Chullin

And is the following teaching of Rabbi so unsatisfactory? [For it was taught: The verse,] Thou shalt not eat it,1 refers to flesh [cooked] in milk. You say it refers to flesh [cooked] in milk; perhaps it refers to some other thing that is forbidden in the Torah? You can reply: Go forth and derive it by one of the thirteen exegetical principles by which the Torah is expounded, namely, ‘The meaning of a verse is to be deduced from its context’. Now what does this context deal with? With that which partakes of the characteristics of two kinds.2 Then this verse also deals with that which partakes of the characteristics of two kinds!3 — From that teaching I might have thought that the prohibition was only in respect of eating but not in respect of deriving benefit from it, he therefore teaches us [another teaching].4 And whence does Rabbi infer that it is also forbidden to derive any benefit from it? — He infers it from the following argument: It is written here: For thou art a holy people onto the Lord,5 and it is written there: There shall be no consecrated prostitutes of the sons of Israel;6 just as there the prohibition refers to the pleasure derived therefrom,7 so here to the pleasure derived therefrom.8 The school of R. Eliezer taught: Ye shall not eat of anything that dieth of itself . . . thou mayest sell it . . . Thou shalt not seethe a kid etc.9 The Torah here implies that when you sell it you may not first cook it [in milk] and then sell it.10 The school of R. Ishmael taught: Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk, is stated three times:11 one is a prohibition against eating it, one a prohibition against deriving benefit from it, and one a prohibition against cooking it. It was taught: Issi b. Judah says: Whence do we know that flesh cooked in milk is forbidden? It is written here: For thou art a holy people,12 and it is written there: And ye shall be holy men unto me; therefore ye shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field:13 just as there it is forbidden [as food], so here it is forbidden [as food]. We have thus learnt that it is forbidden as food; how do we know that it is forbidden for all use? I will tell you: it follows a fortiori: If ‘orlah,14 which is not produced by transgression, is forbidden for all use, then surely flesh cooked in milk, which is produced by transgression,15 is forbidden for all use! But [if you object] this may be true of ‘orlah only, since it had no period of fitness,16 [I reply] the law concerning leaven during Passover shows otherwise, namely, that although it had a period of fitness,17 it is nevertheless forbidden for all use. And [if you object] this may be true of leaven during Passover only, since it carries with it the penalty of kareth,18 [I reply] the law concerning diverse kinds in the vineyard19 shows otherwise, namely, that although it does not carry with it the penalty of kareth, nevertheless it is forbidden for all use. Wherefore is the analogy necessary?20 Surely it can all be inferred from the a fortiori argument derived from ‘orlah thus: If ‘orlah which is not produced by transgression, is forbidden both as food and for all use, how much more then is flesh cooked in milk, which is produced by transgression, is forbidden both as food and for all use! — Because one could refute the argument thus: The law in the case where one ploughed with an ox and an ass together, or where one muzzled a cow when it was treading out [the corn], can prove otherwise, namely, although it21 was produced by transgression it is nevertheless permitted. 22 Wherefore, was it necessary to reply [in the argument], ‘The law concerning diverse kinds in the vineyard shows otherwise’? He could have replied. ‘The law of ‘orlah shows otherwise’; the argument would then have gone round again, with the result that it [sc. the law of flesh cooked in milk] would have been inferred from the common features [of the others]!23 — R. Ashi answered: Because one could have refuted the argument thus: The law of nebelah would show otherwise, for although it is forbidden as food, nevertheless it is permitted for all use. Said R. Mordecai to R. Ashi: We have learnt the following on the authority of R. Simeon b. Lakish: An inference drawn from cases with common features can be refuted only by those [cases] and not by other [cases].24 If so,it can very well be inferred from the common features, can it not?25 — Because26 one can refute it thus: The cases which present these common features are peculiar in that they are both products of the soil.27 But now,28 too, the argument can be refuted thus: This29 may be so of diverse kinds in the vineyard since it deals with products of the soil! — Said R. Mordecai to R. Ashi: We have learnt the following on the authority of R. Simeon b. Lakish: An inference drawn from cases with common features can be refuted by indicating any peculiarity whatsoever; but an argument which employs the expression ‘No, if you say it in this . . . will you say it in that?’ can only be refuted by adducing a feature in the one which is less or more grave than in the other, and not by any peculiarity whatsoever.30 But we may refute all the cases thus: This may be so of all these cases since they all deal with products of the soil!31 — R. Mordecai then said to R. Ashi: We have learnt the following on the authority of R. Simeon b. Lakish: sacrifice owing to physical blemish. These animals are treated partly as ordinary unconsecrated animals in that the flesh thereof may be eaten even by one unclean, and partly as consecrated animals in that they may not be put to work, neither may one enjoy the milk or wool thereof. with the paschal lamb. For just as the latter, if cooked and not roasted, would be forbidden for all purposes as all sacrificial flesh which has been rendered unfit so flesh cooked in milk is forbidden for all purposes. ause, and ase. years; cf. Lev. XIX, 23. together, are each separately permitted. against deriving any benefit, can surely be inferred from the a fortiori argument. forbidden to be eaten, this prohibition of ploughing with an ox and ass together, cannot be brought into this argument. run as follows: Flesh cooked in milk is declared to be forbidden for all purposes by inference from ‘orlah by the a fortiori reasoning; if the objection be taken that ‘orlah is a special case inasmuch as it had no period of fitness, the reply would be that the case of leaven during Passover clearly shows that this distinctive feature (sc. not having a period of fitness) is not the reason for the general prohibition; and if the objection be taken that leaven during Passover is a special case inasmuch as there is a penalty of kareth attached to it, the reply would be that the case of ‘orlah clearly shows that the gravity of the penalty (sc. kareth) is not the reason for the general prohibition; and so the argument would go in a circle: the objection to the case of ‘orlah would be met by the case of leaven during Passover and vice versa. What, however, is common to ‘orlah and leaven during Passover is that each is forbidden as food and also for all use; the inference then follows that flesh cooked in milk, inasmuch as it is forbidden as food, should also be forbidden for all use. This type of argument, namely, an inference from common features of two or more cases, is very frequent in the Gemara; and the result being satisfactory, it was unnecessary to introduce the third case of diverse kinds in the vineyard. common features and which is absent from the case proposed to be inferred from the common features — e.g. the demonstration of a special characteristic peculiar to ‘orlah and to leaven during Passover but absent from flesh cooked in milk would indeed be a valid refutation. It is, however, no refutation of the argument by adducing cases wherein the common features are not found, for such an argument, as here the case of nebelah, is irrelevant. common features, is that there is the following refutation. product of the soil, is a distinction of little or no significance for this is no satisfactory reason why the law should be more severe or less severe. ground. respect, and if one case presents any special characteristic, even though that characteristic does not go down to the root of the matter and is of no significance, the argument is untenable. On the other hand, where the law in one case is inferred from another case, e.g. by an a fortiori argument, an incidental characteristic would not be taken into consideration. Only a characteristic which is of such significance as to suggest the reason for the law in that particular case, would be accepted as a refutation, for then it would be argued thus, ‘No, if you say it in the one case, it is because it has this grave or less grave characteristic; will you say it in the other cases which have not this characteristic’? from cases with common features, so that any peculiarity, however insignificant, would be accepted as a refutation.