Bava Kamma

No.  Because you say that [a certain liability falls on] the unpaid bailee who is subject to pay double payment,  it does not follow that you can say the same in the case of the paid bailee who does not pay double payment.  Now if you assume that an armed malefactor is considered a thief,  it would be possible that even a paid bailee would [in some cases] have to make double payment, as where he pleaded that [the articles in his charge were taken] by an armed malefactor!  — He replied:  What was meant is this: No. Because you say that a certain liability falls on the unpaid bailee, who has to make double payment,  whatever pleas he puts forward,  it does not follow that you can say the same in the case of the paid bailee who could not have to make a double payment except where he puts forward the plea that an armed malefactor  [took away the article in his charge]. He  again brought an objection [from the following]: [From the text] And it be hurt or die  I learn only the case of breakage or death. Whence [could there also be derived cases of] theft and loss?  An a fortiori argument may be applied here: If in the case of Paid Bailee who is exempt for breakage and death  he is nevertheless liable for theft  and loss, in the case of Borrower who is liable for breakage and death  would it not be all the more certain that he should be liable [also] for theft and loss? This a fortiori has indeed no refutation.  Now, if you assume that an armed malefactor is considered a thief why could there be no refutation [of this a fortiori]? It could surely be refuted [thus]: Why [is liability attached] to Paid Bailee if not because he might have to pay double payment where he puts forward the plea [that] an armed malefactor  [took the articles in his charge]?  — He said to him:  This Tanna held that the liability to pay the principal in the absence of any oath  is of more consequence than the liability for double payment which is conditioned by taking the oath. May we say that he  derives support [from the following]: If a man hired a cow from his neighbour and it was stolen, and the hirer said, 'I would prefer to pay and not to swear'  and [it so happened that] the thief was [subsequently] traced, he should make the double payment to the hirer.  Now it was presumed that this statement followed the view of R. Judah  who said that Hirer  is equal [in law] to Paid Bailee.  Since then it says 'the hirer said "I would prefer to pay and not to swear"',  this shows that had he wished he could have freed himself by resorting to the oath. Under what circumstances [could this be so]? Where, for instance, he advances the plea that an armed malefactor [took it].  Now seeing that it says, '… and it so happened that the thief was [subsequently] traced, he should pay the double payment to the hirer',  can it not be concluded from this that an armed malefactor is considered as a thief?  — I might answer: Do you presume that this statement follows the view of R. Judah who said that Hirer  is equal [in law] to Paid Bailee?  Perhaps it follows the view of R. Meir who said that Hirer is equal [in law] to Unpaid Bailee.  If you wish  I may say: [We should read the relevant views] as they were transposed by Rabbah b. Abbuha, who [taught thus]: How is the payment [for the loss of articles] regulated in the case of Hirer? R. Meir says: As in the case of Paid Bailee. R. Judah, however, says: As in the case of Unpaid Bailee.  R. Zera said:  We are dealing here with a case where the hirer advances the plea [that it was taken by] an armed malefactor, and it was afterwards discovered that [it was taken by] a malefactor without arms. IF A SHEEP [ACCIDENTALLY] FELL INTO A GARDEN AND DERIVED BENEFIT [FROM THE FRUITS THERE], PAYMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT. Rab said: [This applies to benefit derived by the animal] from [the lessening of] the impact.  But what when it consumed them? Would there be no need to pay even to the extent of the benefit? Shall we say that Rab is here following the principle laid down by him [elsewhere]? For did Rab not say, 'It should not have eaten'?  — But what a comparison! Rab said 'It should not have eaten' only there where it was injured [by over-eating itself], so that the owner of the fruits could say [to the plaintiff], 'I will not pay as it should not have eaten [my fruits]'. But did Rab ever say this in the case where the animal did damage to others that there should be exemption?