Bava Kamma

Is not the purpose to indicate to us that it was only where the theft was testified to by two witnesses and the slaughter by one or by the thief himself, in which case it was not the confession  which made him liable for the principal, that we argue that confession by the thief himself is meant to be analogous to the testimony borne by one witness? So that just as in the case of testimony by one witness, as soon as another witness appears and joins him liability would be established, so also in the case of confession by the thief himself, if witnesses subsequently appear and testify to the same effect he would become liable. If, however, the very theft and slaughter [or theft and] sale were testified to by one witness or by the thief himself, in which case the confession made him liable at least for the principal, we would not argue that confession by the thief himself should be analogous to the testimony borne by one witness.  [The proof] from the Baraitha [is] as it was taught: If a thief notices that witnesses are preparing themselves to appear and he confesses, 'I have committed a theft [of an ox] but I neither slaughtered it nor sold it' he would not have to pay anything but the principal.  Now, what need is there for the words, 'and he confessed, I have committed the theft [of an ox] but I neither slaughtered it, nor sold it'? Why not simply state 'I have committed the theft [of an ox], or I slaughtered it or I sold it'? Is not the purpose to indicate that it was only where the thief confessed, 'I have committed the theft [of an ox]'. where it was he who by confession made himself liable for the principal, that he would be exempt from the fine, whereas if he had stated 'I have not committed any theft', and when witnesses arrived and testified that he did commit a theft, he turned round and confessed 'I have even slaughtered it or sold it', and witnesses subsequently appeared [and testified] that he had indeed slaughtered it or sold it, in which case it was not he who made himself liable for the principal, he would have to be liable for the fine, thus proving that a confession merely regarding the act of slaughter should not be considered a confession [to bar the pending liability of a fine]!  — It may, however, be said that this is not so, as the purpose [of the apparently superfluous words] might have been to indicate to us the very ruling that since he confessed 'I have committed the theft [of an ox or a sheep]' even though he still said 'I have neither slaughtered it nor sold it' and witnesses appeared [and testified] that he did slaughter it or sell it, he would nevertheless be exempt from any fine, the reason being that the Divine Law says: 'Five-fold or four-fold payment  respectively, but not 'four-fold or three-fold payment'  respectively. Shall we say that the following Tannaim differed on this point? [For it has been taught:] Where two witnesses testified to a theft [of an ox] and other two witnesses subsequently gave evidence that the thief had slaughtered it or sold it, and the witnesses regarding the theft were proved zomemim,  since the testimony became annulled regarding a part of it,  it would become annulled regarding the whole of it.  But if [only] the witnesses to the slaughter were proved zomemim, he would have to make double payment,  whereas they  would [have to pay him three-fold payment as restitution].  In the name of Symmachus it was, however, stated that they would have to make double payment,  whereas he would have to make three-fold payment for an ox and double payment for a ram.  Now, to what did Symmachus refer? It could hardly be to that of the opening clause,  for would Symmachus not agree that a testimony becoming annulled regarding a part of it should become annulled regarding the whole of it? If again he referred to the concluding clause,  did the Rabbis not state correctly that the thief should make double payment while the false witnesses would have to make three-fold payment? It must therefore be that there was another point at issue between them,  viz., where a pair of witnesses came and said to him: 'You have committed the theft [of an ox]'. and he said to them: 'It is true that I have committed the theft [of an ox] and even slaughtered it or sold it, but it was not in your presence that I committed the theft', and he in fact brought witnesses who proved an alibi  against the first witnesses that it was not in their presence that he committed the theft, while the plaintiff brought further witnesses who gave evidence against the thief that he had committed the theft [of an ox] and slaughtered it or sold it. They would thus differ as to the confession regarding the slaughter, the Rabbis holding that though in regard to the theft it was certainly because of the witnesses  that he confessed, the confession regarding the slaughter  should have the usual effect of confession and exempt him from the fine, whereas Symmachus held that since regarding the theft it was because of witnesses that he confessed, the confession of the slaughter should not have the [full] effect of a confession [as it did not tend to establish any civil liability], so that the first witnesses who were found zomemim  would have to pay him  double, whereas he  would have to pay three-fold for an ox and double for a ram!  — R. Aha the son of R. Ika said: No, all might agree that the confession regarding the slaughter would not have the [exempting] effect of a confession, and where they differ here is regarding evidence given by witnesses whom you would be unable to make subject to the law applicable to zomemim, as e.g., where two witnesses came and said to him: 'You have committed the theft [of the ox]', and he said to them: 'I did commit the theft [of the ox] and even slaughtered it or sold it; it was, however, not in your presence that I committed the theft, but in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,' and he in fact brought witnesses who proved an alibi against the first witnesses, that it was not in their presence that he committed the theft, but so-and-so and so-and-so [mentioned by the thief] came and testified against him that he did commit the theft [of the ox] and slaughtered it or sold it. The point at issue in this case would be as follows: The Rabbis maintain that this last evidence was given by witnesses whom you would [of course] be unable to make subject to the law applicable to zomemim [as they were pointed out by the thief himself],  and any evidence given by witnesses whom you would be unable to make subject to the law applicable to zomemim could not be considered valid evidence,  whereas Symmachus maintained that evidence given by witnesses whom you would be unable to make subject to the law applicable to zomemim would be valid evidence.  But is it not an established tradition with us  that any evidence given by witnesses whom you would be unable to make subject to the law applicable to zomemim could not be considered valid evidence? — This is the case only where the witnesses do not know the exact day or the exact hour of the occurrence alleged by them,  in which case there is in fact no evidence at all, whereas here [your inability to make them subject to the law applicable to zomemim was only because] the thief himself was in every way corroborating their statements. The Master stated: 'They  would have to make double payment. But since in this case the thief admitted that he did commit the theft, so that he would surely be required to pay the principal, [why should the witnesses proved zomemim have to make double payment?]  — Said R. Eleazar in the name of Rab: Read: