חולין 4

¹ baskets of [slaughtered] birds, he cuts off the head of one of the birds and gives to him; if he ate it, then we may eat of his slaughtering; if he did not, then we may not eat of his slaughtering. Now Abaye emphasizes the first part of this statement, whereas Raba emphasizes the second part of the statement. Abaye emphasizes the first part of the statement, [viz.] the reason [why the slaughtering of a Cuthean is valid is] that ‘an Israelite was standing over him at the time’, which implies that if the Israelite was merely going in and out it is not sufficient. Raba, on the other hand, emphasizes the second part of this statement, viz, the reason [why the prescribed test is necessary is] because ‘he came and found that [the Cuthean] had slaughtered’, which implies that if the Israelite was going in and out at the time it is in order. Now according to Abaye, is not the second clause difficult to explain? Abaye will tell you. A person going in and out can also be described as one who came and found that he had slaughtered. And according to Raba, is not the first clause difficult to explain? — Raba will say. A person going in and out is regarded as one who is standing over him. ‘And so, too, if [the Israelite] found in the possession of a Cuthean baskets of slaughtered birds, he cuts off the head of one of the birds etc.’. Is this a sufficient test? Perhaps it was only this one bird that he slaughtered properly? — R. Manasseh said, (Mnemonic: putting a knife on rams.) This is a case where [the Israelite] put the basket under the lap of his garments [and took out a bird at random]. But perhaps the Cuthean had made a sign on the bird [by which he recognized it]? — R. Merharsheya said: It is a case where [the Israelite] has crushed the bird. But may it not be that the Cutheans maintain that birds do not require Shechitah according to the law of the Torah? — If you use this argument [you might ask:] Are the rules against pausing, pressing, thrusting, deflecting and tearing, specifically written [in the Torah]? What you must therefore admit, is that, since they have adopted these rules, they certainly observe them; so in our case, too, since they have adopted [Shechitah for birds], they certainly observe it. Now, as to the observance or non-observance [by the Cutheans] of adopted unwritten customs, there are differences of opinion among Tannaim; for it has been taught: The unleavened bread of a Cuthean may be eaten [on Passover] and an Israelite fulfils his obligation by eating of it on the [first night of] Passover. R. Eliezer says. It may not be eaten, because they are not versed in the details of the precepts like an Israelite. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says. Whatever precept the Cutheans have adopted, they are very strict in the observance thereof, more so than Israelites. The Master said: ‘The unleavened bread of a Cuthean may be eaten, and an Israelite fulfils his obligation by eating of it on the [first night of] Passover’. Is not this obvious? — [No.] You might say that they are not versed in the regulation of careful supervision; he, therefore, teaches you [that an Israelite fulfils his obligation by eating of it.] ‘R. Eliezer says. It may not be eaten, because they are not versed in the details of the precepts like an Israelite’; for he is of the opinion that they are not versed in [the regulation of] supervision. ‘R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: Whatever law the Cutheans have adopted, they are very strict in the observance thereof, more so than Israelites’. Is not this view the same as that of the first Tanna? — There is this difference between them, namely: A law which is written in the Torah but it is not known whether the Cutheans have adopted it. The first Tanna is of the opinion that, since it is a written law, even though we do not know whether they have adopted it, [we can rely upon them]. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel holds the view that only if they have adopted it can they be relied upon, but not otherwise. If this is so, why does R. Simeon b. Gamaliel say: ‘Whatever precept the Cutheans have adopted’? He should say: ‘If they have adopted it’. This, rather, is the real difference between them, namely: An unwritten law which has been adopted by them. The first Tanna is of the opinion that, since it is an unwritten law, even though they have adopted it, they do not [observe it]; R. Simeon b. Gamaliel holds the view that, since they have adopted it, they observe it. The [above] text [stated]: ‘Raba said: In the case of an Israelite apostate who eats carrion in order to satisfy his appetite, one prepares the knife and gives it to him, and then we may eat of his slaughtering’. What is the reason for this? — Because, since there is the possibility of permissible and forbidden [food] he would not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden. If so, [should we not argue in like manner] even where a knife is not prepared for him? — No, for he would not go to any trouble. Said the Rabbis to Raba. These is [a Baraitha] taught that supports your view, viz: The leavened bread of transgressors is, immediately after the Passover,^{ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛ}

² permitted [to be eaten], because they exchange it [for non-Jewish bread]. Now, it was thought, that the author of this Baraitha was R. Judah, who holds that leavened bread which has remained over Passover is forbidden by Biblical law, and yet the Baraitha says: It is permitted because they exchange it; thus one can prove the principle that a person would not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden. Is this really so? Perhaps the author [of the Baraitha] is R. Simeon, who holds that leavened bread which has remained over Passover is forbidden only by Rabbinic law, and therefore st is only in connection with Rabbinic laws that a lenient view is taken, but not in connection with Biblical laws? — Be it so, that the author is R. Simeon; but does [the Baraitha] say: Because I assume that they exchange it? It says: Because they exchange It, .e, they certainly exchange it. It follows, therefore, that if in connection with Rabbinic laws [we say] a person would not leave what is permitted and eat what is forbidden, how much more so in connection with Biblical laws! Can we say that the following [Baraitha] supports Raba's view? [For it was taught:] ‘All may slaughter, even a Cuthean, even an uncircumcised Israelite, even an Israelite apostate’. Now, what is meant by an uncircumcised Israelite? Shall I say it is one whose brothers have died as a result of circumcision? Surely such a one is a good Israelite! Clearly, then, it can only mean one who is opposed to the law of circumcision; and the Tanna is of the opinion that one who is opposed to one law is not regarded as one opposed to the whole Torah. Let us now read the last statement: ‘Even an Israelite apostate’. What is meant by an Israelite apostate? If it means one who is opposed to one particular law, then it is identical with [our interpretation of] an uncircumcised Israelite’. It can only mean one who is opposed to this particular practice [Shechitah, and yet he is permitted to slaughter,] thus supporting Raba's view! — It is not so. Indeed, it might be said that one who is opposed to this particular practice [Shechitah] may not [slaughter], because since he constantly disregards it he deems it legitimate; but [by ‘Israelite apostate is meant] one who is an apostate in respect of idolatry, and the view expressed is in accordance with the view of R. ‘Anan, who said in the name of Samuel: In the case of an Israelite who is an apostate in respect of idolatry, we may eat of his slaughtering. The text [above stated]: ‘R. ‘Anan said in the name of Samuel, ‘In the case of an Israelite apostate in respect of idolatry, we may eat of his slaughtering’; for so we find it written concerning Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, that he partook of the feast of Ahab, as it is written: And Ahab slaughtered sheep and oxen for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and persuaded him to go up with him to Ramoth-gilead. But is it not possible that Ahab slaughtered but Jehoshaphat did not eat? — It reads: And he persuaded him. Perhaps he persuaded him with words? — Persuasion [in Scripture] never means with words. Is this so? Is it not written: If thy brother persuade thee? — This verse also means, by eating and drinking. But is it not written: And thou didst persuade Me to destroy him without cause? With reference to the Most High it is different. But is it not possible that he drank [wine] and did not eat [meat]? — But why distinguish and say that drinking [the wine is permitted]? Because you hold the view that one who is an apostate in respect of idolatry is not regarded as opposed to the whole Torah. The same then holds good with regard to eating [meat], for one that is an apostate in respect of idolatry is not regarded as opposed to the whole Torah? — How can you compare the two! With regard to drinking, the only ground for its prohibition is the law concerning the ordinary wine of gentiles, and at that period the ordinary wine of gentiles was not prohibited; but with regard to eating. I maintain that one that is an apostate in respect of idolatry is regarded as opposed to the whole Torah. — If you wish I can answer: It is not the custom of kings to drink without eating; and if you wish l can answer: It reads: And he slaughtered . . . and persuaded him, which suggests: How did he persuade him? By giving him to eat of what he had slaughtered. But perhaps it was Obadiah who slaughtered the animals! — It reads: In abundance; Obadiah could not have managed it all by himself. Perhaps the seven thousand [righteous men] slaughtered, for it is written: Yet will I leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal! — These were in hiding because of Jezebel. But perhaps the servants of Ahab were righteous! — You cannot assume such a thing, for it is written: If a ruler hearkeneth to falsehood, all his servants are wicked. But perhaps the servants of Jehoshaphat too were not righteous; therefore, that which was slaughtered by Ahab's men was eaten by Jehoshaphat's men, but that which was slaughtered by Obadiah was eaten by Jehoshaphat! — You cannot assume such a thing, for ‘if a ruler hearkeneth to falsehood all his servants are wicked’, it follows that if a ruler hearkeneth to the truth all his servants are righteous. But perhaps that which was slaughtered by Ahab's servants was eaten by Ahab and his men, but that which was slaughtered by Jehoshaphat's servants was eaten by Jehoshaphat and his men! —^{ʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒ}