Chullin

Wherein is there a difference between the Tanna of the school of Rab1 and the Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael? — In the long-headed species.2 The Tanna of the school of Rab maintains, [The verse] Which have leaping legs3 . . . [ye may eat] is a general proposition, ‘arbeh’, ‘sol'am’, ‘hargol’, and ‘hagab’,4 are specifications; we thus have a general proposition followed by several specifications, in which case the scope of the general proposition is limited to the particulars specified. Accordingly, those of the same kind [as those specified] are [included], but those not of the same kind are not [included], that is, we include all those that resemble those specified in every respect.5 The Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael on the other hand, maintains, Which have leaping legs . . . [ye may eat], is a general proposition; ‘arbeh’, ‘sol'am’, ‘hargol’, and ‘hagab’, are specifications; ‘after its kind’4 is a further general proposition; we thus have two general propositions separated from each other by several specifications, which include such things as are similar to the particulars specified; accordingly we include all that are similar to those specified even in one respect only. But the first general proposition is not analogous in scope with the other general proposition! For the first general proposition — ‘which have leaping legs’ — implies, if it has [leaping legs] one may eat it,6 but otherwise one may not eat it; whereas the second general proposition — ‘after its kind’ — implies that only those that have the four characteristics [are permitted]! — The Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael nevertheless interprets texts of this kind7 by the principle of ‘general propositions and specifications’. Indeed, the dictum which is expressed frequently, that the Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael interprets texts of this kind by the principle of ‘general propositions and specifications’, emanates from here. The Master said: ‘Will you say that if it goes by the name of hagab [it is permitted] even though it has none of the abovementioned characteristics? The verse therefore states: ‘after its kind’, to teach that every one must have all the abovementioned characteristics’. But if it has not all the characteristics, whence could it have been inferred [that it is permitted]? Does not the Divine Law specify arbeh and hargol?8 — It would indeed be as you say had not sol'am been stated, but now that sol'am is actually stated, and serves to include all that are long-headed, it might also be suggested that it shall include every variety, [even those that have but the slightest resemblance to those specified];9 he therefore teaches us [that this is not so]. Why is it that there [in the first Baraitha] the sol'am is identified with the rashon, and the hargol with the nippol, and here [in the Baraitha of the Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael] the sol'am is identified with the nippol, and the hargol with the rashon? — Each Tanna states the appellation by which each is recognized in his locality.10 OF FISHES: ALL THAT HAVE FINS AND SCALES. Our Rabbis taught: If it has no [fins and scales] now but grows them later on, as the sultanith11 and the ‘afian,12 it is permitted; if it has them now but sheds them when drawn out of the water, as author of it is called a Tanna of the school of Rab. result is that sol'am and hagab are each rendered superfluous for their own sakes, i.e., the varieties they represent would have been inferred by the principle of ‘two general propositions separated from each other by specifications’. These terms are therefore utilized for the following purposes: the former to permit the long-headed species, and the latter to forbid the zarzur, v. supra 65b. According to the Tanna of the school of Rab, however, each particular specification can include only those equal to it in every respect, and as none of the specified types are long-headed the result is that the long-headed species of locusts are forbidden.