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חולין 10

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1 Because it is the habit of reptiles to uncover [a vessel] but not to cover one. (Or you might argue thus: the above decisions only apply to the cases mentioned, viz., where he left the bowl uncovered and came and found it covered, and where he left it covered and came and found it uncovered, but if he found it as he left it, [the water] is neither unclean nor invalid.) Whereas, in the case of water left uncovered, if there is any doubt about it, it is forbidden. This, therefore, proves that regulations concerning danger to life are more stringent than ritual prohibitions. It stands proved. We have learnt elsewhere: Three liquids are prohibited if left uncovered; water, wine and milk. How long must they have remained [uncovered] to become forbidden? Such time as it would take a reptile to come forth from a place near by and drink. What distance is meant by ‘a place near by’? R. Isaac the son of Rab Judah explained: Such time as it would take a reptile to come Forth from under the handle of the vessel and drink therefrom. ‘And drink therefrom’! Then you see it! — Rather; And drink therefrom and return to its hole. It was stated: If a man slaughtered with a knife which was found afterwards to have a notch in it, R. Huna says, even if he broke bones with it the whole day long [after the slaughtering], the shechitah is invalid, because we apprehend that it became notched while cutting the skin [before actually cutting the throat]. R. Hisda, however, says that the shechitah is valid, because we assume that it became notched by a bone. Now R. Huna's opinion is clear, it being in accordance with the principle he laid down above; but what is the reason of R. Hisda's opinion?- He reasons thus: A bone certainly notches [the knife], whereas the skin may or may not notch [the knife]; there is thus a doubt against a certainty, and a doubt cannot set aside a certainty. Raba raised an objection [against R. Hisda], thereby supporting the opinion of R. Huna. [It was taught: ] If a man immersed himself and came up, and then there was found something adhering to his body, even though he was using that particular substance all day long [after his immersion], it is not regarded as a proper immersion unless he can declare: ‘I am certain it was not upon me before [my immersion]’ — Now in this case, he certainly immersed himself, and there is a doubt whether the substance was or was not upon him [before his immersion], yet the doubt sets aside the certainty! — This case is different, for one can say: Let the unclean person remain in his [unclean] status, and assume that there has been no immersion. Well, then, in our case too, one can say: let the animal remain in its [forbidden] status, and assume that there has been no slaughtering? — Surely the animal is slaughtered before us. But, here too, surely this man has immersed himself before us! In the latter case, something has happened to impair [his immersion]. But in the former case, too, something has happened to impair [the slaughtering]! — No; the defect is in the knife but not in the animal. An objection was raised: If one cut through the gullet and then the windpipe was torn away from its position, the slaughtering is valid. If the windpipe was first torn away and then one cut through the gullet, the slaughtering is invalid. If one cut through the gullet and then the windpipe was found to be torn away, and it is not known whether it was torn away before or after the slaughtering — this was an actual case [brought before the Rabbis], and they ruled: Any doubt whatsoever arising about the slaughtering makes it invalid. Now what is the scope of this rule? Does it not include the case mentioned above? — No. It includes those cases where there is a doubt as to whether or not one paused or pressed [in the act of slaughtering].ʰʲˡ

2 But what is the difference? — In the latter cases the defect has arisen in the animal, whereas in the above mentioned case the defect has arisen in the knife but not in the animal. The law is as R. Huna ruled where he did not break up bones [with the knife after slaughtering]. And the law is as R. Hisda ruled where he did break up bones. It follows that R. Hisda maintains his view even where no bones were broken up; then the question is: how did the knife become notched? — You can say: It became notched through striking the bone of the neck. There happened such a case and R. Joseph declared as many as thirteen animals to be trefah. Now, whose view did he follow? Did he follow R. Huna's view [and so declared them all trefah,] including the first animal? — No, he may have followed R. Hisda's view, and [so declared then, all trefah.] excepting the first animal. If you wish, however, I can say that he followed R. Huna's view, because if he followed R. Hisda's view, then, since R. Hisda adopts a lenient view, why is it suggested that the knife became notched through striking the neck-bone of the first animal? Should we not say that it became notched through striking the neck-bone of the last animal? R. Aha the son of Raba told R. Ashi that R. Kahana required the knife to be examined after each animal that was slaughtered. Now, whose view did he adopt? Was it R. Huna's view, with the result that [if the knife were not examined between each animal that was slaughtered,] even the first animal would be trefah? — No. It was R. Hisda's view that he adopted, and [he therefore required the knife to be examined after each animal so that] even those slaughtered after [the first] should be permitted. If this is so, should not the knife be examined by a Sage? — [It is not necessary, for] one witness is believed in matters concerning ritual prohibition. If so, it should never be necessary. — Indeed, has not R. Johanan said that it is only out of respect to the Sage that it was ruled that one must present the knife to the Sage [for inspection]? Whence is derived the principle which the Rabbis have adopted, viz.: Determine every matter by its status? — R. Samuel b. Nahmani said in the name of R. Jonathan. It is derived from the verse: Then the priest shall go out of the house to the door of the house, and shut up the house seven days. Now may it not have happened that, while he was going out, the leprous spot diminished in size? [Yet we do not apprehend this] because we say: Determine every matter by its status. R. Aha b. Jacob demurred to this: Perhaps the priest in going out of the house walks backwards so that he can see [the spot] as he is leaving! — Abaye retorted: There are two answers to your objection. In the first place, going out backwards is not a ‘going out’. In the second place, what will you say when the leprous spot is behind the door? And if you say that he opens up a window [in the door]; have we not learnt: In a dark house one may not open up windows to inspect the leprous spot? — Said Raba to him, With regard to your statement that going out backwards is not a ‘going out’, the case of the High Priest on the Day of Atonement proves otherwise; for in that case, though it is written: And he shall go out, we have learnt: The High Priest goes out and leaves as he entered. And with regard to your reference to the statement that ‘in a dark house one may not open up windows to inspect the leprous spot’, this rule only applies when the leprosy has not yet been ascertained; but once the leprosy has been ascertained the matter is determined. A [Baraitha] was taught which is not in agreement with the view of R. Aha b. Jacob: [Since it is written,] ‘Then the priest shall go out of the house’, you might think that he may go to his own house and shut up [the affected house from there]. the verse therefore reads: ‘To the door of the house’. But if [we had only] ‘the door of the house’ to go by you might think that he may stand under the doorpost [of the affected house] and shut it up. The verse therefore reads: ‘Out of the house’, that is to say, he must go right out of the house. How is this done? He stands outside the doorpost and shuts it up. Moreover, whence do we know that if he went to his own home and shut it up [from there], or if he remained within the [affected] house and shut it up the shutting-up is valid? The verse therefore says. ‘And he shall shut tip the house’, implying that the shutting-up in whatever way effected [is valid]. And R. Ahab. Jacob? —ʳˢʷˣʸᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒ