חולין 115 — Soncino English Talmud

¹should not what has been [unlawfully] prepared on the Sabbath be forbidden, since I have declared it to be abominable unto you? — Scripture says: For it is holy unto you, that means, ‘it’ is holy, but what has been prepared on it is not holy. Furthermore if a man ploughed with an ox and an ass together, or if he muzzled a cow when it was treading out [the corn], should it not be forbidden, since I have declared these acts to be abominable to you? — Surely if what has been [unlawfully] prepared on the Sabbath, which is a grave matter, is permitted, how much more so these! Should not [the produce of a field sown with] diverse kinds of seeds be forbidden, since I have declared it to be abominable to you? — From the fact that the Divine Law states with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard. Lest [the fruit of thy seed which thou hast sown, and the fruit of thy vineyard] be defiled [tikdash], [which has been interpreted as,] ‘lest it be burnt in fire’ [tukad esh], it follows that diverse kinds of seeds [sown in a field] are permitted. But perhaps [the inference is this]: whereas diverse kinds in a vineyard are forbidden to be eaten and also to be made use of, diverse kinds of seeds are forbidden to be eaten but are permitted to be made use of? — These [latter] have been compared with diverse kinds of cattle, for it is written: Thou shalt not let thy cattle gender with a diverse kind; thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed, and just as the issue [of the mating of diverse kinds] of thy cattle is permitted, so the produce of [diverse kinds of seed sown in] thy field is permitted. And whence do we know that the issue of diverse kinds of cattle is permitted? — From the fact that the Divine Law has prohibited the offering of a cross-breed to the Most High we may infer that to the common person it is permitted. Should not ‘It and its young’ be forbidden, since I have declared it to be abominable to you? — Since the Divine Law has forbidden an animal that is out of time for an offering to the Most High it follows that such is permitted to the common person. Should not [the mother-bird] which has been sent away from the nest be forbidden, since I have declared it to be abominable to you? — The Torah would not order to send it away if it would thereby lead to transgression. R. Simeon b. Lakish said: Whence do we know that flesh [cooked] in milk is forbidden [to be eaten]? From the verse: Eat not of it raw, nor cooked in any cooking with water. Now the verse need not have added ‘in any cooking’; why then does it say ‘in any cooking’? To teach you that there is another cooking which is [also forbidden to be eaten] like this. And which is it? It is flesh [cooked] in milk. Said to him R. Johanan,^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ

^ᵃnote:To eat as well as to derive any benefit therefrom. This is the meaning of ‘forbidden’ throughout this passage.
^ᵇnote:Yet it is established law that if, e.g., a man cooked food on the Sabbath it may be eaten at least by others if not by himself; v. supra 15a, and Ter. II, 3.
^ᶜnote:Ex. XXXI, 14.
^ᵈnote:I.e., the produce of the field which had been so ploughed and the corn which had been so trodden (Rashi); or, the ox or ass which had committed the trespass (Tosaf.). V. however, Rashi infra s.v. vrnt tk.
^ᵉnote:Cf. Deut. XXII, 10, and XXV, 4.
^ᶠnote:Cf. Lev. XIX, 19. Nevertheless the produce of diverse kinds of seeds sown together is permitted to be eaten; v. Kil. VIII, 1.
^ᵍnote:Deut. XXII, 9. Heb. ase,, interpreted as at seu,.
^ʰnote:I.e., that it is absolutely forbidden.
^ⁱnote:Lev. XIX, 19.
^ʲnote:I.e., the issue of diverse kinds of cattle. This is prohibited for a sacrifice, derived from Lev. XXII, 27. V. supra 38b.
^ᵏnote:Cf. Lev. ibid. 28. If the dam and its young were both slaughtered in one day, that which was slaughtered last should be forbidden for all time and for all use; nevertheless it is established law that even though the law has been transgressed both animals are permitted; v. supra 78a.
^ˡnote:Cf. Lev. XXII, 27, and Zeb. 112b.
^ᵐnote:The prohibition of ‘It and its young’ is brought about by its inappropriateness in point of time, for one may slaughter them on different days.
^ⁿnote:Cf. Deut. XXII, 6, 7.
^ᵒnote:Lit., ‘for a stumbling-block’. The finder of this mother-bird, ignorant of the fact that it has been sent away from the nest, would eat it, and so be led into sin by another's performance of a precept. It must therefore be permitted.
^ᵖnote:Ex. XII, 9. A literal rendering of the verse.

²And is the following teaching of Rabbi so unsatisfactory? [For it was taught: The verse,] Thou shalt not eat it, refers to flesh [cooked] in milk. You say it refers to flesh [cooked] in milk; perhaps it refers to some other thing that is forbidden in the Torah? You can reply: Go forth and derive it by one of the thirteen exegetical principles by which the Torah is expounded, namely, ‘The meaning of a verse is to be deduced from its context’. Now what does this context deal with? With that which partakes of the characteristics of two kinds. Then this verse also deals with that which partakes of the characteristics of two kinds! — From that teaching I might have thought that the prohibition was only in respect of eating but not in respect of deriving benefit from it, he therefore teaches us [another teaching]. And whence does Rabbi infer that it is also forbidden to derive any benefit from it? — He infers it from the following argument: It is written here: For thou art a holy people onto the Lord, and it is written there: There shall be no consecrated prostitutes of the sons of Israel; just as there the prohibition refers to the pleasure derived therefrom, so here to the pleasure derived therefrom. The school of R. Eliezer taught: Ye shall not eat of anything that dieth of itself . . . thou mayest sell it . . . Thou shalt not seethe a kid etc. The Torah here implies that when you sell it you may not first cook it [in milk] and then sell it. The school of R. Ishmael taught: Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk, is stated three times: one is a prohibition against eating it, one a prohibition against deriving benefit from it, and one a prohibition against cooking it. It was taught: Issi b. Judah says: Whence do we know that flesh cooked in milk is forbidden? It is written here: For thou art a holy people, and it is written there: And ye shall be holy men unto me; therefore ye shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field: just as there it is forbidden [as food], so here it is forbidden [as food]. We have thus learnt that it is forbidden as food; how do we know that it is forbidden for all use? I will tell you: it follows a fortiori: If ‘orlah, which is not produced by transgression, is forbidden for all use, then surely flesh cooked in milk, which is produced by transgression, is forbidden for all use! But [if you object] this may be true of ‘orlah only, since it had no period of fitness, [I reply] the law concerning leaven during Passover shows otherwise, namely, that although it had a period of fitness, it is nevertheless forbidden for all use. And [if you object] this may be true of leaven during Passover only, since it carries with it the penalty of kareth, [I reply] the law concerning diverse kinds in the vineyard shows otherwise, namely, that although it does not carry with it the penalty of kareth, nevertheless it is forbidden for all use. Wherefore is the analogy necessary? Surely it can all be inferred from the a fortiori argument derived from ‘orlah thus: If ‘orlah which is not produced by transgression, is forbidden both as food and for all use, how much more then is flesh cooked in milk, which is produced by transgression, is forbidden both as food and for all use! — Because one could refute the argument thus: The law in the case where one ploughed with an ox and an ass together, or where one muzzled a cow when it was treading out [the corn], can prove otherwise, namely, although it was produced by transgression it is nevertheless permitted. Wherefore, was it necessary to reply [in the argument], ‘The law concerning diverse kinds in the vineyard shows otherwise’? He could have replied. ‘The law of ‘orlah shows otherwise’; the argument would then have gone round again, with the result that it [sc. the law of flesh cooked in milk] would have been inferred from the common features [of the others]! — R. Ashi answered: Because one could have refuted the argument thus: The law of nebelah would show otherwise, for although it is forbidden as food, nevertheless it is permitted for all use. Said R. Mordecai to R. Ashi: We have learnt the following on the authority of R. Simeon b. Lakish: An inference drawn from cases with common features can be refuted only by those [cases] and not by other [cases]. If so,it can very well be inferred from the common features, can it not? — Because one can refute it thus: The cases which present these common features are peculiar in that they are both products of the soil. But now, too, the argument can be refuted thus: This may be so of diverse kinds in the vineyard since it deals with products of the soil! — Said R. Mordecai to R. Ashi: We have learnt the following on the authority of R. Simeon b. Lakish: An inference drawn from cases with common features can be refuted by indicating any peculiarity whatsoever; but an argument which employs the expression ‘No, if you say it in this . . . will you say it in that?’ can only be refuted by adducing a feature in the one which is less or more grave than in the other, and not by any peculiarity whatsoever. But we may refute all the cases thus: This may be so of all these cases since they all deal with products of the soil! — R. Mordecai then said to R. Ashi: We have learnt the following on the authority of R. Simeon b. Lakish:^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ

^ᵠnote:Deut. XII, 25. Which is superfluous in the context, the prohibition having already been stated in the preceding verse.
^ʳnote:The foregoing verses state the law concerning consecrated animals that were redeemed after being rendered unfit for sacrifice owing to physical blemish. These animals are treated partly as ordinary unconsecrated animals in that the flesh thereof may be eaten even by one unclean, and partly as consecrated animals in that they may not be put to work, neither may one enjoy the milk or wool thereof.
^ˢnote:I.e., flesh and milk. The teaching of this Mishnah is attributed to Rabbi as the editor of the whole Mishnah.
^ᵗnote:R. Simeon b. Lakish derives the prohibition against making use of flesh cooked in milk from the verse in connection with the paschal lamb. For just as the latter, if cooked and not roasted, would be forbidden for all purposes as all sacrificial flesh which has been rendered unfit so flesh cooked in milk is forbidden for all purposes.
^ᵘnote:Deut. XIV, 21. Heb. ause og. This verse concludes with the prohibition: Thou shalt not seethe a kid etc.
^ᵛnote:Ibid. XXIII, 18. Heb. ase. The analogy is drawn by reason of the similar expression used in both passages, ause, and ase.
^ʷnote:Viz., the act of coition.
^ˣnote:Hence flesh cooked in milk is forbidden for all purposes.
^ʸnote:Ibid. XIV, 22.
^ᶻnote:For as soon as it has been cooked in milk it is forbidden to be sold or used for any purpose.
^ᵃᵃnote:Ex. XXIII, 19; XXXIV, 26; Deut. XIV, 21.
^ᵃᵇnote:Deut. ibid.
^ᵃᶜnote:Ex. XXII, 30. The analogy is based upon the expression ‘holy’ written in each verse.
^ᵃᵈnote:vkrg. Lit., ‘uncircumcision’. The fruit of newly planted trees was forbidden for all use during the first three years; cf. Lev. XIX, 23.
^ᵃᵉnote:Sc. by cooking.
^ᵃᶠnote:The fruit of ‘orlah as soon as it comes into being is forbidden, whereas flesh and milk, before being cooked together, are each separately permitted.
^ᵃᵍnote:Before the passover.
^ᵃʰnote:V. Glos.
^ᵃⁱnote:Cf. Deut XXII, 9.
^ᵃʲnote:To establish the law that flesh cooked in milk is forbidden to be eaten, v.p. 634, n. 10. This prohibition, and that against deriving any benefit, can surely be inferred from the a fortiori argument.
^ᵃᵏnote:Sc. the produce of the field so ploughed, or the corn which had been so trodden out.
^ᵃˡnote:And so, too, with flesh cooked in milk. But now that is it established by the analogy that flesh cooked in milk is forbidden to be eaten, this prohibition of ploughing with an ox and ass together, cannot be brought into this argument.
^ᵃᵐnote:Thus it was unnecessary to introduce the case of sowing diverse kinds in the vineyard. The argument would then run as follows: Flesh cooked in milk is declared to be forbidden for all purposes by inference from ‘orlah by the a fortiori reasoning; if the objection be taken that ‘orlah is a special case inasmuch as it had no period of fitness, the reply would be that the case of leaven during Passover clearly shows that this distinctive feature (sc. not having a period of fitness) is not the reason for the general prohibition; and if the objection be taken that leaven during Passover is a special case inasmuch as there is a penalty of kareth attached to it, the reply would be that the case of ‘orlah clearly shows that the gravity of the penalty (sc. kareth) is not the reason for the general prohibition; and so the argument would go in a circle: the objection to the case of ‘orlah would be met by the case of leaven during Passover and vice versa. What, however, is common to ‘orlah and leaven during Passover is that each is forbidden as food and also for all use; the inference then follows that flesh cooked in milk, inasmuch as it is forbidden as food, should also be forbidden for all use. This type of argument, namely, an inference from common features of two or more cases, is very frequent in the Gemara; and the result being satisfactory, it was unnecessary to introduce the third case of diverse kinds in the vineyard.
^ᵃⁿnote:I.e., the refutation must be in the nature of a peculiar characteristic possessed by the cases that determine the common features and which is absent from the case proposed to be inferred from the common features — e.g. the demonstration of a special characteristic peculiar to ‘orlah and to leaven during Passover but absent from flesh cooked in milk would indeed be a valid refutation. It is, however, no refutation of the argument by adducing cases wherein the common features are not found, for such an argument, as here the case of nebelah, is irrelevant.
^ᵃᵒnote:V. supra n. 1.
^ᵃᵖnote:l.e., the reason why the argument is not run on the lines suggested (v. p. 636, n. 1), drawing the inference from the common features, is that there is the following refutation.
^ᵃᵠnote:‘Orlah and leavened grain are products of the soil whereas milk and flesh are not. This characteristic, sc. being a product of the soil, is a distinction of little or no significance for this is no satisfactory reason why the law should be more severe or less severe.
^ᵃʳnote:I.e., even now when the third case, sc. diverse kinds in a vineyard, is introduced the argument can be refuted on this ground.
^ᵃˢnote:That it is forbidden as food and also for use.
^ᵃᵗnote:Where an inference is made from the common features of two cases all the cases must indeed be alike in every respect, and if one case presents any special characteristic, even though that characteristic does not go down to the root of the matter and is of no significance, the argument is untenable. On the other hand, where the law in one case is inferred from another case, e.g. by an a fortiori argument, an incidental characteristic would not be taken into consideration. Only a characteristic which is of such significance as to suggest the reason for the law in that particular case, would be accepted as a refutation, for then it would be argued thus, ‘No, if you say it in the one case, it is because it has this grave or less grave characteristic; will you say it in the other cases which have not this characteristic’?
^ᵃᵘnote:it is assumed for the present that an inference from three cases is to be regarded on the same footing as an inference from cases with common features, so that any peculiarity, however insignificant, would be accepted as a refutation.