1The owner's knowledge is required. If R. Ishmael, why particularly if he designated [a place]: even if he did not, it is still the same! — This is a case of 'it goes without saying.' [Thus:] It goes without saying that if he designated [a place for it, the owner's knowledge of its return is not required,] since it is its place: but even if no designation was made, so that it is not its place, yet the owner's knowledge is not required. Then consider the second clause: IF THE OWNER DESIGNATES A PLACE FOR IT, AND HE MOVES IT AND IT IS BROKEN, WHETHER IN HIS HAND OR AFTER HE PUTS IT DOWN, — [IF HE MOVED IT] FOR HIS PURPOSE, HE IS RESPONSIBLE; IF FOR ITS OWN NEED, HE IS NOT LIABLE. That agrees with R. Akiba, who ruled, The owner's knowledge is required. If R. Akiba, why particularly if designation is made: even if not,it is likewise so? — This is a case of 'it goes without saying.' [Thus:] It goes without saying that if he did not designate [a place for it, the owner's knowledge of its return is required,] since it is not its place; but even if designation was made, so that it is its place, the owner's knowledge is still required. Then the first clause agrees with R. Ishmael, and the second with R. Akiba? — Even so, for R. Johanan said: He who will explain me [the Mishnah of] BARREL so as to agree with one Tanna, I will carry his attire after him to the baths. R. Jacob b. Abba interpreted it before Rab as meaning that he took it with the intention of stealing it; R. Nathan b. Abba interpreted it before Rab as meaning that he took it with the intention of using it. Wherein do they [sc. R. Jacob b. Abba and R. Nathan b. Abba] differ? — In whether [unlawful] use must be accompanied by damage. He who says, [He must have taken it] in order to steal it, holds that [unlawful] use must result in damage; whilst he who maintains that it was in order to use it, is of the opinion that [unlawful] use need not result in damage. R. Shesheth raised an objection: Does he [the Tanna] State 'he took it?' he actually Says, HE MOVES IT! But, said R. Shesheth, this treats of one who took it in order to reach down birds [whilst standing] upon it, and he [the Tanna of the Mishnah] holds that a borrower without permission is regarded as a robber. Thus the whole of it [sc. the Mishnah] agrees with R. Ishmael, the second clause meaning that he did not return it to its place. And R. Johanan? — 'HE PUTS IT DOWN' implies in its own place. It has been stated: Rab and Levi: One maintained, [Unlawful] use [by the bailee] must involve damage; and the other maintained, It need not. It may be proved that it was Rab who ruled that [unlawful] use need not involve damage. For it has been taught: If a shepherd who was guarding his flock left it and entered the town: then a wolf came and destroyed a sheep, or a lion, and tore it to pieces, he is free from liability. If he put his staff or wallet upon it, he is liable. Now we pondered thereon: because he put his staff or wallet upon it, he is liable: but he [also] took them away! Whereupon R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha in Rab's name: It means that it is still upon it. Yet even if it was still upon it, what of that? but he had not taken possession of it! R. Samuel son of R. Isaac answered in Rab's name: It means that he smote it with his staff and it ran before him. But he had inflicted no damage upon it! Hence this Surely proves that he [Rab] holds that [unlawful] use need not involve damage! — [No.] Say thus: He had weakened it with his staff. This follows too from the fact that he states, He smote it with his staff. This proves it. Now, since Rab holds that [unlawful] use must involve damage, it follows that Levi maintains that it does not: what is Levi's reason? — Said R. Johanan on the authority of R. Jose b. Nehorai: [Unlawful] use stated in connection with a paid bailee differs from that stated in connection with a gratuitous bailee;ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸ
2but I say, It is not different. Wherein [and why] is it different? — For [unlawful] use should not have been stated in connection with a paid bailee, and it would have been inferred from a gratuitous bailee: if an unpaid bailee, who is not responsible for theft or loss, is nevertheless liable if he puts it [the bailment] to use; then a paid bailee, who is responsible for theft or loss, is surely [liable if he puts it to use]. Why then did Scripture state them [both]? To teach you that [unlawful] use need not involve damage. 'But I Say, It is not different,' in accordance with R. Eleazar, who maintained: Both have the same purpose. How Say, 'both have the same purpose'? — Because one can refute [that argument]. As for a gratuitous bailee, [he may be liable if he used it] because he must repay double on a [false] plea of theft. And he who does not refute [it thus] is of the opinion that [liability to] the principal without [the option of] an oath is a greater responsibility than [having to pay] double after a [false] oath. Raba said: [Unlawful] use need not have been mentioned in connection with either an unpaid or a paid bailee, and it could have been inferred from a borrower. If a borrower, who in using it acts with its owner's permission, is [nevertheless] responsible [for unpreventable accidents]; surely the same applies to unpaid and paid bailees! Then why is it stated [in connection with these two]? Once, to teach you that [unlawful] use need not involve damage. And the other: that you should not say: It is sufficient that that which is deduced a minori shall be as that from which it is deduced: just as a borrower is exempt if the owner [is in his service], so also are unpaid and paid bailees exempt, if the owner [is in their service.] Now, on the view that [unlawful] use must involve damage, what is the purpose of these two [statements] on [unlawful] use? — One, that you should not say, It is sufficient that that which is deduced a minori shall be as that from which it is deduced. And the other, for what was taught: [If a man shall deliver unto his neighbour money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen … If the thief be not found,] then the master of the house shall be brought unto the judges — for an oath. You say, 'for an oath'. But perhaps it is not so, the meaning being for judgment? [Unlawful] use is stated below; and [unlawful] use is stated above: just as there, [the reference is] to an oath, so here too, for an oath [is meant]. ᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒ