Bekhorot

holds with R. Jose the Galilean who said: It is possible to ascertain simultaneity in natural processes, and how much more so in human actions.1 May we say that Tannaim differ in this matter? If [a slain body was] found at the same distance between two cities, we do not perform the ceremony of breaking the heifer's neck.2 R. Eliezer says: Both cities bring two heifers. Is not the difference of opinion based on this very point? For the first Tanna holds: that it is impossible to be exact,3 whereas R. Eliezer holds that it is possible to be exact! — But can you really say this? If the first Tanna holds that it is impossible to be exact, why did they not have the ceremony of breaking the heifer's neck? Let the two cities bring one heifer between them and make a stipulation?4 Rather, according to these Tannaim quoted above, they all hold that it is possible to be exact.5 The point at issue, however, is whether we hold that the words ‘[the city] which is nearest’, imply ‘but not [the cities] which are nearest’: The first Tanna holds: The words, ‘Which is nearest’ imply ‘but not [the cities] which are nearest’, whereas R. Eliezer holds: ‘[The city] which is nearest’, implies even [the cities] which are nearest. What do we decide?6 R. Hiyya b. Abin reported in the name of R. Amram: A Tanna taught: If a slain body is found at exactly the same distance between two cities, R. Eliezer says: Both cities bring two heifers, whereas the Sages say: They shall bring one heifer between them and make a stipulation. Now what is the reasoning of the Rabbis [Sages]? If the Rabbis hold that it is possible to be exact and the words ‘[The city] which is nearest’, imply also ‘[the cities] which are nearest’, then let them bring two heifers. And if the words ‘[The city] which is nearest’ imply ‘but not [the cities] which are nearest, then they should not bring even one heifer? You can, therefore, deduce from this that the Rabbis hold that it is impossible to be exact even in human actions. This is proved. R. TARFON SAYS: THE PRIEST CHOOSES FOR HIMSELF THE BETTER ONE. What is the reason of R. Tarfon? — He holds that the animal which is stronger came forth first. R. AKIBA SAYS: WE COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM, etc. R. Hiyya b. Abba reported in the name of R. Johanan: The priest takes the lean one. Said R. Hiyya b. Abba to R. Johanan: But do we not read meshammenin?7 — He replied to him: While you were not yet eating date-berries8 in Babylonia, we expounded R. Akiba's statement from the latter part of the Mishnah. For the latter part of the Mishnah says: IF ONE OF THEM DIES, R. TARFON SAYS THEY DIVIDE IT. R. AKIBA SAYS: THE CLAIMANT MUST PRODUCE THE EVIDENCE. Now, if we were to assume that the word meshammenin etc. means that they are divided equally, here also let them divide the live animal equally! Rather what is meant by meshammenin is that the fat animal [remains to be divided] between them,9 for [the Israelite] says to the priest: Bring a proof that it is a firstling and take it.10 AND THE SECOND ONE [IN THE POSSESSION OF THE ISRAELITE] IS LEFT TO PASTURE UNTIL IT IS BLEMISHED What is the reason of R. Meir?11 — Said R. Johanan: Because the priest can make a claim upon him from two sides. For he can say to him: If it is a firstling then it belongs to me entirely. And if it is not a firstling, give me the priest's gifts therefrom. And R. Jose — what is his reason? Said Raba: [The Rabbis] put one who had not taken possession, in the position of one who had taken possession. So although it had not reached the priest's hands, it is as if it had reached his hands and he had sold it to the Israelite when blemished.12 Said R. Eleazar: All [the authorities concerned] agree that an animal which is a doubtful first-born, since the priest has [a beast] in its stead,13 is liable for the priest's gifts. [You say] all the authorities concerned. Now, whose view does this represent? R. Jose's! But is not this obvious? For R. Jose exempts only where the priest has [a beast] in its stead, in which case [the Sages] put one who has not taken possession, in the position of one who had taken possession. But where the priest has nothing In its stead, it is not so? — You might have thought that the reason of R. Jose was because he held that if you make him liable for the priest's gifts he may come to shear and work [the animal], even where the priest has nothing in its stead. He consequently informs us [that we do not fear this]. But how can you say this?14 Have we not learnt [in the subsequent Mishnah]: For R. Jose used to say: atone for her’. between the Israelite and the priest. of doubtful ownership. is, according to the ruling (supra 12b) exempt from the priest's gifts. nothing in its place, the animal grazes until it is blemished and is therefore liable for the priest's gifts, for in such a case you cannot argue that it is as if it had been acquired by the priest and subsequently sold to the Israelite, as the priest received nothing in return.