1A denar may not be lent for a denar [to be returned]. Now, which denar is meant? Shall we say, a silver denar for a silver denar [to be repaid]: but is there any view that it does not rank as money even in relation to itself? Hence it must obviously mean a gold denar for a gold denar. Now, with whom [does this ruling agree]? If with Beth Hillel — but they maintain that it ranks as coin! Therefore it must surely be in accordance with Beth Shammai, thus proving that it was R. Johanan who held that such redemption is not permissible! — No. In truth, I may assert that R. Johanan ruled that such redemption may be made, but a loan is different. For since the Rabbis treated it as produce in reference to buying and selling, as we say that it is that [sc. gold] which appreciates or depreciates, it ranks as produce in reference to loans too. This is reasonable too. For when Rabin came, he said in R. Johanan s name: Though it was ruled that a denar may not be lent for a denar [to be repaid], yet the second tithe may be redeemed therewith. This proves it. Come and hear: If one changes a sela''s worth of second tithe [copper] coins, Beth Shammai rule: the full sela''s worth of coins must be changed. But Beth Hillel rule: [He may change] only a shekel's worth into silver, and retain a shekel's worth of coins. Now, if in Beth Shammai's opinion redemption may be made with [copper] perutahs, can there be a doubt that it may be redeemed with gold? — Copper coins are different, for where they circulate, they have greater currency. Another version puts is thus: R. Johanan and Resh Lakish [differ thereon]: One maintains that the dispute concerns changing sela's for [gold] denarii. Beth Shammai hold that 'the money' implies the first money, but not the second; whereas Beth Hillel argue, 'the money … money' implies extension, thus including even a second [redemption of] money. But all agree that [actual] produce may be redeemed by [gold] denarii, since it [sc. the gold denarii] is, after all still the first money. Whilst the other maintains: The dispute concerns the exchanging of [real] produce for [gold] denarii too. Now, on the view that the dispute refers only to the exchange of sela's for denarii, instead of stating the dispute in reference to the exchange of sela's for denarii, let it be stated in reference to the exchange of sela's for sela's! — If the dispute were stated thus, I might have thought that it applies only thereto, but as for exchanging sela's for [gold] denarii, Beth Hillel concede to Beth Shammai that gold ranks as produce in respect to silver, and therefore such redemption is not permissible. Hence we are taught otherwise. Come and hear: If one exchanges a sela' of second tithe in Jerusalem, Beth Shammai say: He must exchange the whole sela' for [copper] coins. But Beth Hillel rule: He must change it into a silver shekel, and [retain] a shekel's worth of [copper] coins. Now, if silver may be redeemed with [copper] Perutahs, and we do not say. [It may be exchanged into] money once, but not twice: are we to say it in respect of gold, which is more valuable? — Said Raba: Do you raise an objection from Jerusalem! Jerusalem is different, since it is written thereof, And thou shalt bestow that money [sc. in Jerusalem] for whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, for oxen, for sheep, [etc.]. Come and hear: 'If one changes a sela''s worth of second tithe [copper] coins, Beth Shammai rule: the full sela''s worth of coins must be changed. But Beth Hillel rule: He must change only a shekel's worth into silver, and retain a shekel's worth of coins'? — Hence [we must assume that] all agree, that 'the silver … silver' is an extension, including even a second redemption of money. But if a dispute between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish was stated, It was stated thus: One maintains: Their dispute concerns the changing of sela's into [gold] denarii only. Beth Shammai hold: We forbid this as a precautionary measure,ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷ
2lest one postpone his pilgrimages [to Jerusalem], for he may not have the full number of silver coins required for a [gold] denar, and so will not take them up [thither]; whilst Beth Hillel are of the opinion that we do not fear that he may postpone his pilgrimages, for even if they are insufficient to change into a denar, he will still take them up. But all agree that produce may be redeemed with [gold] denarii, for since it rots [if kept long], he will certainly not keep it back. But the other maintains: The dispute refers even to the exchange of produce for denarii. Now, according to the version that by Biblical law it [the exchange] is indeed permitted, but that the Rabbis forbade it, it is well: hence he [the Tanna] teaches 'he may turn'…'he may not turn.' But according to the version that they differ in Scriptural law, he should have stated, 'One can redeem'…'one cannot redeem!' This difficulty remains. It has been stated: Rab and Levi-one maintains: Coins can effect a barter; the other rules that they cannot — Said R. Papa: What is his reason who maintains that a coin cannot effect a barter? Because his [the recipient's] mind is set on the legend thereof, and the legend is liable to cancellation. We learnt: GOLD ACQUIRES SILVER. Does that not mean, even in virtue of barter, thus proving that a coin may effect a barter? — No; only in virtue of payment. If so, instead of stating, GOLD ACQUIRES SILVER, he should have said, 'Gold sets up a liability for silver'! — Learn: 'Gold sets up a liability for [etc.].' Reason supports this too; since the second clause states. SILVER DOES NOT ACQUIRE GOLD. Now, should you agree that it means, 'in virtue of payment.' it is well: thus we say, gold ranks as produce, silver as money, and money cannot effect a title in respect of produce. But should you maintain that the reference is to barter — let each acquire the other! Moreover, it has been taught: Silver does not acquire gold: E.g.. If one sells twenty-five silver denarii for a gold denar, even if the other party takes possession of the silver, he does not acquire it until he [the first] takes possession of the gold. Now, should you agree that the reference is to payment, it is well: therefore he gains no title thereto. But if you maintain that this treats of barter, let him acquire it! — What then: as payment? If so, consider the first clause: Gold acquires silver: e.g. If one sold a gold denar for twenty-five silver denarii, immediately the other party takes possession of the gold, the ownership of the silver vests [in the first] wherever it be. Now, should you agree that the reference is to barter, it is well: hence it is taught, the ownership of the silver vests [in the first] wherever it be. But should you maintain that it treats of payment, instead of saying thus, he [the Tanna] should have taught: The man [the recipient of the gold] becomes liable [for the silver]! — Said R. Ashi: After all, it refers to payment, and what is meant by 'wherever it be', is 'just as it is,' viz., as he stipulated. [Thus:] If he had stated. 'I will give you [coins] out of a new purse', he cannot give him [coins] out of an old purse, even If they are superior. Why? Because he can say, 'I need them to store away.' R. Papa said: Even on the view that a coin cannot effect a barter, — though indeed it cannot effect a barter, it can nevertheless be acquired through barter. For this may be compared to produce, according to R. Nahman's view. Thus, though in R. Nahman's view produce cannot effect a barter, yet it can surely be acquired through barter; so coin too is not [in any way] different. An objection is raised: If one is standing in a granary and has no money with him, he may say to his friend, 'Behold, this produce is given to you as a gift;' ˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳ