חולין 68 — Soncino English Talmud

¹MISHNAH. IF AN ANIMAL WAS IN DIFFICULT LABOUR AND THE FOETUS PUT FORTH ITS FORE-LIMB AND WITHDREW IT WITHIN, IT MAY BE EATEN. IF IT PUT FORTH ITS HEAD, THOUGH IT WITHDREW IT WITHIN, IT IS CONSIDERED AS BORN. WHATSOEVER IS CUT OFF FROM THE FOETUS WITHIN THE WOMB [AND LEFT INSIDE] MAY BE EATEN, BUT WHATSOEVER IS CUT OFF FROM THE SPLEEN OR KIDNEYS [OF THE ANIMAL AND LEFT INSIDE] MAY NOT BE EATEN. THIS IS THE RULE: THAT WHICH IS FROM THE BODY OF THE ANIMAL IS FORBIDDEN, BUT THAT WHICH IS NOT FROM THE BODY OF THE ANIMAL IS PERMITTED. GEMARA. Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: The actual limb [that was put forth] is forbidden. Why? Because the verse says. Ye shall not eat any flesh in the field torn of beasts [trefah], which implies that any flesh that had got beyond its bound is forbidden. [An objection was raised.] We have learnt: IF AN ANIMAL WAS IN DIFFICULT LABOUR AND THE FOETUS PUT FORTH ITS FORE-LIMB AND WITHDREW IT WITHIN, IT MAY BE EATEN. Presumably [IT MAY BE EATEN] refers to the actual limb! — No, it refers to the foetus [that is within]. If it refers to the foetus, why does [the Tanna] say AND WITHDREW IT? Even if it did not withdraw it [the foetus would be permitted]! — Indeed the law is the same even though it did not withdraw it within, but because he stated in the second clause. IF IT PUT FORTH ITS HEAD, THOUGH IT WITHDREW IT WITHIN, IT IS CONSIDERED AS BORN, he says also in the first clause AND WITHDREW IT. But what does the second clause teach us? That as soon as the head emerged it is considered as born? But we have learnt it elsewhere: ‘Who is considered a firstborn for the right of inheritance and not for the priest? He that was born after a premature child the head of which had even emerged alive, or after a nine-months child the head of which had emerged dead’. Now this is so because the head [of the nine-months child] had emerged dead, but had it emerged alive then the child that was born after this would not be considered a firstborn, even for the right of inheritance! Should you, however, say that [there] it was taught with regard to man, and [here] it is taught with regard to beasts, because we could not apply the principle as established in the case of beasts to man, inasmuch as there is no ante-chamber in beasts, neither could we apply the principle as established in the case of man to beasts, inasmuch as the face of a human being is a principal feature; surely we have expressly learnt it [even with regard to beasts], viz., If part of the afterbirth emerged [before slaughtering the dam] it may not be eaten, for it is a token of birth in the case of woman and also a token of birth in the case of beasts. Now if you were to say that the withdrawal of the limb within, which is stated in the first clause [of our Mishnah], is to be particularly stressed, it is well; for then we could say that the second clause was stated on account of the first clause. But if you say that neither the first nor the second clause is to be particularly stressed [for any special teaching], then why are they stated at all? — It is not so, for, in point of fact, [IT MAY BE EATEN] refers to the actual foetus [and not to the limb], but as R. Nahman b. Isaac had said [elsewhere]: It would not have been necessary to mention [the withdrawal of the limb within] except in so far as it affects the part where it is cut off, likewise we may say here. It was only stated in so far as it affects the part where it is cut off. Come and hear: If an animal was in difficult labour and the foetus put forth its fore-limb and withdrew it within, and then the dam was slaughtered, it may be eaten. If the dam was slaughtered, and then it withdrew it within, it may not be eaten. If it put forth its fore-limb and it was immediately cut off, and then the dam was slaughtered, that which is outside is unclean, and also forbidden [to be eaten], but that which is inside is clean, and permitted. If the dam was slaughtered and then [the limb] was cut off,^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ

^ᵃnote:Before the slaughtering of the animal. The animal, however, was slaughtered before the foetus was born.
^ᵇnote:V. Gemara. The general principle is that with the slaughtering of an animal everything that is within it, e.g., a foetus, is rendered permitted. The Gemara, however, argues as to the effect of the slaughtering upon the limb which was put out of the womb prior to the slaughtering.
^ᶜnote:And is not rendered permitted by the slaughtering of the animal.
^ᵈnote:V. supra 55a. The spleen and the kidneys are specifically mentioned since a lesion of these organs does not render the animal trefah.
^ᵉnote:Ex. XXII, 30.
^ᶠnote:The implication is in the phrase in the field, i.e., any flesh that had gone out of its precincts or bounds, e.g., consecrated meat of a sin-offering outside the sanctuary, or meat of a peace-offering outside the walls of Jerusalem, or, as here, an embryo outside the womb, is forbidden like trefah.
^ᵍnote:Bek. 46a, where this principle is established. It is therefore inappropriate to say that the first clause is stated on account of a second clause which is itself unnecessary.
^ʰnote:To be entitled to a portion in the inheritance twice as much as any one of his brothers. Deut. XXI, 17.
^ⁱnote:I.e., that the father is not obliged to redeem this child from the priest by payment of five shekels, the prescribed money of redemption; cf. Num. XVIII, 16.
^ʲnote:The distinction is this: with regard to the law of inheritance the Torah contemplates a viable firstborn child, a child on whose death the parent would have to go into mourning (derived by the Rabbis by interpreting ubut ,hatr, Deut. XXI, 17, ‘the beginning of his strength’, as ‘the beginning of his mourning’). With regard to the law of the redemption of the firstborn, however, it was intended to apply to ‘whatsoever openeth the womb’, Ex. XIII, 2, whether the child born was living or not.
^ᵏnote:Thus establishing the principle that with the emergence of the head the child is deemed born.
^ˡnote:I.e., the forepart of the female genitals. So that as soon as the head emerges from the womb of the beast and sees the light of day it is forthwith regarded as born.
^ᵐnote:And therefore with the emergence of the head the human being is deemed born.
^ⁿnote:V. infra 77a. For it may be that the head of the foetus was contained in that part of the afterbirth which emerged, in which case the foetus would be regarded as born and would not be rendered permitted by the subsequent slaughtering of the dam, and the afterbirth which belongs to it would likewise be forbidden.
^ᵒnote:The emergence of the afterbirth.
^ᵖnote:To teach that in such circumstances even the limb which had emerged is rendered permitted by the slaughtering of the dam.
^ᵠnote:Thus: if the limb had been withdrawn into the womb, then only that part which had actually emerged would have to be cut off as forbidden meat; but if it had not been withdrawn, then the limb which had emerged plus a little more of that which is within would have to be cut away as forbidden meat.
^ʳnote:I.e., the dam was slaughtered whilst the limb of the foetus protruded from its womb, but immediately after the slaughtering the limb was withdrawn into the womb.
^ˢnote:I.e., the limb that had been cut off.
^ᵗnote:For a limb cut off from the living animal is a source of uncleanness like nebelah; v. infra 128b.
^ᵘnote:The rest of the foetus is rendered permitted by the slaughtering of its dam and likewise free from uncleanness, and it does not suffer any uncleanness by reason of its contact with this limb, because it is a living animal, and a living animal cannot contract uncleanness.

²the flesh is [unclean] like that which had touched nebelah: so R. Meir. But the Sages say: It is unclean like that which had touched a slaughtered trefah animal. Now it says in the first clause, ‘If the foetus put forth its fore-limb and withdrew it within, and then the dam was slaughtered, it may be eaten. Presumably [‘it may be eaten’] refers to the actual limb! — No, it refers to the foetus. But if it refers to the foetus, [how can we explain] the next clause which reads: ‘If the dam was slaughtered and then it withdrew it within, it may not be eaten’? If it refers to the foetus, why is it forbidden? — As R. Nahman b. Isaac had said [elsewhere]: It would not have been necessary to mention it except in so far as it affects the part where it is cut off; we may say the same here: It was only stated in so far as it affects the part where it is cut off. But surely this is not so. For when Abimi came from Be Huzai he brought with him the following teaching: ‘If [the foetus] withdrew the hoof within, you may eat, and if it withdrew two hoofs within, you may eat’. Presumably this means, if it withdrew the hoof within, you may eat the hoof! — No, it means, if it withdrew the hoof within, you may eat the foetus. But if it refers to the foetus, why does it state ‘if it withdrew [the hoof]’? Even if it did not withdraw it [the foetus would be permitted]! — R. Nahman b. Isaac said: It would not have been necessary to mention [the withdrawal of the hoof within] except in so far as it affects the part where it is cut off. But since two texts are adduced here, presumably one teaches that the actual limb [is permitted] and the other the rule with regard to the place where [the limb is] cut off. — No. One teaches the rule with regard to the place where it is cut off and the other teaches that a foetus with uncloven hoofs that is in the womb of the cow [is permitted] even according to the view of R. Simeon. For the ruling of R. Simeon, that an animal with uncloven hoofs that was brought forth by a cow is forbidden, applies only to the case where it came forth into the world, but where it was still within the womb of the dam it is permitted. Ulla said in the name of R. Johanan: The actual limb is permitted. Whereupon Rab Judah said to Ulla: ‘But both Rab and Samuel have said that the actual limb is forbidden’! He replied: ‘Would that I had of the dust of Rab and Samuel! I would fill my eyes with it!’ Nevertheless thus said R. Johanan: Everything was included in the general rule of the verse: Ye shall not eat any flesh in the field torn of beasts [trefah]. But since Scripture expressly mentioned the case of the sin-offering namely that if it was taken out of its bounds and also brought in again it is forbidden, it is clear that only in the case of a sin-offering is this so, but in all other cases if they got back within their bounds they would be permitted. An objection was raised. It is written: Ye shall not eat any flesh in the field torn of beasts [trefah]. Why does the verse add [trefah]? [for this reason.] Since we find that Second Tithe or Firstfruits, if they were taken out of their bounds, and were brought in again they are permitted; now we might have thought that in this case, too, that is also the law, the verse therefore adds, trefah. How is this derived from the verse? Rabbah said: It is like trefah; just as a trefah animal, once it has been rendered trefah, can never be permitted, so also flesh which had got out of its bounds can never be permitted again! This is indeed a refutation of Ulla's view. The Master said: ‘Since we find that Second Tithe or Firstfruits, if they were taken out of their bounds, etc.’ Where do we find this? From the following verse: Thou mayest not eat within thy gates the tithe of thy corn, etc., that is to say, only within thy gates thou mayest not eat them, but if they were taken out [of Jerusalem] and brought in again, they are permitted. Those in the West report it in this version: Rab says: The emergence of a limb is regarded as the birth of that limb; R. Johanan says: The emergence of a limb is not regarded as the birth of that limb. What is the actual difference between them? — Whether to render forbidden the lesser portion of the limb that was within or not. The question was raised: According to him who says that the emergence of a limb is not regarded as the birth of that limb, what would be the law if the foetus first put forth one fore-limb and withdrew it within, and then the other fore-limb and withdrew it within, [and then other parts of its body and withdrew them within,] and so on until, all in all, the greater portion of the foetus had emerged? Are we to say that here it is obvious that the greater portion of the foetus has emerged [and it is deemed fully born], or since each part had been withdrawn within it remains withdrawn? And if you were to accept the view that since each part had been withdrawn within it remains withdrawn, it will further be asked, what would be the position if the foetus put forth a fore-limb and it was cut off, then another fore-limb and it was cut off [and so with the other limbs] until the greater portion of the foetus had been cut off? Are we to say that it is obvious that the greater portion has emerged [and it is deemed fully born], or perhaps we should say [it is deemed born] only when the greater portion of the foetus emerged at one time? — Come and hear. [We have learnt:]^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ

^ᵛnote:Of the foetus and of the dam.
^ʷnote:As the limb that protruded was not affected by the slaughtering of the dam, it is unclean like nebelah, and renders unclean by contact the rest of the foetus as well as the flesh of the dam.
^ˣnote:The Sages hold that the limb that protruded is to this extent affected by the slaughtering that it has thereby been rendered clean and is not a source of uncleanness like nebelah. This is on all fours with the case of a trefah animal which, if slaughtered, is thereby rendered clean and is not regarded as nebelah. Nevertheless according to Rabbinic decree, the flesh of a slaughtered trefah animal would render consecrated things unclean by contact, v. infra 73a.
^ʸnote:So that the ruling in the second clause ‘It may not be eaten’ only means that a little more than the part which protruded may not be eaten but the rest of the foetus may.
^ᶻnote:The modern Khuzistan.
^ᵃᵃnote:These words are in Deut. XIV, 6: And every beast that parteth the hoof, and cleaveth the cleft into two hoofs . . . in the beast, ye may eat, from which is derived the general law that the foetus within the dam is rendered permitted by the slaughtering of the dam. The interpretation is: And every beast . . . in the beast, ye may eat; the hoof . . . in the beast, ye may eat; and two hoofs . . . in the beast ye may eat. That is, if the foetus put forth two hoofs (i.e., two legs) and then withdrew one within, the latter would be permitted by the slaughtering of the dam but not the other which remained protruding. If, however, both hoofs were withdrawn within, both would be permitted.
^ᵃᵇnote:And the Baraitha reported by Abimi informs us that if the foetus withdrew the hoof within, one may even eat the part where the hoof was subsequently cut off, though, of course, not the hoof itself. Likewise, if the foetus withdrew its two hoofs within, one may even eat the part where each hoof was cut off.
^ᵃᶜnote:The expressions ‘the hoof’ and ‘two hoofs’; v. p. 368, n. 9.
^ᵃᵈnote:I.e., if the limb was withdrawn within, even the limb itself would be permitted; and if the limb was not withdrawn within, then the part where it was subsequently cut off would be permitted. As far as the part where the limb is cut off is concerned there should be no difference in law whether it put forth one or two hoofs, so that there would be no need of two texts to permit it in both cases.
^ᵃᵉnote:I.e., only if the limb was withdrawn within would the part where it was subsequently cut off be permitted.
^ᵃᶠnote:V. Bek. 6b.
^ᵃᵍnote:Such was his veneration for these two scholars.
^ᵃʰnote:Ex. XXII, 30. The general proposition is that anything that gets out of its prescribed bounds (i.e., into the field) is forbidden. V. supra p. 365 n. 6.
^ᵃⁱnote:The verse in Lev. X, 18 clearly demonstrates that the flesh of a sin-offering if taken out beyond the Temple precincts is rendered unfit and must be burnt, whether or not it was once again brought into the Temple precincts. Now it must be remembered that the case of the sin-offering is just one of the instances implied in Ex. XXII, 30, so that it need not have been expressly mentioned (v. supra p. 365, n. 6). The fact that it is stated suggests that in a particular respect it is different from other cases of ‘out of bounds’, and that is, that in this case even if it were brought back within its bounds it would be of no avail and the flesh would still have to be burnt. On the other hand, in all other eases of this class, the fact that it has been brought in again within bounds would be an effective remedy.
^ᵃʲnote:The case of the limb of a foetus which protruded from the womb.
^ᵃᵏnote:Even though it had been brought back within bounds.
^ᵃˡnote:Deut. XII, 17.
^ᵃᵐnote:The dispute between Rab and R. Johanan as to whether or not the actual limb which had emerged but which is now withdrawn is rendered permitted by the slaughtering of the dam.
^ᵃⁿnote:Lit., ‘there is birth to limbs’. And the slaughtering of the dam would not render this limb permitted even through it was drawn in within the womb at the time of the slaughtering.
^ᵃᵒnote:So that if the limb was within the womb at the time of the slaughtering it would be rendered permitted.
^ᵃᵖnote:Between the first version of the dispute and the second version (Rashi). According to the Alfasi the question is: What is the practical issue between Rab and R. Johanan? For according to the version in the West, even R. Johanan agrees that the part of the limb which had emerged is forbidden. V. Asheri a.l.
^ᵃᵠnote:l.e., the greater portion of a limb emerged but a little of it remained inside. There will in this case be a difference of view as to the opinion expressed by Rab according to the first or second version. According to the second version Rab maintains that the emergence of a limb is regarded as the birth of that limb, similarly be would hold that the emergence of the greater portion of a limb is reckoned as the birth of that entire limb, hence even the lesser portion of the limb which had never emerged would not be rendered permitted by the slaughtering of the dam. According to the first version this lesser portion would be rendered permitted, for it is only the actual part of the limb which had emerged that is forbidden. According to Alfasi, the law as to the lesser portion of the limb that remained within is the issue between Rab and R. Johanan.
^ᵃʳnote:And this even according to him who maintains that the emergence of a limb is deemed to be the birth of that limb.