Bava Kamma

Raba, however, said that all might have been agreed that there is progressive [liability for] hire from the very commencement until the end, and also that one who betroths [a woman] by [forgoing] a debt [due from her] would not thereby effect a valid betrothal, and it was again unanimously held that a craftsman does not acquire title to the improvement carried out by him upon an article,  and here we are dealing with a case where, e.g., he added a particle out of his own [funds  to the raw material supplied by her], R. Meir holding that where the [instrument of betrothal] is both [the foregoing of] a debt and [the giving of] a perutah,  the woman thinks more  of the perutah,  whereas the Rabbis held that where the [instrument of betrothal] is both [the foregoing of] a debt and [the giving of] a perutah, she thinks more of the debt [which she is excused]. This was also the difference between the following Tannaim, as taught: [If a man says,] 'In consideration of the hire for the work I have already done for you  [be betrothed to me],'  she would not become betrothed,  but [if he says], 'In consideration of the hire for work which I will do for you [be betrothed to me]', she would become betrothed. R. Nathan said that if he said, 'In consideration of the hire for work I will do for you,' she would thereby not become betrothed; and all the more so in this case where he said, 'In consideration of the hire for work I have already done for you.' R. Judah the Prince, however, says: It was truly stated that whether he said, 'In consideration of the hire for the work I have already done for you,'  or, 'In consideration of the hire for work I will do for you,' she would not thereby become betrothed, but if he added a particle out of his own funds  [to the raw material supplied by her], she would thereby become betrothed.  Now, the difference between the first Tanna and R. Nathan is on the question of the liability for hire [whether or not it is progressive from the very commencement],  while the difference between R. Nathan and R. Judah the Prince is on the question [what is her attitude when the betrothal is made both by the foregoing of] a debt [and the giving of] a perutah. Samuel said: An expert slaughterer who did not carry out the slaughter properly  would be liable to pay, as he was a damage-doer, [and] he was careless, and this would be considered as if the owner asked him to slaughter for him from one side  and he slaughtered for him from the other. But why was it necessary for him to say both 'he was a damage-doer [and] he was careless'? — If he had said only he was a damage-doer, I might have said that this ruling should apply only where he was working for a hire,  whereas where he was working gratuitously this would not be so; we are therefore told, [that there is no distinction as] he was careless. R. Hama b. Guria raised an objection to this view of Samuel [from the following]: If an animal was given to a slaughterer and he caused it to become nebelah,  if he was an expert he would be exempt, but if an amateur  he would be liable. If, however, he was engaged for hire, whether he was an amateur or expert he would be liable. [Is this not in contradiction to the view of Samuel?] — He replied:  Is your brain disordered? Then another one of our Rabbis came along and raised the same objection to his view. He said to him:  'You surely deserve to be given the same as your fellow.  I was stating to you the view of R. Meir and you tell me the view of the Rabbis! Why did you not examine my words carefully wherein I said: "For he was a damage-doer [and] he was careless, and this should be considered as if the owner asked him to slaughter for him from one side  and he slaughtered for him from the other." For surely who reasons in this way if not R. Meir, who said that a human being has to take greater heed to himself?' But what [statement of] R. Meir [is referred to]? We can hardly say the one of R. Meir which we learned: (Mnemonic: KLN)  'If the owner fastened his ox [to the wall inside the stable] with a cord or shut the door in front of it properly but the ox [nevertheless] got out and did damage, whether it had been Tam or already Mu'ad he would be liable; this is the opinion of R. Meir,'  for surely, in that case, there they differed as to the interpretation of Scriptural Verses!  — It therefore seems to be the one of R. Meir which we learned: [If wool was handed over to a dyer] to dye it red but he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, R. Meir says that he would have to pay [the owner] for the value of the wool.  But did he not there spoil it  with his own hands?  — The reference therefore must be to the one of R. Meir which was taught: 'If a pitcher is broken and [the potsherds] are not removed, or a camel falls down and is not raised, R. Meir orders payment for any damage resulting therefrom, whereas the [other] Sages say that no action can be instituted in civil courts though there is liability according to divine justice,'  and we came to the conclusion  that they differed as to whether or not stumbling implies negligence. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said that R. Johanan stated that an expert slaughterer who did not carry out the slaughter properly  would be liable to pay, even if he was as skilled as the slaughterer of Sepphoris. But did R. Johanan really say so? Did Rabbah b. Bar Hanah not say that such a case came before R. Johanan in the synagogue of Maon  and he said to the slaughterer. 'Go and bring evidence that you are skilled to slaughter hens, and I will declare you exempt'? — There is, however, no difficulty, as the latter ruling was [in a case where the slaughterer was working] gratuitously whereas the former ruling applies [where the slaughterer works] for hire,  exactly as R. Zera said: If one wants the slaughterer to become liable to him,  he shall give him a dinarius beforehand. An objection was raised: If wheat was brought to be ground and the miller omitted to moisten it and he made it into branflour or coarse bran, or if flour [was given] to a baker and he made out of it bread which crumbled, or an animal to a slaughterer and he rendered it nebelah,  he would be liable, as he is on the same footing as a worker who receives hire.  [Does this not imply that he was working gratuitously? — No.] read: 'Because he is a worker receiving hire.' A case of magrumeta  was brought before Rab, who declared it trefa and nevertheless released the slaughterer from any payment. When R. Kahana and R. Assi met that man  they said to him: 'Rab did two things with you.' What was meant by these two things? If you say it meant two things to his  disadvantage, one that Rab should have declared it kasher in accordance with R. Jose b. Judah,  whereas he declared it trefa in accordance with the Rabbis,  and again that since he acted in accordance with the Rabbis,  he should at any rate have declared the slaughterer liable, is it permitted to say a thing like that? Was it not taught:  When [a judge] leaves [the court] he should not say, 'I wanted to declare you innocent, but as my colleagues insisted on declaring you liable I was unable to do anything since my colleagues formed a majority against me,' for to such behaviour is applied the verse, A tale-bearer revealeth secrets?  — It must therefore be said that the two things were to his  advantage, first that he did not let you eat a thing which was possibly forbidden, secondly that he restrained you from receiving payment which might possibly have been a misappropriation. It was stated: If a denar was shown to a money changer [and he recommended it as good] but it was subsequently found to be bad, in one Baraitha it was taught that if he was an expert he would be exempt but if an amateur he would be liable, whereas in another Baraitha it was taught that whether he was an expert or an amateur he would be liable. R. Papa stated: The ruling that in the case of an expert he would be exempt refers to such, e.g., as Dankcho and Issur  who needed no [further] instruction whatever, but who made  a mistake regarding a new stamp at the time when the coin had just [for the first time] come from the mint. There was a certain woman who showed a denar to R. Hiyya and he told her that it was good. Later she again came to him and said to him, 'I afterwards showed it [to others] and they said to me that it was bad, and in fact I could not pass it.' He therefore said to Rab: Go forth and change it for a good one and write down in my register that this was a bad business. But why [should he be different from] Dankcho and Issur  who would be exempt because they needed no instruction? Surely R. Hiyya also needed no instruction? — R. Hiyya acted within the 'margin of the judgment,'  on the principle learnt by R. Joseph: 'And shalt show them  means