Bava Metzia

now, since this is redundant in respect of money neshek, as it is already written, Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother,  utilise the subject [to teach that the prohibition of] ribbith [applies to] money.  [From this] I know it only of the borrower:  whence do we know it of the lender? Neshek is stated in reference to the borrower; also in reference to the lender:  just as with respect of the neshek written in reference to the borrower, no distinction is drawn between money and provisions, neshek and ribbith,  so also, in respect to neshek written in reference to the lender, you must draw no distinction between money and provisions, neshek and ribbith. Whence do we know to extend [the law] to everything?  From the verse, neshek of anything that is lent upon usury. Rabina said: There is no need of any verse [to teach] either that the prohibition neshek in respect of victuals, or of ribbith in respect of money, [applies to the lender]. For were it written, 'Thy money thou shalt not give him upon neshek, and thy food upon marbith,' [it would be] even as you say.  Since, however, it is written, Thy money thou shalt not give him upon neshek and upon marbith thou shalt not lend thy victuals,  read it thus: 'Thy money thou shalt not give him upon neshek and upon marbith, and upon neshek and upon marbith thou shalt not give thy victuals.'  But does not the Tanna state, 'it is said…it is said'?  — He means this: if the verse were not written [in such a way], I should have adduced a gezerah shawah: now, however, that the verse is couched [thus], the gezerah shawah is unnecessary. Then for what purpose do I need the gezerah shawah? — In respect of neshek of anything for which usury may be given, which is not written in connection with the lender. Raba said: Why did the Divine Law write an injunction against ribbith, an injunction against robbery, and an injunction against overreaching?  — They are necessary. For had the Divine Law stated an injunction against ribbith [only], [no other prohibition could be deduced therefrom] because it is anomalous,  the prohibition lying even upon the debtor.  Again, had the Divine Law written an interdict against robbery [I might argue that] that is because it is against his [the victim's] wish,  but as for overreaching, I might maintain [that it is] not [forbidden].  And were there a prohibition in the Divine Law against overreaching only, [I might reason,] that is because he [the defrauded] does not know [of his loss], to be able to pardon. Now one could not be deduced from another: but cannot one be derived from the other two? — Which could be [thus] deduced? Should the Divine Law omit the prohibition of usury, that it might follow from these [robbery and fraud]? [But I would argue,] The reason why these are [forbidden] is because they lack [the victim's] consent:  will you say [the same] of usury, which is [taken] with his [the debtor's] consent? And if the Divine Law omitted the injunction against overreaching, that it might be deduced from the others, [I would argue:] The reason why the others are [forbidden] is because commerce  is not carried on thus!  — But the Divine Law should not have stated the prohibition of robbery, and it would have followed from the others. For what objections will you raise: as for interest, that it is an anomaly? Then let overreaching prove it.  [Should you argue,] As for fraud, [the reason of the prohibition] is that he [the victim] is in ignorance thereof, and cannot pardon: then let interest prove it.  And thus the argument revolves: the distinguishing feature of one is not the distinguishing feature of the other, and vice versa. The characteristic common to both is that he robs him. So also may I adduce [actual] robbery [as prohibited]! — I will tell you: That indeed is so. Then what is the need of an injunction against robbery? In respect of withholding the payment of a hired worker. But [the prohibition against the] withholding of such payment is explicitly stated: Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy! … at his day thou shalt give him his hire!  — To teach that he [who withholds payment] transgresses two negative precepts.  Then let it  be referred to interest or fraud, that [in their case] two negative commands are transgressed?  — It is a matter deduced from its context,