Bava Kamma

where the wall was shaky. The Master stated: 'To bend over a neighbour's corn standing in front of a fire.' Under what circumstances? If we assume that the fire can now reach it in a normal wind, why is he not liable also according to the judgments of Man? — It must therefore be where it would reach them only in an unusual wind. R. Ashi said: What is referred  to is 'covering' the offender having caused the stalks to become hidden in the ease of Fire. The Master stated: 'To hire false witnesses.' Under what circumstances? If we assume for his own benefit,  should he not pay the money  and should he thus not also be liable even in accordance with the judgments of Man? — It therefore must mean for the benefit of his neighbour. 'To know of evidence in favour of another and not to testify on his behalf.' With what case are we dealing here? If with a case where there are two [witnesses], is it not obvious that it is a Scriptural offence,  [as it is written], If he do not utter it then he shall bear his iniquity?  — It must therefore be where there is one [witness]. (Mnemonic: He who does, Deadly poison, Entrusts, His fellow, Broken.) But are there no more cases [of the same category]? Is there not the case of a man who does work with the Water of Purification  or with the [Red] Heifer of Purification,  where he is similarly exempt according to the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?  Again, is there not the case of one who placed deadly poison before the animal of a neighbour, where he is exempt from the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?  So also is there not the case of one who entrusts fire to a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor [and damage results], where he is exempt from the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?  Again, is there not the case of the man who gives his fellow a fright, where he is similarly exempt from the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?  And finally is there not the case of the man who, when his pitcher has broken on public ground, does not remove the potsherds, who, when his camel falls does not raise it, where R. Meir indeed makes him liable for any damage resulting therefrom, but the Sages hold that he is exempt from the judgments of Man though liable according to the judgments of Heaven?  — Yes, there are surely many more cases [to come under the same category], but these four cases were particularly necessary to be stated by him,  as otherwise you might have thought that even according to the judgments of Heaven there should not be any liability. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case of breaking down a fence in front of a neighbour's animal you might have said that since the wall was in any case bound to come down, what offence was committed, and that even according to the judgments of Heaven there should be no liability. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case of bending over a neighbour's standing corn in front of a fire you might also have said that the defendant could argue, 'How could I know that an unusual wind would come?' and that consequently even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable; it was therefore indicated to us [that this is not the case]. So also according to R. Ashi who said that the reference is to 'covering', you might have said that [the defendant could contend], 'I surely intended to cover and thus protect your property,  and that even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case of hiring false witnesses you might also have said that the offender should be entitled to plead, 'Where the words of the Master  are contradicted by words of a disciple,  whose words should be followed?'  and that even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case where one knows evidence in favour of another and does not testify on his behalf, you might also have said that [the offender could argue], 'Who can say for certain that even had I gone and testified on his behalf, the other party would have admitted [the claim], and would not perhaps have sworn falsely [against my evidence]?'  and that even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not the case]. IF THE WALL BROKE DOWN AT NIGHT OR IF ROBBERS BROKE IN etc., Rabbah said: This  is so only where the animal undermined the wall. What then of the case where it did not undermine the wall?  Would there then be liability? Under what circumstances? If it be assumed that the wall was sound, why then even where it did not undermine it  should there be liability? What else could the defendant have done? But if, on the other hand, the wall was shaky, why even in the case where the animal undermined it should there be exemption? Is not this a case where there is negligence  at the beginning but [damage results from] accident  at the end? Your view is correct enough on the assumption  that where there is negligence at the beginning [and damage results through] accident at the end there is exemption, but if we take the view  that where there is negligence at the beginning though [damage results from] accident at the end there is liability, what can be said? — This ruling of the Mishnah therefore refers to a sound wall and even to a case where it did not undermine the wall.  For the statement of Rabbah was made with reference to [the ruling in] the concluding clause, IF THE OWNER HAD LEFT THEM IN A SUNNY PLACE OR HANDED THEM OVER TO THE CARE OF A DEAF-MUTE, AN IDIOT OR A MINOR AND THEY GOT AWAY AND DID DAMAGE, HE WOULD BE LIABLE. Rabbah thereupon said: This would be so even where it undermined the wall. For there would be no doubt that [this would be so] where it did not undermine the wall  as there was negligence throughout, but even where it did undermine the wall,  the ruling  would also hold good. You might have said [in that case, that where it undermined the wall]  it should be regarded as a case of negligence at the beginning but accident at the end.  It was therefore indicated to us  that [it is regarded as a case of] negligence throughout, the reason being that the plaintiff might say, 'You should surely have realised that since you left it in a sunny place, it will use every possible device for the purpose of getting out. IF THE ROBBERS TOOK THEM OUT, THE ROBBERS WOULD BE LIABLE [FOR THE DAMAGE].