Eruvin

But should it not then1 be forbidden all the more2 because it was produced on the festival?3 — The fact, however, is that the water in the clouds is in constant motion.4 Now you have arrived at this explanation5 you can raise no difficulty about the ocean either,6 since the water in the ocean is also in constant motion, and it was taught: Running rivers and gushing springs7 are8 on a par with the feet of all men.9 R. Jacob b. Idi stated in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: The halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri. Said R. Zera to R. Jacob b. Idi: ‘Did you hear it explicitly10 or did you understand it by implication?’11 — ‘I’, the other replied: ‘have heard it explicitly’ — What was that general statement?12 — [The one in] which R. Joshua b. Levi has laid down: The halachah is in agreement with the authority that maintains the less restrictive ruling in respect of the laws of ‘erub.13 What need then was there for the two statements?14 — R. Zera replied: Both were required. For if we had been informed only that ‘the halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri’, it might have been assumed [that this applies in all cases] whether the halachah leads to a relaxation15 or to a restriction;16 hence we were informed that ‘the halachah is in agreement with the authority that maintains the less restrictive ruling in respect of the laws of ‘erub.’17 Then let him state, ‘The halachah is in agreement with the authority that maintains the less restrictive ruling in respect of ‘erub’; for what purpose was it necessary to state also that ‘the halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri’? — It was required because18 it might have been presumed that the statement19 applied only to an individual authority who differs from another20 individual authority or to several authorities who differ from several other authorities, but not to an individual authority21 who differed from several authorities.22 Said Raba to Abaye: Consider! The laws of ‘erub are Rabbinical, [of course]. Why then should it matter whether an individual differs from another individual or whether an individual authority differs from several other authorities? — Said R. Papa to Raba: Is there no difference in the case of a Rabbinical law between a dispute of two individuals and one between an individual authority and several other authorities? Have we not in fact learnt: R. Eliezer23 ruled: For any woman who had passed24 three menstrual periods25 [without observing any discharge of blood] it is sufficient [to regard herself as menstrually unclean from] the time when she [observed a re-appearance of such a discharge].26 And it was taught: It once happened that Rabbi gave a practical decision in agreement with the ruling of R. Eliezer,27 and after he had recollected28 he remarked: R. Eliezer23 deserves to be relied upon in a time of need.29 Now what is meant by the expression ‘after he recollected’? If it be suggested: After he recollected that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eliezer but with the Rabbis [the difficulty would arise:] How could he act in agreement with his view30 even in a time of need? It must consequently be conceded that the law was laid down neither in agreement with R. Eliezer nor in agreement with the Rabbis, and that it was after he had recollected that not one individual but several authorities differed from him that he remarked: ‘R. Eliezer deserves to be relied upon in a time of need’.31 Said R. Mesharsheya to Raba (or, as others say. R. Nahman b. Isaac said to Raba): Is there no difference in the case of a Rabbinical law between a dispute of two individuals and one between an individual authority and several authorities? Was it not in fact taught: [On receiving] an early32 report [of the death of a near relative both] the seven and the thirty days of mourning must be observed33 [but on receiving] a belated34 one only one day of mourning is to be observed. And what is meant by ‘early’ and ‘belated’? [A report received] within thirty [days of the death is said to be] ‘early’ [and one received] after thirty [days from the death is said to be] ‘belated’; so R. Akiba. The Sages, however, ruled: Whether a report is early or belated both the seven and the thirty days of mourning must be observed.35 And in connection with this Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Johanan: Wherever you come across a law which an individual authority relaxes and several authorities restrict, the halachah is in agreement with the majority who restrict it, except in this case where the halachah is in agreement with R. Akiba,36 though he relaxes the law and the Sages restrict it. In this respect he is of the same opinion as Samuel who laid down: The halachah is in agreement with the authority that relaxes the law in the case of a mourner.37 Thus38 it follows that it is only in the case of mourning that the Rabbis39 have relaxed the law but that elsewhere,40 even in respect of a Rabbinical law41 a difference is to be made between a dispute of two individuals and a dispute of an individual authority against a number of authorities! to move. Nuri the man is enabled to move not only within his four cubits but also to a distance of two thousand cubits in all directions. is restricted to a radius of two thousand cubits from their place so that the man who found them is unable to carry them to the end of his own limit. ownerless objects. been menstrually unclean twenty-four hours retrospectively whenever a discharge reappears (cf. Nid. 3a). menstrual periods reduces the period of uncleanness only in the case of a woman approaching old age but not in that of a young woman. the laws of levitical uncleanness would have entailed severe hardship (v. Rash Cf. however, Tosaf. s.v. lunxk a.l.). Rabbinical law as is that of the twenty-four hours retrospective uncleanness in the case under discussion. clothes, for instance, which are forbidden during the seven, are permitted during the thirty days. as the laws of mourning spoken of here) the opinion of a majority is of no consequence.