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חולין 66

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1 Wherein is there a difference between the Tanna of the school of Rab and the Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael? — In the long-headed species. The Tanna of the school of Rab maintains, [The verse] Which have leaping legs . . . [ye may eat] is a general proposition, ‘arbeh’, ‘sol'am’, ‘hargol’, and ‘hagab’, are specifications; we thus have a general proposition followed by several specifications, in which case the scope of the general proposition is limited to the particulars specified. Accordingly, those of the same kind [as those specified] are [included], but those not of the same kind are not [included], that is, we include all those that resemble those specified in every respect. The Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael on the other hand, maintains, Which have leaping legs . . . [ye may eat], is a general proposition; ‘arbeh’, ‘sol'am’, ‘hargol’, and ‘hagab’, are specifications; ‘after its kind’ is a further general proposition; we thus have two general propositions separated from each other by several specifications, which include such things as are similar to the particulars specified; accordingly we include all that are similar to those specified even in one respect only. But the first general proposition is not analogous in scope with the other general proposition! For the first general proposition — ‘which have leaping legs’ — implies, if it has [leaping legs] one may eat it, but otherwise one may not eat it; whereas the second general proposition — ‘after its kind’ — implies that only those that have the four characteristics [are permitted]! — The Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael nevertheless interprets texts of this kind by the principle of ‘general propositions and specifications’. Indeed, the dictum which is expressed frequently, that the Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael interprets texts of this kind by the principle of ‘general propositions and specifications’, emanates from here. The Master said: ‘Will you say that if it goes by the name of hagab [it is permitted] even though it has none of the abovementioned characteristics? The verse therefore states: ‘after its kind’, to teach that every one must have all the abovementioned characteristics’. But if it has not all the characteristics, whence could it have been inferred [that it is permitted]? Does not the Divine Law specify arbeh and hargol? — It would indeed be as you say had not sol'am been stated, but now that sol'am is actually stated, and serves to include all that are long-headed, it might also be suggested that it shall include every variety, [even those that have but the slightest resemblance to those specified]; he therefore teaches us [that this is not so]. Why is it that there [in the first Baraitha] the sol'am is identified with the rashon, and the hargol with the nippol, and here [in the Baraitha of the Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael] the sol'am is identified with the nippol, and the hargol with the rashon? — Each Tanna states the appellation by which each is recognized in his locality. OF FISHES: ALL THAT HAVE FINS AND SCALES. Our Rabbis taught: If it has no [fins and scales] now but grows them later on, as the sultanith and the ‘afian, it is permitted; if it has them now but sheds them when drawn out of the water, asʰʲˡ

2 the colias, scomber, swordfish, athrias and tunny, it is permitted. We have learnt elsewhere: All [fishes] that have scales have also fins, but there are some that have fins but no scales. Those that have fins and scales are clean, but those that have fins and no scales are unclean. But consider, we rely upon scales, the Divine Law then should have stated scales only [as the distinguishing mark] and not fins! — Had the Divine Law only stated scales and not fins I might have said that the word for scales [Kaskasim] meant fins, and even unclean fishes [would have been permitted]; the Divine Law therefore stated fins as well as scales. But even now that the Divine Law states fins as well as scales, whence do we know that the term Kaskasim means [the scales that cover the fish like] a garment? — Because it is written: And he was clad with kaskasim [a coat of mail]. This being so, the Divine Law need not have stated fins at all but only scales [kaskasim]! — R. Abbahu said, and so it was taught in the school of R. Ishmael, [It is stated in order] to make the teaching great and glorious. Our Rabbis taught: Since the verse stated that you may eat that which has fins and scales, I would have inferred that you may not eat that which has not; and since the verse stated that you may not eat that which has not fins and scales, I would have inferred that you may eat that which has. Why then are both verses stated? To teach that he infringes a positive as well as a negative command. Why does Scripture state, These ye may eat of all that are in the waters? Because [without this verse] I should have argued thus: since Scripture has permitted [to eat the creeping things of the water in two verses], in one verse expressly and in the other impliedly, then just as when it expressly permitted them it referred only to those that were in [the water of] vessels, so, too, when it impliedly permitted them it permitted only those that were in vessels. Whence should I have known that one may bend down and swallow without any hesitation even those found in cisterns, ditches, or caverns? It is therefore written: These ye may eat of all that are in the waters. Where does Scripture permit those [creeping things] found in [the water of] vessels? In the verse: These ye may eat of all that are in the waters . . . [in the seas and in the rivers], which signifies that [those creeping things found] in the seas and in the rivers, if they have [fins and scales) you may eat, and if they have not [fins and scales] you may not eat, whereas all those found in [the water of] vessels you may eat, even though they have not [fins and scales]. But perhaps [I ought to say that] those found in vessels you may not eat at all, even though they have [fins and scales]! — You cannot say so, for it is written: And all that have not fins and scales in the seas and in the rivers, of all that swarm in the waters . . . [they are a detestable thing unto you!], which signifies that [those found] in the seas and in the rivers, if they have not [fins and scales], you may not eat, whereas [those found] in vessels, even though they have not [fins and scales], you may eat. Perhaps [I ought to argue thus], ‘In the waters’ is a general proposition ‘in the seas and in the rivers’ is a specification; we thus have a general proposition followed by a specification, in which case the scope of the general proposition is limited to the particulars specified; hence only with regard to those found in the seas and in the rivers [are the distinguishing marks of fins and scales essential], but not with regard to those found in gutters and trenches! — ‘In the waters’, is repeated thus stating another general proposition. But here these two general propositions follow one another! — Rabina said, [It is to be interpreted] as said in the West, viz., Wherever you find two general propositions that follow one anotherʳˢʷˣʸᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜ