Even though no other Israelite took possession of his estate’ and much less so if one did take possession; but is not the law just the reverse, viz., that where one did take possession restrictions are imposed? — R. Papa replied: Read: ‘Though he did take possession’. but was it not stated: ‘Even, though he did not take possession’? — It is this that was meant: Though he took possession after dusk he imposes no restrictions, since he could not take possession while it was yet day. At all events it was stated in the first clause that ‘restrictions are imposed’. But why should restrictions be imposed? Let him renounce his share? — The ruling that he imposes restrictions applies only so long as he does not make his renunciation. R. Johanan replied: The Baraithas represent the view of Beth Shammai who ruled that no renunciation is allowed on the Sabbath. For we learned: WHEN MUST ONE'S SHARE BE PRESENTED? BETH SHAMMAI RULED: WHILE IT IS YET DAY AND BETH HILLEL RULED: AFTER DUSK. Said Ulla: What is Beth Hillel's reason? The case of renunciation is on a par with that of saying, ‘You should have gone to the better kind’. What, objected Abaye, is the comparison with the case of saying. ‘You should have gone to the better kind’, where the gentile died on the Sabbath?’ Rather it is this principle on which they are here at variance: Beth Shammai are of the opinion that the renunciation of a domain is like conferring acquisition of a domain [to another], but conferring acquisition of a domain on the Sabbath is forbidden; while Beth Hillel are of the opinion that renunciation is merely the giving up of one's domain, and the giving up of a domain on the Sabbath is perfectly permissible. MISHNAH. IF A HOUSEHOLDER WAS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH HIS NEIGHBOURS, WITH THE ONE IN WINE AND WITH THE OTHER IN WINE, THEY NEED NOT PREPARE AN ERUB; BUT IF HIS PARTNERSHIP WAS WITH THE ONE IN WINE AND WITH THE OTHER IN OIL, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB. R. SIMEON RULED: NEITHER IN THE ONE CASE NOR IN THE OTHER NEED THEY JOIN IN AN ERUB. GEMARA. Rab explained: Only [if the wine was kept] in one container. Said Raba: A deduction also supports this view. For it was stated: WITH THE ONE IN WINE AND WITH THE OTHER IN OIL, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB; now if you grant that the first clause deals with one container and the final clause with two containers both rulings are quite correct, but if you contend that the first clause deals with two containers and the final clause deals with two containers, why. [it might be objected,] should a difference be made between wine and wine and between wine and oil? — Wine and wine, Abaye retorted, can properly be mixed, but wine and oil cannot properly be mixed. R. SIMEON RULED: NEITHER IN THE ONE CASE NOR IN THE OTHER NEED THEY JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB. Even if the partnership was with the one in wine and with the other in oil? — Rabbah replied: Here we are dealing with a courtyard that was situated between two alleys, R. Simeon following his own View. For we learned: R. Simeon remarked: To what may this case be compared? To three courtyards that open one into the other and also into a public domain, where, if the two outer ones made an ‘erub with the middle one, it is permitted to have access to them and they are permitted access to it, but the two other ones are forbidden access to one another. Said Abaye to him: Are the two cases at all alike, seeing that there it was stated: ‘The two outer ones are forbidden,’ while here It was stated that THEY NEED NOT JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB at all? — The ruling that THEY NEED NOT JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB applies only to one between the neighbours and the householder, but the neighbours among themselves must certainly join in an ‘erub.ʰʲˡʳˢʷˣʸᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛ

2 R. Joseph. however, replied: R. Simeon and the Rabbis differ on the same principle as that on which R. Johanan b. Nuri and the Rabbis differ. For we learned: If some oil floated on wine and a tebul yom touched the oil, he causes the oil only to be unfit; but R. Johanan b. Nuri ruled: They both form a connection with each other. The Rabbis may hold the same view as the Rabbis while R. Simeon may hold the same view as R. Johanan b. Nuri. It was taught: R. Eleazar b. Taddai ruled: In either case it is necessary for them to join in an erub. Even if the partnership was with the one In wine and with the other also in wine? Rabbah explained: Where this [householder] comes with his lagin [of wine] and pours [it into the common cask] and the other comes with his lagin and pours it in, no one disputes the ruling that this alone is a valid ‘erub. They only differ where the householders bought a cask of wine in partnership. R. Eleazar b. Taddai is of the opinion that there is no such rule as bererah while the Rabbis maintain that the rule of bererah holds good. R. Joseph explained: R. Eleazar b. Taddai and the Rabbis differ on the question whether it is permissible to rely upon shittuf where an ‘erub is required. the one Master holding that It is not permissible to rely on it while the Masters maintain that it is permissible to rely on it. Said R. Joseph: Whence do I derive this? [From the following:] Since Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab, ‘The halachah is in agreement with R. Meir’ and R. Berona stated in the name of Rab, ‘The halachah is in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Taddai’. Now what is the reason? Obviously because both rulings are based on the same principle. Said Abaye to him: If the principle is the same what need was there to lay down the halachah, twice? — It is of this that we are informed: That in matters of ‘erub we [sometimes] adopt two restrictive rulings. What is the ruling of R. Meir and what is that of the Rabbis? [Those about which] it was taught: An ‘erub of courtyards must be prepared with bread; but wine, even if preferred. may not be Used for ‘erub, Shittuf of an alley may be done even with wine; but bread, if preferred. may [obviously] be used for the shittuf. An ‘erub must be prepared for courtyards even where shittuf is arranged for the alleys in order that the law of ‘erub may not be forgotten by the children who might believe that their fathers had been preparing no ‘erub; so R. Meir. The Sages, however, ruled: Either ‘erub or shittuf [is enough]. R. Nehumi and Rabbah differ on the interpretation of this statement. One maintains that in the case of bread no one disputes the ruling that one is enough and that they only differ in the case of wine,ᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻᶜᵃᶜᵇᶜᶜᶜᵈᶜᵉᶜᶠᶜᵍᶜʰᶜⁱᶜʲᶜᵏᶜˡᶜᵐᶜⁿᶜᵒᶜᵖᶜᵠᶜʳ