Chullin

hut not [the mere expression of] his intention. — He replied. He certainly did not put the question in regard to the mere [expression of the] intention [of a minor]. What he asked was whether his intention1 could be inferred from his act.2 For example: there stood [an animal intended for] a burnt-offering on the south side [of the altar], and the minor brought it to the north side and slaughtered it there. Should we say that since he brought it to the north side and slaughtered it there [it is clear that] he had the proper intention,3 or should we rather say that he did not find a convenient place [in the south]?4 But has not R. Johanan already expressed his view in such a case? For we have learnt:5 If [a man] took his fruit up to the roof in order to keep it free from maggots and dew fell upon it, it does not come within the rule of ‘if water be put’.6 If, however, he had the Intention [that the dew should fall upon it] it comes within the rule of ‘if water be put’. If it was taken up by a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, it does not come within the rule of ‘if water be put’, even though they had the intention [that the dew should fall upon it], because the law recognizes the act of a minor but not [mere] intention. And R. Johanan explained that this rule only applies where they7 did not turn the fruit over, but if they did turn the fruit over it comes within the rule of ‘if water be put’.8 The question [R. Johanan] put was this: Was this rule9 laid down by the Torah or only by the Rabbis?10 R. Nahman b. Isaac gives this version [of the foregoing argument]. R. Hiyya b. Abba said that R. Johanan put this question: Does the law recognize the act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his expressed intention] or not? Said R. Ammi to R. Hiyya. He might as well have put the question in regard to the [expression of the] intention [of a minor]. Why did he not put the question in regard to the [expression of the] intention [of a minor]? Because we have learnt that the law does not recognize the [expression of the] intention of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his intention]; for the same reason he need not have put the question in regard to the act of a minor because we have learnt that the law recognizes the act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his expressed intention]! — The question [R. Johanan] put was this: Is this rule laid down by the Torah or only by the Rabbis? — And [R. Johanan himself] solved [it]: The act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his unexpressed intention] is recognized even by the Torah; [the mere expression of] his intention is not recognized even by the Rabbis;11 the [unexpressed] intention of the minor evidenced from his act is not recognized by the Torah but only by the Rabbis. Samuel put the following question to R. Huna: Whence do we know that an act performed incidentally in connection with sacrifices12 is invalid? — [He replied,] Because it is written: And he shall slaughter the bullock,13 thus teaching that the slaughtering should be intended for a bullock. Thereupon Samuel said: This we already know;14 but whence do we know that this rule is indispensable?15 — He replied: It is written: Ye shall slaughter it at your will,16 that is to say, slaughter it intentionally.17 MISHNAH. THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTlle18 IS NEBELAH19 AND DEFILES BY CARRYING.20 GEMARA. It is nebelah only but it is not prohibited for all other purposes. Who is the authority for this view? — R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan replied: It cannot be R. Eliezer, for were it R. Eliezer [it should also be prohibited for all other purposes] since he maintains that the thoughts of a gentile are usually directed towards idolatry. 21 R. Ammi said that the Mishnah is to be interpreted thus: THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTILE IS NEBELAH, but [that which is slaughtered] by a min22 is presumed to be intended for idolatry.21 We thus learnt here what our Rabbis have taught: That which is slaughtered by a min [is regarded as] intended for idolatry, his bread as the bread of Cutheans,23 his wine as wine used for idolatrous purposes, his scrolls of the Law as books of soothsayers,24 his fruit as tebel.25 Some add, even every act in connection with any sacrifice had to be intended for the particular sacrifice. necessary to slaughter a burnt-offering there but because he found the place more convenient. made wet by water or other liquids specified in Maksh. VI, 4. It is provided, however, that the owner must have applied the water to the produce intentionally, or, at least, that the presence of the water on the produce was acceptable to him. V. Maksh. I, 1. assumed, however, that they did not expressly state their Specific purpose, for if they did, it would not be necessary for R. Johanan to teach this, for it is obvious that their act is conclusive evidence of their expressed intention. Here is a clear case of an act which, though not conclusive, might well serve to indicate the minor's intention; yet R. Johanan ruled that the law was satisfied with such evidence of intention. a more lenient result; e.g., in the case of the burnt-offering mentioned above, the result of applying the rule would be to declare the sacrifice valid. If, however, the rule was only laid down by the Rabbis, it would only be applied in such cases where the effect of such application would produce a more stringent result; e.g, in the case of the fruit on the roof, the result of applying the rule would be to regard the fruit as susceptible to uncleanness. stringent result. proper intention the rule becomes indispensable, in accordance with the Rabbinic dictum: wherever Scripture repeats an injunction it is meant to be indispensable. regarded as nebelah and may not he eaten; but also, like nebelah, it may be used for any other purpose. Glos. Cuthean is as one who eats the flesh of swine. on penalty of death at the hands of Heaven.