Soncino English Talmud
Eruvin
Daf 69b
unless he is a mumar in respect of idolatry?1 — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: Only in respect of presenting or renouncing his right to his share,2 this being in agreement with what was taught: An Israelite mumar who observes the Sabbath in public3 may renounce his share, but one who does not observe the Sabbath in public may not renounce his share, because the Rabbis have laid down: An Israelite may renounce or present his share, whereas with a gentile transfer is possible only through the letting of his share. How is this4 done? He5 says to him,6 ‘My share is acquired by you’ or ‘my share is renounced in your favour’, [and the latter thereby] acquires possession and there is no need for him to perform a formal act of acquisition.7 R. Ashi replied:8 To this Tanna9 the desecration of the Sabbath is an offence as grave as idol worship;10 as it was taught: Of you11 implies:12 But not all of you, thus excluding a mumar;13 ‘of you’14 only among you did I make distinctions15 but not among the other nations;16 ‘of the cattle’17 includes men who resemble cattle.18 From here it has been inferred that sacrifices may be accepted from transgressors in Israel,19 in order that they might return in repentance, all except from a mumar, from one who offers libations of wine to idols and from one who publicly desecrates the Sabbath.20 Now is not this statement self contradictory: First you said: ‘Of you implies: But not all of you, thus excluding a mumar’, and then you state, ‘Sacrifices may be accepted from transgressors in Israel’?21 This, however, is no contradiction since the first clause might deal with a person who is a mumar in respect of all the Torah, while the intervening clause might refer to one who is a mumar in respect of one precept only. But [then] read the final clause: ‘Except from a mumar and from one who offers libations of wine to idols’. What, pray, is one to understand by this type of mumar? If he is a mumar in respect of all the Torah he is obviously identical with the one in the first clause;22 and if he is a mumar in respect of one precept only, does not a contradiction arise from the middle clause?23 Must it not consequently be conceded that it is this that was meant:24 Except from one who is a mumar in respect of offering libations of wine to idols or the desecration of the Sabbath in public?25 It is thus evident that idolatry and the desecration of the Sabbath are offences of equal gravity.26 This is conclusive. MISHNAH. IF ONE OF THE TENANTS OF A COURTYARD FORGOT TO JOIN IN THE ‘ERUB,27 HIS HOUSE IS FORBIDDEN BOTH TO HIM AND TO THEM FOR THE TAKING IN OR FOR THE TAKING OUT OF ANY OBJECT.28 BUT THEIR HOUSES ARE PERMITTED BOTH TO HIM AND TO THEM.29 IF THEY PRESENTED THEIR SHARES30 TO HIM, HE IS PERMITTED THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE COURTYARD BUT THEY ARE FORBIDDEN.31 IF THERE WERE TWO [WHO FORGOT TO JOIN IN THE ‘ERUB], THEY32 IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON ONE ANOTHER, BECAUSE ONE TENANT MAY PRESENT HIS SHARE33 AND ALSO ACQUIRE THE SHARES OF OTHERS34 WHILE TWO TENANTS MAY PRESENT THEIR SHARES BUT MAY NOT ACQUIRE ANY.35 WHEN MUST ONE'S SHARE BE PRESENTED?36 BETH SHAMMAI RULED: WHILE IT IS YET DAY,37 AND BETH HILLEL RULED: AFTER DUSK. IF A TENANT PRESENTED HIS SHARE33 AND THEN CARRIED OUT ANY OBJECT, WHETHER UNWITTINGly OR INTENTIONAlly, LIE IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS;38 SO R. MEIR. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE ACTED WITH INTENTION HE IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS, BUT IF UNWITTINGLY HE IMPOSES NO RESTRICTIONS. GEMARA. Apparently it is only HIS HOUSE that IS FORBIDDEN but his share in the courtyard39 is permitted;40 but how is one to understand the circumstances? If he has renounced his rights,41 why should his house42 be forbidden? And if he has not renounced his rights why should his courtyard be permitted? Here we are dealing with the case of a tenant who renounced his right to his courtyard but not his right to his house, the Rabbis43 being of the opinion that a tenant who renounces his right to his courtyard does not ipso facto renounce his right to his house, since a person might well live in a house that has no courtyard. BUT THEIR HOUSES ARE PERMITTED BOTH TO HIM AND TO THEM. What is the reason? — Because he44 is regarded as their guest. IF THEY PRESENTED THEIR SHARES TO HIM, HE IS PERMITTED THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE COURTYARD BUT THEY ARE FORBIDDEN. Why should not they be regarded as his guests? — One man may be regarded as the guest of five45 men; five men cannot be regarded as the guests of one. Does this46 then imply that renunciation47 may be followed by renunciation?48 — No; it is this that was meant: IF THEY originally49 PRESENTED THEIR SHARES TO HIM, HE IS PERMITTED THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE COURTYARD BUT THEY ARE FORBIDDEN. IF THERE WERE TWO WHO FORGOT TO JOIN IN THE ‘ERUB THEY IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON ONE ANOTHER. Is not this obvious?50 — This ruling was necessary only in a case where one of them has subsequently51 renounced his share52 in favour of the other. As it might have been assumed that the latter should be permitted [the full use of the courtyard].53 hence we were informed that [this is not so], because the former, at the time he renounced his share, was not himself permitted the unrestricted use of that courtyard.54 BECAUSE ONE TENANT MAY PRESENT HIS SHARE. What need again was there for this ruling? If that he MAY PRESENT, did we not learn this before?55 If that he MAY ACQUIRE, did we not already learn this also?56 — It was necessary on account of the final clause: TWO TENANTS MAY PRESENT THEIR SHARES. Is not this also obvious?57 — It might have been presumed desecration of the Sabbath. according to which a man who publicly desecrates the Sabbath is regarded as a mumar only in respect of his disability to present and renounce his share in connection with the laws of ‘erub. Such a man, as has originally been assumed, is in fact regarded as a mumar in all respects. since both their houses and courtyard have been converted into one common domain. to carry objects from a private house into a courtyard which belongs to another tenant as well as to its owner. previously presented to them. into their houses. renunciation of his share in a courtyard implies ipso facto his renunciation of his right to his house. in connection with the other tenants’ houses only. ‘renounced his right’ in their favour in consequence of which (as was explained supra) it was laid down in the first clause that ‘THEIR HOUSES ARE PERMITTED’. independent of the first one. of the other tenants’ shares was useless and, therefore, invalid. As he could not acquire their shares he could not obviously renounce them in favour of anyone else. right’ in their favour. may present their shares to one of their number.
Sefaria