Eruvin

while R. Nehemiah ruled: If they are in their original place1 they may be eaten but if they are not in their original place2 they may not be eaten. Now what [are the circumstances under which they came to be] in their original place?3 If it be suggested that they were in their original place through some intentional act, surely [it could be retorted] was it not specifically taught: ‘R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, [the fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’,4 from which it follows, does it not, that only if they are returned] unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally?5 Must we not then admit that they [came to be] in their original place through some unintentional act, and that some words are missing, the correct reading being as follows: Fruits that were carried outside the Sabbath limit unwittingly may be eaten, but if they were carried wittingly they may not be eaten. This applies only where they are not in their original place but if they were in their original place they may be eaten even if they were carried intentionally. And in connection with this R. Nehemiah came to lay down that even when they are in their original place the law applies only where they were carried unwittingly but not when it was done wittingly?6 — No; if they are in their original place through an intentional act no one7 disputes the ruling that they are forbidden, but the difference of opinion here8 is [one regarding fruits] that are not in their original place through an unintentional act. The first Tanna is of the opinion that if they are not in their original place through an unintentional act they are permitted while R. Nehemiah maintains that even [if they were carried] unintentionally they are permitted only9 in their original place but not where they are not in their original place.10 Since, however, it was stated in the final clause, ‘R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, [The fruits] are always11 forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’ [from which it follows that only if they’ are returned [unintentionally is this law applicable12 but not [if they are returned] intentionally, it may be concluded that the first Tanna is of the opinion that [the fruits] are permitted even [if they are returned] intentionally.13 This is conclusive. R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: If a man was walking and did not know where the Sabbath limit ended he may walk a distance of two thousand moderate paces;14 and this constitutes for him the Sabbath limit. R. Nahman further stated in the name of Samuel: If a man took up his Sabbath abode in a valley15 around which gentiles put up a fence16 on the Sabbath, he may only walk a two thousand cubits distance in all directions17 but may move objects throughout all the valley18 by throwing them,19 but R. Huna ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits but may move objects within four cubits only.20 But why21 should he not22 be allowed to move objects throughout all its area by throwing them? — He23 might be drawn after his object.24 Then why should he not be allowed to move25 objects in the usual way within the two thousand cubits?26 Because the [area in which he is permitted to walk]27 is like a partition along the full width of which a breach was made towards a place28 into which it is forbidden29 to carry anything from it.30 Hiyya b. Rab ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits and may also move objects31 within these two thousand cubits.32 In agreement with whose view?33 Is it neither in agreement with that of Rab nor with that of R. Huna?34 — Read: He may move objects within four cubits. If so, is not his ruling identical with that of R. Huna?35 — Read: And so ruled Hiyya b. Rab. Said R. Nahman to R. Huna: Do not dispute the view of Samuel36 since in a Baraitha it was taught in agreement with his view. For it was taught: that the latter who ruled that ‘if they were in their original place they may be eaten even if they were carried intentionally’ upholds the same view as R. Papa. traced to any Tanna differ from the rulings of both the Tannas mentioned? where they are thereby returned to their original place, and had he differed from him and R. Eliezer b. Jacob on one point only (that of unintentional carriage where the fruits are not in their original place), there would have been no point in the expression of ‘always’ in the latter's statement of disagreement. Hence the conclusion that the first Tanna differed from the others on two points, (a) on unintentional carriage even when the fruits are not in their original place and (b) intentional carriage where they are in their original place, his view being that the fruits are permitted even where there is only one point in favour of their permissibility, viz., either (a) unintentional carriage or (b) return to their original place. R. Nehemiah and his colleague who maintain that permissibility is invariably dependent on both (a) and (b) were, therefore, justified, when expressing their disagreement, in emphasizing that the fruits are forbidden always sc. in the absence of either (a) or (b). The objection against R. Papa whose view it has now been shown coincides with that of the first Tanna, is consequently removed. Sabbath had set in. cubits. An enclosure is regarded as an area of four cubits (throughout which one may move freely) only (a) where the man was within it at the time the Sabbath began or (b) where he was forcibly put into it at any time, but not where a fence was put up during the Sabbath after he had willingly taken up his Sabbath abode in the place. way since the fence is valid irrespective of the time during which it was put up (cf. supra 20a). throwing and carrying applies only when one is permitted to carry but not to walk. As the carrying is permitted and the walking is forbidden, throwing was allowed. When, however, carrying is forbidden throwing also is equally forbidden. partition whatsoever. that breach, the movement of objects would have been permitted. objects on the ground that ‘he might be drawn after his object’, he should also follow R. Huna's reasoning in forbidding the movement of objects within two thousand cubits because they open out to a forbidden place; and if, like R. Nahman, he does not provide against the possibility that ‘he might be drawn after his object’, throwing beyond the two thousand cubits also should be permitted. name by R. Nahman.