Soncino English Talmud
Bava Metzia
Daf 87b
BEFORE ITS LABOUR IS COMPLETED, UPON THAT WHICH IS DETACHED FROM THE SOIL AFTER ITS LABOUR IS COMPLETED, AND UPON THAT WHICH DOES NOT GROW FROM THE SOIL. GEMARA. Whence do we know these things? — It is written, When thou comest into thy neighbour's vineyard, then thou mayest eat. We have found [this law to be true of] a vineyard: whence do we know it of all [other] things? We infer [them] from the vineyard: just as the vineyard is peculiar in that it [sc. its products] grow from the earth, and at the completion of its labour the labourer may eat thereof; so everything which grows from the soil, the labourer may eat thereof at the completion of its work. [But, might it not be argued:] As for a vineyard, [the worker's privilege may be due to the fact] that it is liable to [the law of] gleanings, [which other cereals are not]? — We, deduce it from the standing corn. But how do we know it of standing corn itself? — Because it is written, When thou comest into the kamath [standing corn] of thy neighbour, then thou mayest pluck the ears with thine hand. But [may you not argue:] as for standing corn, that is because it is liable to hallah? (And how do you know that this kamah means [only] such standing crops as are liable to hallah: perhaps Scripture means all standing crops? — That is derived from the use of kamah in two places. Here it is written, When thou comest into the kamath [standing corn of] thy neighbour; whilst elsewhere it is written, from such time as thou beginnest to put the sickle to the kamah [corn]: just as there, a kamah which is liable to hallah is meant, so here too.) [Hence, repeating the difficulty] one may refute [the analogy drawn from standing corn]: as for standing corn, that is because it is liable to hallah! — Then let the vineyard prove it. As for a vineyards that is because it is liable to [the law of] gleanings! — Let the standing corn prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the peculiarity of one is not that of the other, and vice versa. The feature common to both is, they grow from the soil, and the worker may [thus] eat of them when their labour is being finished; so also, everything which grows from the soil, when at the completion of its labour, the worker may eat of it. [No, this does not follow, as it might be argued that] their common feature is that both are used in connection with the altar; and so olives will be inferred too, since they also are thus used? (But are olives inferred through [partaking of] a common feature? They themselves are designated kerem, as it is written, And he burnt up both the shocks and the standing corn, and also the olive kerem. — R. Papa said: It is designated olive kerem, but not simply kerem.) But still, the difficulty remains! — Samuel answered: Scripture saith, and a sickle [thou shalt not move unto thy neighbour's standing corn], which [i.e., the 'and'] extends the law to everything which requires a sickle. But this word 'sickle' is needed [to intimate that] when the sickle [is used] you may eat, but not otherwise! — That follows from, but thou shalt not put any in thy vessel. Now, this [deduction] is satisfactory in respect of that which requires the sickle, but what of that which does not? — But, said R. Isaac, the Writ says, kamah, to extend the law to everything which stands upright [from the soil]. But have you not employed the analogy of kamah, written twice, to shew that it means [only] such standing crops as are liable to hallah? — That was only before the word 'sickle' was adduced: now, however, that 'sickle' has been quoted, everything which needs a sickle is embraced, even if not liable to hallah; hence, what is the purpose of kamah? To include everything which stands upright. But now that we infer [these laws] from 'sickle' and kamah, what is the need of, 'When thou comest into thy neighbour's vineyard'? — To teach its [detailed] laws, replied Raba. As it has been taught: When thou comest — 'coming' is mentioned here; and elsewhere too it is said, [Thou shalt not oppress a hired servant … At this day thou shalt give him his hire,] neither shall the sun come down upon it: just as there Scripture refers to an employee, so here too. 'Into thy neighbour's vineyard', but not into a heathen's vineyard. Now, on the view that the robbery of a heathen is forbidden, it is well: but if it be held permitted — does an employee need [a verse to grant him permission]! — He interprets 'into thy neighbour's vineyard', as excluding a vineyard of hekdesh. 'Then thou mayest eat', but not suck out [the juice]; 'grapes', but not grapes and something else; 'as thine own person', as the person of the employers, so the person of the employee: just as thou thyself mayest eat [thereof] and art exempt [from tithes], so the employee too may eat and is exempt. 'To thy satisfaction': but not gluttonously; 'but thou shalt not put any in thy vessel': [only] when thou canst put it into thine employer's baskets, thou mayest eat, but not otherwise. R. Jannai said: Tebel is not liable to tithes
Sefaria
Bava Metzia 88a · Deuteronomy 23:25 · Deuteronomy 23:26 · Leviticus 19:10 · Numbers 15:20 · Deuteronomy 16:9 · Deuteronomy 23:26 · Berakhot 35a · Menachot 6a · Kiddushin 5b · Chullin 114a · Menachot 60b · Sotah 29b · Makkot 4b · Nazir 40a · Kiddushin 78a · Sanhedrin 66a · Yevamot 77a · Kiddushin 21a · Judges 15:5 · Deuteronomy 23:26 · Deuteronomy 23:25 · Deuteronomy 23:26 · Deuteronomy 23:25 · Deuteronomy 24:15 · Deuteronomy 23:25 · Gittin 81a · Berakhot 35b
Mesoret HaShas
Gittin 81a · Berakhot 35b · Berakhot 35a · Menachot 6a · Kiddushin 5b · Chullin 114a · Menachot 60b · Sotah 29b · Makkot 4b · Nazir 40a · Kiddushin 78a · Sanhedrin 66a · Yevamot 77a · Kiddushin 21a