Bava Kamma

who can collect nothing better than the medium quality.  If, however, you hold that R. Akiba authorises the payment of all loans out of the best, [the treasurer of the Temple could still hardly avail himself of this privilege as] the analogy between these two kinds of liability could be upset as follows: A private creditor is at an advantage in that for damages he will surely be paid out of the best, but is not the Temple Treasury at a very great disadvantage in this respect?  — It may still be maintained that it applies to the case where a private ox gored a consecrated ox, and in answer to the difficulty raised by you — that the Divine Law definitely says The ox of one's neighbour, thus exempting for damage done to consecrated property — it may be suggested that R. Akiba shares the view of R. Simeon b. Menasya as taught:  R. Simeon b. Menasya says: In the case of a consecrated ox goring a private one, there is total exemption; but for a private ox, whether Tam or Mu'ad, goring a consecrated ox, full damages must be paid.  If this is R. Akiba's contention, whence could it be proved that the point at issue between R. Ishmael and R. Akiba is as to the best of the plaintiff's equalling the worst of the defendant's? Why not say that on this point they are both of opinion that the qualities are estimated in relation to the plaintiff's possessions,  whereas the disagreement between them is on the point at issue between R. Simeon b. Menasya and the Rabbis [i.e., the majority against him], R. Akiba holding the view of R. Simeon b. Menasya, and R. Ishmael that of the Rabbis? — If so, what would be the purport of the first clause of R. Akiba, 'Scripture only intended that damages be collected out of the best'?  Again, would not then even the last clause 'And this even more so applies to sacred property' be rather illogically phrased?  Furthermore, R. Ashi said: It was explicitly taught: Of the best of his field and of the best of his vineyard shall he make restitution  refers to the field of the plaintiff and to the vineyard of the plaintiff: this is the view of R. Ishmael. R. Akiba [on the other hand] says: The best of the defendant's field and the best of the defendant's vineyard. Abaye pointed out to Raba the following contradiction: Scripture records, Out of the best of his field and out of the best of his vineyard shall he make restitution  [thus indicating that payment must be made] only out of the best and not out of anything else; whereas it is taught: He should return,  includes payment in kind,  even with bran?  — There is no contradiction: the latter applies when the payment is made willingly, while the former refers to payments enforced [by law]. 'Ulla the son of R. Elai, thereupon said: This distinction is evident even from the Scriptural term, He shall make restitution,  meaning, even against his will. Abaye, on the other hand, said to him: Is it written yeshullam  ['Restitution shall be made']? What is written is yeshallem  ['He shall make restitution'], which could mean of his own free will! — But said Abaye: [The contradiction can be solved] as the Master  [did] in the case taught: An owner of houses, fields and vineyards  who cannot find a purchaser [is considered needy and] may be given the tithe for the poor  up to half the value of his estate.  Now the Master discussed the circumstances under which this permission could apply: If property in general, and his included, dropped in value, why not grant him even the value of more [than the half of his estate's value], since the depreciation is general? If, on the other hand, property in general appreciated, but his, on account of his going about looking here and there for ready money, fell in price,