Bava Kamma

are not equivalent in law to a single undivided statement,  whereas R. Jose maintained that statements following one another within the minimum of time [sufficient for the utterance of a greeting] are equivalent in law to a single undivided statement.  But did R. Jose really maintain that statements following one another within the minimum of time [sufficient for the utterance of a greeting] are equivalent in law to a single undivided statement? For we have learnt: If a man declares: Let this animal be a substitute  for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering, it will be a substitute for the burnt-offering,  according to the view of R. Meir, whereas R. Jose says: If from the outset he intended this,  his words would have to be acted upon,  as it was impossible for him to utter two terms at the same time, but if he first declared; 'Substitute for a burnt-offering', and then changed his mind and said, 'Substitute for a peace-offering', it will be a substitute for a burnt-offering only.  Now this statement we found strange; for is not the case of a change of mind obvious?  And R. Papa therefore said: We assume that the change of mind took place within the minimum of time [required for the utterance of a greeting]!  [Does this not prove that R. Jose maintained that statements following one another within the minimum of time sufficient for the utterance of a greeting would not be equivalent in law to a single undivided statement?]  — It may be said that there are two different minimums of time [within which two different kinds of greetings could be uttered], one sufficient for the greeting given by a disciple to his master, and the other sufficient for the greeting of the master to the disciple. Where  R. Jose does not hold [the two statements to be one] is where the interval is sufficient for the greeting of a disciple to the master, viz. 'peace [upon] thee, master [and] teacher,' as this is too long,  but where it is only sufficient for the greeting of the master to the disciple, 'peace [upon] thee,  he holds that they do [form one]. Raba stated: Witnesses [testifying to a capital charge] who have been proved wrong  [by a pair of other witnesses]  and subsequently also proved zomemim, would be put to death, as the confutation was a first step in the subsequent proof of an alibi,  though the proof of this was not yet complete at that time. Raba said: [The authority] on which I base this is that which has been taught: [If a set of witnesses declare], We testify that so-and-so has put out the eye of his slave  and  knocked out his tooth  (and so indeed the master himself says), and these witnesses are [by subsequent witnesses] proved zomemim, they would have to pay  the value of the eye to the slave.  How are we to understand this? If we assume, according to the apparent meaning of the text, that there was here no other pair of witnesses,  why should they pay the value of the eye to the slave? After they have done their best to get him [undeservedly] freed, are they also to pay him the value of his eye? Moreover, should they in such a case not have to pay the owner for the full value of the slave [as they falsely demanded his freedom]? Furthermore, 'and so indeed the master himself says,' — how could the master be satisfied [with such a false allegation to his detriment]? Does it therefore not mean a case, e.g., in which a pair of witnesses had already appeared [previously] and stated that the master knocked out the slave's tooth and then put out his eye so that the master would have to pay him the value of his eye,  and a middle pair of witnesses appeared later and stated that the first put out the slave's eye and then his tooth, so that he would not have to give him anything but the value of his tooth,  so that the first set of witnesses confuted the middle set, and it is to this that the words refer 'and so indeed the master himself says', for he was well satisfied with the statement alleged by the middle set? The text then goes on: 'And these are [by subsequent witnesses] proved zomemim' — that is, the middle set — 'they would have to pay the value of the eye to the slave'.  Does not this show that the confutation is the first step in a subsequent proof of an alibi?  — Abaye said: No; [what we can assume is] that the statement of these witnesses was transposed by a [second] set of witnesses, who also proved them zomemim.  That this was so is evident,