Bava Kamma

'The Consecration [of cattle  to the altar, the prohibition of] leaven  [from any use] and the manumission of a slave  release any of these articles [if mortgaged] from the burden of the mortgage.  Are we then to say that this statement of Raba constituted a point at issue between these Tannaim? — No; it is possible that all concurred in the ruling of Raba [in general cases], but in this particular case here the Rabbis  [might perhaps] have specially protected the mortgage of the husband.  Or again if you like I may say that these Tannaim were unanimous in not accepting the enactment of Usha, but in the case here they might have differed as to whether the right to usufruct amounts in law to a right to the very substance, exactly as this was the dividing point between the following Tannaim. For it was taught:  'If an owner sells his slave to a man with whom he stipulates that the slave shall still remain to serve him for the next thirty days, R. Meir says that the vendor  would be subject to the law of "a day or two"9 because the slave was still "under" him,' his view being that the right to a usufruct in the slave amounts in law to a right to the very substance of him. 'R. Judah on the other hand says that it is the purchaser who would be subject to the law of "a day or two"10 because the slave was "his money",' his view being that a right to a usufruct in the slave does not amount in law to a right to the very substance of him. 'But R. Jose says that both of them  would be subject to the right of "a day or two": the vendor because the slave was still "under" him and the purchaser because the slave was already "his money",'for he was in doubt whether a right to a usufruct should amount to a right to the very substance or should not amount to a right to the very substance, and, as is well known, a doubt in capital charges should always be for the benefit of the accused.  'R. Eliezer on the other hand says that neither of them would be subject to the law of "a day or two": the purchaser because the slave is not "under" him, and the vendor because he is not "his money".' Raba said: The reason of R. Eliezer was because Scripture says, For he is his money,  implying that he has to be 'his money' owned by him exclusively.  Whose view is followed in the statement made by Amemar that if a husband and wife sold the melog property [even simultaneously], their act is of no effect? Of course the view of R. Eliezer.  So too, who was the Tanna who stated that which our Rabbis taught: 'One who is half a slave and half a freeman,  as well as a slave belonging to two partners does not go out free for the mutilation of the principal limbs,  even those which cannot be restored to him'? Said R. Mordecai to R. Ashi: Thus was it stated in the name of Raba, that this ruling gives the view of R. Eliezer. For did R. Eliezer not say that 'his money' implied that which was owned by him exclusively? So also here 'his slave'  implies one who is owned by him exclusively. MISHNAH. IF A MAN BOXES ANOTHER MAN'S EAR, HE HAS TO PAY HIM  A SELA'.  R. JUDAH IN THE NAME OF R. JOSE THE GALILEAN SAYS THAT [HE HAS TO PAY HIM] A MANEH.  IF HE SMACKED HIM [ON THE FACE] HE HAS TO PAY HIM TWO HUNDRED ZUZ;  [IF HE DID IT] WITH THE BACK OF HIS HAND HE HAS TO PAY HIM FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ. IF HE PULLED HIS EAR, PLUCKED HIS HAIR, SPAT SO THAT THE SPITTLE REACHED HIM, REMOVED HIS GARMENT FROM UPON HIM, UNCOVERED THE HEAD OF A WOMAN IN THE MARKET PLACE, HE MUST PAY FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ.