Bava Metzia

Why is it different [if the bill fell] into the hands of a judge?  — Raba says: The meaning [of the clause] is this: If a third person finds a bill which has already been in the hands of a judge, that is, when it bears a legal endorsement,  it must never be produced again.  And [thus we learn that a found bill] must not be returned [to the claimant] not only when it bears no legal endorsement, so that it can be assumed that it was written for the purpose of securing a loan but the loan did not take place, but even when it bears a legal endorsement, as when it has been verified [in Court], because we apprehend that payment may have been made.  But R. Jose says: It retains its validity — and we do not apprehend that payment may have been made. But does not R. Jose really apprehend that payment may have been made? Has it not been taught [in a Baraitha]: In the case of a marriage-contract  found in the street, if the husband admits [that he has not paid her the amount specified in the contract] it shall be returned to the wife, but if the husband does not admit it, it must not be returned either to him or to her; R. Jose says that if the wife is still with the husband it shall be returned to her,  but if she has become a widow or has been divorced, it must not be returned either to him or to her?  — Reverse [the Baraitha and read it this way]: If [a bill] fell into the hands of a judge, it must never be produced again; this is the view of R. Jose. And the Sages say that it retains its validity.  But if so, the two opinions of the Rabbis contradict each other!  — [The Baraitha which deals with] the [lost] marriage-contract [conveys] in its entirety [the view of] R. Jose, but a clause is omitted, and [the Baraitha] should read thus: If the husband does not admit [that he has not paid the wife the amount specified in the contract] it must not be returned either to him or to her. This, however, only applies to [the case of] a widow or a divorced woman, but [in the case of a wife] who is still with her husband it shall be returned to the wife; this is the view of R. Jose; for R. Jose says: If the wife is still with the husband, it shall be returned to her; but if she has become a widow or has been divorced, it must not be returned either to him or to her. R. Papa says: There is really no need to reverse [the Baraitha];  R. Jose only states the case in accordance with the views of the Rabbis [and he says to them:] According to me we do not apprehend that payment may have been made even in the case of a widow or a divorced woman, but according to you — admit at least that when the wife is still with the husband [the marriage-contract] should be returned to her, as she is not entitled to receive payment [as long as she is his wife]. But the Rabbis answered him: Say, he handed her over bundles [of valuables] as security [and she has retained them]!  Rabina says: By all means reverse the first [Baraitha],  and the reason why the Rabbis decide here [that if the husband does not admit liability, the marriage-contract must not be returned either to him or to her] is that we apprehend [lest the wife had] two marriage-contracts.  And as to R. Jose — he does not apprehend [lest the wife had] two marriage-contracts. R. Eleazar says: The division  [takes place] when both [claimants] cling either to the form  [of the bill] or to the operative part  [thereof], but if one [claimant] clings to the form, and the other clings to the operative part, one takes the form and the other takes the operative part. And R. Johanan says: They always divide equally. [What!] Even if one clings to the form and the other to the operative part? Was it not taught: Each one takes as much as his hand grasps?  — [Yes.] But it is necessary [to have R. Johanan's decision] in a case where the operative part is contained in the middle [of the document].  But if so, what need is there to state it?  — It is necessary [to state it that it may be applied to a case] where [the operative part] is nearer to one [of the claimants].  You might assume that one could say to the other, 'Divide it this way', therefore we are informed that the other may say to him: 'What makes you think of dividing it this way? Divide it the other way.' R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina: According to R. Eleazar, who says. 'One takes the form [of the bill] and the other takes the operative part.' — of what use are [the parts] to either of them? Does one need them to use as a stopper for one's bottle?  — He [Rabina] answered him: [It is] the estimated value thereof [that has to be considered]. We estimate how much a dated document is worth as compared with one undated: with a dated document a debt may be collected from mortgaged property, but with the other [document] no debt can be collected from mortgaged property  — and one gives the other the difference [in the value of the two documents]. Also [the decision previously given in the words], 'They shall divide,' as quoted,  refers to the value [of the bill]. For if you do not assume this, [how explain:] 'TWO HOLD A GARMENT' [etc.]? Would you say that here also they divide [the garment] in halves? They would surely render it useless! — This presents no difficulty,