Chullin

but even if he first slaughtered the burnt-offering and later [on the same day] the unconsecrated animal, he also is not culpable, because the first slaughtering was not a slaughtering such as renders the animal fit for food.1 R. Jacob, however, said in the name of R. Johanan. The consumption [of sacrifices] upon the altar is deemed ‘eating’. Why? Because it is written: And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten;2 the verse speaks of two ‘eatings’, the eating by man and the ‘eating’ by the altar. MISHNAH. IF A PERSON SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL] AND IT WAS FOUND TO BE TREFAH, OR IF HE SLAUGHTERED [IT AS AN OFFERING] TO IDOLS. OR IF HE SLAUGHTERED THE RED COW,3 OR AN OX WHICH WAS CONDEMNED TO BE STONED,4 OR A HEIFER WHOSE NECK WAS TO BE BROKEN,5 R. SIMEON SAYS. HE DOES NOT THEREBY TRANSGRESS [THE LAW OF ‘IT AND ITS YOUNG’];6 BUT THE SAGES SAY, HE DOES. IF A PERSON SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL] AND IT BECAME NEBELAH UNDER HIS HAND, OR IF HE STABBED IT,7 OR TORE AWAY [THE ORGANS OF THE THROAT]. HE DOES NOT THEREBY TRANSGRESS THE LAW OF IT AND ITS YOUNG.8 GEMARA. R. Simeon b. Lakish said: They said so9 only where the person slaughtered the first animal to idols and the second for his table [needs],10 but if he slaughtered the first animal for his table [needs] and the second to idols he is [certainly] not culpable [on the ground of ‘It and its young’] for he suffers the heavier penalty.11 Whereupon R. Johanan said to him: Why, even school children know that! But [I say that] sometimes even where he slaughtered the first animal for his table [needs] and the second to idols he is culpable [on the ground of ‘It and its young’], if, for example, he was warned of the prohibition of ‘It and its young but not of idolatry.12 R. Simeon b. Lakish, however, maintains, since if he had been warned [of idolatry] he would not be culpable [on account of ‘It and its young’],13 then even if he had not been warned of idolatry he is likewise not culpable [on account of ‘It and its young’]. They14 are indeed consistent in their views. For when R. Dimi came [from Palestine] he reported as follows:15 He who committed inadvertently16 an act which, if he had committed it wilfully, would have been punishable with death or with stripes, and [the act committed is punishable also with] something else,17 R. Johanan says, he is liable,18 but R. Simeon b. Lakish says, he is not liable. ‘R. Johanan says, he is liable’, for he had not been warned [of the major penalty];19 ‘R. Simeon b. Lakish says, he is not liable’, for since if he had been warned [of the major penalty] he would not be liable, so, too, if he had not been warned of it he is also not liable. Now both [disputes] are required.20 For if only this [dispute] were reported I might have said that only here does R. Simeon b. Lakish assert his view,21 but there I should have said that he is in agreement with R. Johanan. And if the other dispute only were reported I might have said that only there does R. Johanan assert his view, but here I should have said that he is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Lakish. Both disputes therefore had to be reported. [Do you say that according to R. Simeon the slaughtering of] the Red Cow is a slaughtering which does not render it fit [for food]? Surely it has been taught: R. Simeon says. The Red Cow contracts food uncleanness.22 since it had a period of fitness [to be used for food]. burnt-offering is no slaughtering for it does not render the flesh permitted to be eaten. ‘eaten’ indicates the two modes of consumption of a sacrifice, one by man and the other by the altar. Hence the slaughtering of a burnt-offering is a slaughtering, inasmuch as it renders the flesh fit to be eaten’, i.e., burnt, by the altar. eaten, consequently he does not transgress the law of ‘It and its young’. defective. young. unto idols; for these two penalties are incurred by him by different acts, death for slaughtering the first animal, and stripes for the second. suffer the heavier penalty, namely, death. therefore suffers stripes by virtue of the law of It and its young. stripes (by virtue of the law of ‘It and its young’), and the dispute in Keth. l.c., where the death penalty or stripes and a money payment are considered. penalty, the penalty of stripes, being a minor penalty and of the same character as the major penalty in that they are both corporal punishments, is set aside absolutely, even though in the circumstances for want of the requisite warning the death penalty cannot be inflicted. In the other case however where the penalties involved are of two distinct characters, the one being corporal, i.e., death or stripes, and the other a monetary payment, even R. Simeon b. Lakish would agree that if the major penalty of death or stripes did not apply for want of the necessary warning, the minor penalty of payment would apply. raises the interesting question. Why is there any consideration here about the flesh of the Red Cow contracting uncleanness? Surely it conveys uncleanness without having first come into contact with a carcass, cf. Num. XIX, 7, 8, 10. He suggests therefore the following circumstances: A morsel of the flesh of the Red Cow was covered over on all sides by less than an egg's bulk of dough, but together the flesh and the dough make up an egg's bulk, which is the minimum quantity for a foodstuff to contract or to convey uncleanness (v. however Tosaf. B.K. 77a, s.v. vrp). If then it is held that the flesh of the Red Cow is deemed a foodstuff, then the entire bulk will be rendered unclean by contact, say, with a carcass, and will convey uncleanness to other foodstuffs. If, on the other hand, it is not deemed a foodstuff this built cannot suffer uncleanness, and whatever foodstuffs come into contact with it will likewise not be rendered unclean, since they did not make any direct contact with the flesh of the Red Cow which is covered up on all sides with dough; v. Ker. 21b. V. however, Tosaf. supra 81b, s.v. vrp.