1 while R. Nehemiah ruled: If they are in their original place they may be eaten but if they are not in their original place they may not be eaten. Now what [are the circumstances under which they came to be] in their original place? If it be suggested that they were in their original place through some intentional act, surely [it could be retorted] was it not specifically taught: ‘R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, [the fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’, from which it follows, does it not, that only if they are returned] unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally? Must we not then admit that they [came to be] in their original place through some unintentional act, and that some words are missing, the correct reading being as follows: Fruits that were carried outside the Sabbath limit unwittingly may be eaten, but if they were carried wittingly they may not be eaten. This applies only where they are not in their original place but if they were in their original place they may be eaten even if they were carried intentionally. And in connection with this R. Nehemiah came to lay down that even when they are in their original place the law applies only where they were carried unwittingly but not when it was done wittingly? — No; if they are in their original place through an intentional act no one disputes the ruling that they are forbidden, but the difference of opinion here is [one regarding fruits] that are not in their original place through an unintentional act. The first Tanna is of the opinion that if they are not in their original place through an unintentional act they are permitted while R. Nehemiah maintains that even [if they were carried] unintentionally they are permitted only in their original place but not where they are not in their original place. Since, however, it was stated in the final clause, ‘R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, [The fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’ [from which it follows that only if they’ are returned [unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally, it may be concluded that the first Tanna is of the opinion that [the fruits] are permitted even [if they are returned] intentionally. This is conclusive. R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: If a man was walking and did not know where the Sabbath limit ended he may walk a distance of two thousand moderate paces; and this constitutes for him the Sabbath limit. R. Nahman further stated in the name of Samuel: If a man took up his Sabbath abode in a valley around which gentiles put up a fence on the Sabbath, he may only walk a two thousand cubits distance in all directions but may move objects throughout all the valley by throwing them, but R. Huna ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits but may move objects within four cubits only. But why should he not be allowed to move objects throughout all its area by throwing them? — He might be drawn after his object. Then why should he not be allowed to move objects in the usual way within the two thousand cubits? Because the [area in which he is permitted to walk] is like a partition along the full width of which a breach was made towards a place into which it is forbidden to carry anything from it. Hiyya b. Rab ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits and may also move objects within these two thousand cubits. In agreement with whose view? Is it neither in agreement with that of Rab nor with that of R. Huna? — Read: He may move objects within four cubits. If so, is not his ruling identical with that of R. Huna? — Read: And so ruled Hiyya b. Rab. Said R. Nahman to R. Huna: Do not dispute the view of Samuel since in a Baraitha it was taught in agreement with his view. For it was taught:ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲ
2 If a man was measuring [the distance from his ‘erub] and advancing [towards another town], and his measuring [of the permitted two thousand cubits] terminated in the middle of the town, he is allowed to move objects throughout the town provided only that he does not pass his Sabbath limit. Now, in what manner could he move the objects? Obviously by throwing. And R. Huna? — He can answer you: No; by pulling. R. Huna ruled: If a man was measuring [the distance from his ‘erub] and his measuring [of the permitted two thousand cubits] terminated in the middle of a courtyard he has only a half of the courtyard [in which to move]. Is not this obvious? — Read: He has a half of the courtyard [in which to move]. Is not this also obvious? — It might have been presumed that there was cause to fear that one might carry objects about all the courtyard, hence we were informed [that no such possibility need be considered]. R. Nahman stated: Huna agrees with me that if a man was measuring [the distance from his ‘erub] and was thus advancing [towards another town], and his measurement [of the two thousand cubits] terminated at [a line corresponding to] the edge of a roof he is allowed to move objects in any part of the house. What is the reason? Because [the projection of] the roof of the house would strike him. R. Huna son of R. Nathan said: [The divergence of opinion here is] like that between the following Tannas: IF HE WAS TAKEN TO ANOTHER TOWN, OR IF HE WAS PUT IN A CATTLEPEN OR IN A CATTLE-FOLD, HE MAY, RULED R. GAMALIEL AND R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH, MOVE THROUGH THE WHOLE OF ITS AREA; BUT R. JOSHUA AND R. AKIBA RULED: HE HAS ONLY FOUR CUBITS. Now did not R. Gamaliel and R. Eleazar b. Azariah rule that the man may MOVE THROUGH THE WHOLE OF ITS AREA, because they do not forbid walking in a cattle-pen Or in a cattle-fold as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking in a valley, and since evidently they have not forbidden walking [in the former] as a preventive measure against walking [in the latter] they, likewise, did not forbid the moving of objects [by throwing them beyond the Sabbath limit] as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking [beyond that limit]; while R. Joshua and R. Akiba ruled: HE HAS ONLY FOUR CUBITS because they forbid walking in a cattle-pen or in a cattle-fold as a preventive measure against walking in a valley; and since evidently they have forbidden walking [in the former] as a preventive measure against walking [in the latter] they also forbid the moving of objects [by throwing them beyond the Sabbath limit] as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking [beyond that limit]? — Whence [could this be proved]? It is in fact possible that R. Gamaliel and R. Eleazar b. Azariah did not forbid walking in a cattle-pen or in a cattle-fold as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking in a valley for the sole reason that two different places are there involved, but [as regards forbidding the] movement of objects [as a preventive measure] against the possibility of walking which involves one and the same place they may well have enacted a prohibition as a preventive measure against the possibility of being drawn after one's object. As to R. Joshua and R. Akiba also, whence [could it be proved that they restricted the walking to four cubits] because they have enacted a preventive measure? — It is in fact possible that [the reason for their restriction is] that they hold the view that all the house is regarded as four cubits only while a man occupied a place within its walls while it was yet day but not where he did not occupy the place while it was yet day. Rab laid down: The law is in agreement with R. Gamaliel in respect of a cattle-pen, a cattle-fold and a ship; and Samuel laid down: The law is in agreement with R. Gamaliel in respect of a ship but not in respect of a cattle-pen or a cattle-fold. Both at any rate agree that the law is in agreement with R. Gamaliel in respect of a ship; what is the reason? — Rabbah replied: Because the man has occupied a place within its walls while it was yet day. R. Zera replied: Because the ship continually takes him from the beginning of four cubits and puts him down at the end of the four cubits. What is the practical difference between them? — The practical difference between them is the case where the sides of the ship were broken down, or where one leaps from one ship into another. But why does not R. Zera give the same reason as Rabbah? — He can answer you: The sides37ᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘ