Eruvin

except at the time they are purchased by their owner1 or when the priest prepares them [for the altar].2 Is it then still [maintained that] R. Jose is of the opinion that the rule of bererah is not to be upheld? Was It not in fact taught: If an ‘Am ha-arez3 said to a haber,3 ‘Buy for me a bundle of vegetables’ or ‘a loaf’,4 [the latter]5 need not tithe it;6 so R. Jose, but the Sages ruled: He must tithe it?7 Reverse [the rulings].8 Come and hear: If a man said: ‘let the [second] tithe which I have in my house be redeemed with the sela’ that would happen to come from my purse into my hand’ it is, said R. Jose, redeemed?9 — Reverse [the rulings and] read: ‘R. Jose said: It is not redeemed’. What reason, however, do you see for reversing two statements10 for the sake of one,11 [why not] reverse the one11 for the sake of the two?10 — The last cited Baraitha was at all events12 taught in a reversed form; since In its final clause it was stated: R. Jose, however, admits that where a man said: ‘The [second] tithe which I have in my house shall be redeemed with the new sela’13 that would happen to come14 from my purse into my hand’, the tithe is redeemed.15 Now since he16 ruled here that it ‘is redeemed’ it follows that in the previous17 case [his ruling was that] it is not redeemed.18 What, however, is to be understood [by the case of] the new sela’? If there are two or three [other new sela's in his purse] so that selection is possible19 then this case is exactly identical with the first one.20 If, however, there was only one, what [sense is there in the expression,] ‘That would happen to come ?21 — As in the first clause it was taught: ‘That would happen to come’, it was taught in the final clause also, ‘That would happen to come’.22 Raba asked R. Nahman: Who is that Tanna who does not uphold the rule of bererah even in the case of a Rabbinical enactment? For It was taught: ‘If a man said to five persons, "Behold I am preparing an ‘erub for one of you whom I may choose23 [in due course] so that if I wish it he would be allowed to go24 and if I would not wish it he would not go", the ‘erub is effective if he made up his mind25 while it was yet day,26 [but if he did it] after dusk the ‘erub is not effective’?27 The other remained silent and gave him no answer whatever. But why could he not tell him that the Tanna was one of the school of Ayo?28 — He did not hear [of. Ayo's ruling].29 R. Joseph said:30 Do you wish to remove Tannas from the world?31 [The fact is that the question32 is one] on which Tannas differ. For it was taught: [If a man33 said,] ‘Behold I am preparing an erub for all the Sabbaths of the years so that whenever I should wish it I would go34 and whenever I should not wish it I would not go’,35 his ‘erub is effective if he made up his mind36 while it was yet day;37 [but if he decided] after dusk, R. Simeon ruled: His ‘erub is effective38 while the Sages ruled: His ‘erub is not effective.39 But surely, we heard of R. Simeon40 that he does not uphold bererah, so that a contradiction arise between two rulings of R. Simeon? — The fact is [that the views41 are to be] reversed.42 But what difficulty [is this]? Is it not possible that R. Simeon does not uphold bererah only in a Pentateuchal law40 but in respect of a Rabbinical law43 he may well uphold it? — He44 is of the opinion that he who upholds bererah does so in all cases45 making no distinction between a Pentateuchal and a Rabbinical law, while he who does not uphold bererah does not do it In any case irrespective of whether a law is Pentateuchal or Rabbinical. Rabbah replied: There40 [the case is altogether] different,46 [the reason47 being] that it is essential [for the priestly and levitical dues] to be48 firstfruit,49 so that whatever remains shall be distinguishable [from it].50 Said Abaye to him:51 Now then,52 if a man who had before him two pomegranates of tebel53 said: ‘If rain will fall to-day the one shall be terumah53 for the other and if no rain will fall to-day the other shall be terumah for the first’, would his assertion here also, whether there was rain that day or not, be will and void?54 And should you reply [that the law is] so indeed [it can be retorted:] Have we not in fact learnt: ‘[If a man said,] "The terumah of this heap55 and its tithes shall be in the middle thereof" or "The terumah of this [first] tithe56 shall be In the middle thereof", R. Simeon ruled: He has thereby given it a valid name?’57 — There58 [the law] is different59 because60 [the remainder of the produce]’ is round about the dues.61 And if you prefer I might reply62 in accordance with the reason elsewhere indicated:63 They said to R. Meir, ‘Do you not agree that the skin64 might burst65 and the man would thus have been drinking liquids of tebel?’66 And he replied: ‘When it will have burst [there would be time for the question to be considered]’.67 On the previous assumption, however, that it is essential [for the priestly and levitical dues] to be ‘firstfruit’ so that whatever remains shall be distinguishable from it,68 what could they have meant?69 It is this that they meant: ‘According to our view [the reason for the prohibition is that] it is essential [for the priestly and levitical dues] to be "firstfruit" so that whatever remains shall be distinguishable [from it],70 but even according to your view, the priest is at liberty (cf. supra 11. 1) to choose either bird for either sacrifice. for himself and which was for the other and though the seller also was an ‘am ha-arez whose produce the haber tithes as demai. which for the ‘am ha-arez every part of the purchase is regarded as that of the haber, and that part of it which he subsequently gives to the ‘and ha-arez is regarded as a partial sale of his own purchase. As a haber must not sell to an ‘am ha-arez any demai he must tithe it before he gives it to him. Now since R. Jose ruled that the haber need not tithe it he is obviously of the opinion that the rule of bererah holds, so that when the ‘am ha-arez selects, or the haber selects for him his part of the purchase the selection is deemed to be retrospective. How then could it be maintained that R. Jose does not uphold bererah? could not be asserted that the sela’ which was taken out later was the very coin which the man originally intended for the redemption, it follows that R. Jose upholds bererah. How then could it be maintained supra that the rule of bererah is not upheld by R. Jose? tithe is not redeemed because it is impossible to ascertain which particular sela’ the man had originally in his mind, so he should have ruled in the latter case also where it is equally impossible to ascertain which of the two or three new coins the man had originally in mind. person and his subsequent selection cannot be made retrospective. Now, since ‘erub is a Rabbinical enactment, it follows that bererah is inapplicable even to Rabbinical enactments, and the question is who is that Tanna? enactment. the opposite direction from the town, making a total of four thousand cubits from the latter. cubits in all directions from the town including the two thousand cubits distance from it in the opposite direction of the ‘erub, making a total of four thousand cubits from that ‘erub. is established. which R. Simeon upholds, is regarded as retrospective. does not uphold bererah even in a Rabbinic enactment. Simeon's prohibition. distinguishable from it. terumah was indistinguishable from the other which was to be the remainder? not, as second tithe, be eaten outside Jerusalem; and if it contracted uncleanness, the guilt of eating unclean terumah is incurred by the man who eats it. In the second case the entire heap is subject to the restrictions of terumah of the tithe. Now, the dues and the remainder of the heap are obviously indistinguishable from one another, and yet, according to R. Simeon, the nailing of the dues is valid; but if Raba's submission in the case of the pomegranates is to be accepted the difficulty would arise why is the naming valid? Meir in the case of the wine (supra 36b, f). used by adopting the procedure described. Thus it follows that the question of bererah, which R. Simeon well upholds, does not arise here at all, the sole reason of the prohibition being the possible bursting of the skill.