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חולין 120

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1 to our Mishnah thus, THE HIDE, MEAT JUICE, SEDIMENT . . . [BONES . . .] ARE TO BE INCLUDED TO CONVEY FOOD UNCLEANNESS. Thereupon R. Simeon b. Lakish said: This was taught only with regard to a bone which is considered a protection, but a hair is not considered a protection; R. Johanan, however, said: Even a hair is considered a protection. Said Resh Lakish to R. Johanan: But can there be a protection over another protection? — [He replied,] It penetrates right through. R. Aha demurred saying: If so, how may we write Tefillin? It is necessary that the writing be perfect and it is not so? — He must have overlooked the statement [of the Rabbis] in the West, viz., Any hole [in parchment] over which the ink can pass is not considered a hole. R. Johanan then raised the following objection against Resh Lakish: If there was an olive's bulk of [unclean] flesh on the hide and a man touched a shred hanging from it, or a hair that was opposite it, he becomes unclean. It is, is it not, because it [the hair] is regarded as a protection? — No, it is because it is regarded as a handle. But of what use is one hair? — As R. Ila'a referred [elsewhere] to a bristle among many bristles, so here, too, it refers to a hair amongst other hairs. And where was this view of R. Ila'a stated? — In connection with the following Mishnah: The bristles of an ear of corn contract uncleanness and convey uncleanness, but are not included together with the rest. Of what use is a bristle? — R. Ila'a replied: It refers to a bristle among many bristles. MEAT JUICE. What is the ROTEB? — Raba said: It is the fat. Whereupon Abaye said to him: But should it not by itself convey food uncleanness? — Rather it must be, meat juice which had set. But why ‘had set’? Even if it had not set it should also [be included with the meat], for Resh Lakish has said that the juice of vegetables is to be included [with the vegetable] to make up the date's bulk with regard to the Day of Atonement. — There it is a question of satisfying one's hunger and anything [though not strictly a foodstuff] would satisfy it; here, however, it is a question of what can be included [with a foodstuff] and, therefore, if it [the meat juice] had set it can be included, but if it had not set it cannot be included. SEDIMENT. What is the KIPPAH? — Raba said,lt is the sediment [of boiled meat]. Whereupon Abaye said to him: But should it not by itself convey food uncleanness? — Rather said R. Papa: It must be the spices. We have learnt elsewhere: If a man clotted blood and ate it, or if he melted [forbidden] fat and gulped it down, he is culpable. Now it is quite clear in the case where he clotted blood and ate it, for since he clotted it he thereby determined it [as a foodstuff], but [why should he be culpable] where he melted fat and gulped it down? Scripture uses the term ‘eating’ in connection with it, and this is not eating? — Resh Lakish said: The verse says: Soul, to include one who drinks. The same has been taught in respect of leavened bread: Where a man dissolved it and gulped it down, if it was leavened, he is liable to the penalty of kareth, and if it was unleavened, he has not thereby fulfilled his obligation on the Passover. Now it is quite right to say ‘If it was unleavened he has not thereby fulfilled his obligation on the Passover’, for the Divine Law says: Bread of affliction, and this is not bread of affliction; but why does it say: ‘If it was leavened he is liable to the penalty of kareth’? Does not Scripture use the term eating’ in connection with it? Resh Lakish said: The verse says: Soul, to include one who drinks. And the same has been taught in respect of the carcass of a clean bird: If he dissolved it with fire (and gulped it down], he is unclean; but if in the sun, he is not unclean. Whereupon we put the questions is not the expression ‘eating’ written in connection with it? And Resh Lakish replied. The verse says: Soul, to include one who drinks. But if so, even (if he dissolved it) in the sun he should also [be unclean]? — In the sun it becomes putrid. Now this was necessary [to have been taught with regard to each of these cases]. For if the Divine Law had stated it only with regard to the fat, one could not have inferred the same with regard to leavened bread, for (in the case of the former) there was never a moment when it was permitted; nor could one have inferred the same with regard to the carcass [of a clean bird], for the former is punishable by kareth. And had the Divine Law stated it only with regard to leavened bread, one could not have inferred the same with regard to the fat, for the former does not admit of any exception; nor could one have inferred the same with regard to the carcass [of a clean bird], for the former is punishable by kareth. And had the Divine Law stated it only with regard to the carcass [of a clean bird], one could not have inferred the same with regard to the others, for the former conveys uncleanness. [Clearly] one case could not have been inferred from the other, but could not one case have been inferred from the other two? — Which could have been inferred? Had not the Divine Law stated it with regard to the carcass [of a clean bird] but this latter was to be inferred from the others, [such inference could be refuted thus]: It is so with the other cases since they are punishable by kareth. And had not the Divine Law stated it with regard to leavened bread but this latter was to be inferred from the others, [such inference could be refuted thus], it is so with the other cases since they were never permitted at any time. And had not the Divine Law stated it with regard to the forbidden fat but this latter was to be inferred from the others, [such inference could be refuted thus]: It is so with the other cases since they admit of no exceptions; will you, then, say the same of the forbidden fat which admits of an exception? — What is this [exception]? Is it that the forbidden fat of cattle is permitted to the Most High? But a carcass [of a bird], too, is permitted to the Most High, namely, a bird whose head has been nipped off! Or is it that the fat of a wild animal [is permitted] to a common man? But a carcass, namely, the sin-offering of a bird whose head has been nipped off, is also permitted to priests! — In truth, [the exception is that] the fat of a wild animal [is permitted] to a common man, and as for your difficulty from the case of the priests, [it must be remembered that] the priests enjoy this privilege from the table of the Most High. Wherefore is the following teaching necessary: ‘[It is written,] The unclean, to signify that the juice and the broth and the sediment of these are forbidden’? Surely it could have been inferred from the above cases? — It is necessary, for had not the Divine Law stated it expressly I would have said: ‘It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred’, and as there [a minimum of] an olive's bulk is essential, so here a minimum of an olive's bulk is essential.33ʰʲˡʳˢʷˣʸᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍ

2 The Divine Law then could have stated it with regard to creeping things and the other cases would have been inferred therefrom? Such inference could be refuted thus: It is so with the case of creeping things since they convey uncleanness no matter what their size. And as for [the Baraitha] which was taught: ‘The liquids that exuded from produce of tebel, or from new produce, or from consecrated produced or from seventh year produce, or from the produce of diverse kinds, are like [the produce] themselves’ — whence is this derived? Should you say it can be inferred from the other cases, [but it will be refuted thus,] It is so with the others since each is an original prohibition. Now this [inference] could stand in respect of those that are original prohibitions, but whence would we know it in respect of prohibitions which are not original? — We could infer it from the law of the firstfruits. And whence do we know it with regard to the firstfruits? — From the following teaching of R. Jose: It is written: The fruit, that is to say, you shall bring fruit but not liquids. And whence do we know that where a man brought grapes and trod them [into wine they are acceptable as firstfruits]? The verse therefore says: Thou shalt bring. But the inference can be refuted thus: It is so with firstfruits since they require the recital [of a passage] and also setting down! — Rather it must be inferred from terumah. And whence do we know it with regard to terumah itself? Because it has been likened to the firstfruits, for a Master has said: The offering if thine hand refers to the firstfruits. But [it will be refuted thus]: It is so with regard to terumah since on account of it people incur the penalty of death and the penalty of the [added] fifth! — Rather it must be inferred from the two, from terumah and the firstfruits. But [it will be refuted thus], It is so with regard to terumah and the firstfruits since on account of them people incur the penalty of death and the penalty of the [added] fifth! — Rather it must be inferred either from terumah and one of the other cases or from the firstfruits and one of the other cases. And as for [the Mishnah] which we learnt: ‘[If a non-priest drank in error] date-honey, cider, vinegar from wintergrapes, or any other juices, of terumah, R. Eliezer declares him liable to the payment, of the value and the [added] fifth, but R. Joshua declares him exempt [from the added fifth]’ — on what principle do they differ? — They differ as to [whether we say], ‘Deduce from it and [entirely] from it’, or, ‘Deduce from it and establish it ln its own place’. R. Eliezer holds, ‘Deduce from it and [entirely] from it’: thus, ‘deduce from it’ — just as in the case of firstfruits the liquids which exude from them are like [the fruits] themselves, so in the case of terumah, too, the liquids which exude from it are like [the fruit] itself; ‘and [entirely] from it’ — just as this law of firstfruits applies even to the other kinds, so with regard to terumah, too, this law applies even to ,the other kinds. R. Joshua holds, ‘Deduce from it and establish it in its own place’: thus ‘deduce from it’ — just as in the case of firstfruits the liquids which exude from them are like [the fruits] themselves, so in the case of terumah, too, the liquids which exude from it are like [the fruit] itself; ‘and establish it in its own place’ — just as the liquids that can be consecrated as terumah are only wine and oil but no other liquids, so, too, the rule that the liquids which exude from it are like [the fruit] itself, applies only to wine and oil, but to no other liquids. And as for [the Mishnah] which we learnt: ‘No liquid may be brought as firstfruits excepting the product of olives and grapes’ — who is the author thereof? — It is R. Joshua who holds the principle, ‘Deduce from it and establish it in its place’, and then he infers the law as to firstfruits from terumah. And as for [the Mishnah] which we learnt: ‘One would not suffer the penalty of forty stripes incurred through the transgression of the law of ‘orlah [for the liquid which issued from any orlah fruits] save for that which issued from olives and grapes’ — who is the author thereof’? — It is R. Joshua who holds the principle, ‘Deduce from it and establish it in its own place’, he then infers the law as to firstfruits from terumah,ᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡ