Bava Kamma

Still, would not this imply exemption in the case of an ox which was normal?  — R. Jeremiah thereupon said: A particularly strong case is taken:  There could be no question that in the case of a normal ox there should be liability, but in the case of an ox which is deaf or abnormal or small it might have been thought that it was its deafness that caused [the damage to it] or that it was its smallness that caused it [to fall] so that the owner of the pit should be exempt.  We are therefore told [that even here he is liable]. Said R. Aha to Rabina: But it has been taught: If a creature possessing sense fell into it there would be exemption. Does this not mean an ox possession sense? — He replied: No, it means a man. [If that is so,] would not this imply that only in the case of a man who possesses sense that there would be exemption, whereas if he did not possess sense there would be liability, [and how can this be, seeing that] it is written 'ox' [which implies] 'and not man'? — The meaning of 'one possessing sense' must therefore be 'one of the species of rational being'. But he again said to him: Was it not taught: If there fell into it an ox possessing sense there would be exemption? — Raba therefore said: [The Mishnaic text indeed means] precisely an ox which was deaf, an ox which was abnormal, an ox which was small, for in the case of an ox which was normal there would be exemption, the reason being that such an ox should have looked more carefully while walking. So indeed was it taught likewise:  Where there fell into it an ox which was deaf, or abnormal or small, or blind or while walking at night time, there would be liability whereas if it was normal and walking during the day there would be exemption. MISHNAH. BOTH AN OX AND ANY OTHER ANIMAL ARE ALIKE [BEFORE THE LAW WITH REFERENCE] TO FALLING INTO A PIT,  TO EXCLUSION FROM MOUNT SINAI,  TO PAYING DOUBLE [IN CASES OF THEFT],  TO RESTORING LOST PROPERTY,  TO UNLOADING [BURDENS TOO HEAVY FOR AN ANIMAL TO BEAR],  TO ABSTAINING FROM MUZZLING,  TO HETEROGENEOUS ANIMALS [BEING COUPLED  OR WORKING TOGETHER],  TO SABBATH REST.  SO ALSO BEASTS AND BIRDS ARE LIKE THEM. IF SO WHY DO WE READ, AN OX OR AN ASS? ONLY BECAUSE SCRIPTURE SPOKE OF THE MORE USUAL [ANIMALS IN DOMESTIC LIFE]. GEMARA. [WITH REFERENCE] TO FALLING INTO A PIT, since it is written, He should give money unto the owner of it,  [to include] everything that an owner has, as indeed already stated.  TO EXCLUSION FROM MOUNT SINAI [as it is written] Whether it be animal or man, it shall not live.  Beast  is included in 'animal' and [the word] 'whether' includes 'birds'. TO PAYING DOUBLE, as we said elsewhere:  [The expression] for all manner of trespass  is comprehensive. TO RESTORING LOST PROPERTY; [this is derived from the words] with all lost things of thy brother.  TO UNLOADING [BURDENS TOO HEAVY FOR AN ANIMAL TO BEAR]; we derive this [by] comparing [the term] 'ass'  with [the term] 'ass'  [occurring in connection] with the Sabbath.  TO [ABSTAINING FROM] MUZZLING; this we learn [similarly by] comparing [the term] 'ox'  with [the term] 'ox'  [used in connection] with Sabbath.  TO HETEROGENEOUS ANIMALS; the rule as regards ploughing we learn [by comparing the term] 'ox'  with the term 'ox'  used [in connection] with Sabbath;  and the rule as regards coupling we learn [by comparing the term] 'thy cattle'  with the term 'thy cattle'  [used in connection] with Sabbath. But whence are [all these rules known] to us in the case of Sabbath [itself]? — As it was taught: R. Jose says in the name of R. Ishmael: In the first Decalogue  it is said thy manservant and thy maidservant and thy cattle  whereas in the second Decalogue  it is said thy ox and thy ass and any of thy cattle.  Now, are not 'ox' and 'ass' included in 'any of thy cattle'? Why then were they singled out? To tell us that just as in the case of the 'ox and ass' mentioned here,  beasts and birds are on the same footing with them.  So also [in any other case where 'ox and ass' are mentioned] all beasts and birds are on the same footing with them. But may we not say that 'thy cattle' in the first Decalogue  is a generalisation, and 'thy ox and thy ass' in the second Decalogue is a specification, and [we know that] where a generalisation is followed by a specification, the generalisation does not include anything save what is mentioned in the specification,  [whence it would follow that only] 'ox and ass' are [prohibited]  but not any other thing? — I may reply that the words 'and any of thy cattle' in the second Decalogue constitute a further generalisation, so that we have a generalisation preceding a specification which in its turn is followed by another generalisation; and in such a case you include also  that which is similar to the specification,  so that as the specification [here] mentions objects possessing life, there should thus also be included all objects possessing life. But, I may say, the specification mentions [living] things whose carcass would cause defilement whether by touching or by carrying.  [Why not say that] there should also be included all [living] things whose carcass would similarly cause defilement whether by touching or by carrying,  so that birds would thus not be included?  — I may reply: If that were the case, the Divine Law would have inserted only one [object in the] specification. But which [of the two]  should the Divine Law have inserted? For were the Divine Law to have inserted [only] 'ox', I might have thought than an animal which was eligible to be sacrificed upon the altar  should be included, but one which was not eligible to be sacrificed upon the altar  should not be included, so that the Divine Law was thus compelled to insert also 'ass'.  If [on the other hand] the Divine Law had inserted [only] 'ass', I might have thought that [an animal which was subject to the] sanctity of first birth  should be included, but that which was not subject to the sanctity of first birth  should not be included; the Divine Law therefore inserted also 'ox'.  It must therefore [be said that] and all thy cattle is [not merely a generalisation but] an amplification.  [Does this mean to say that] wherever the Divine Law inserts [the word] 'all', it is an amplification? What about tithes where [the word] 'all' occurs and we nevertheless expound it as an instance of generalisation and specification? For it was taught:  And thou shalt bestow that money for all that thy soul lusteth after  is a generalisation; for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink  is a specification; or for all that thy soul desireth is again a generalisation. Now, where a generalisation precedes a specification which is in its turn followed by another generalisation you cannot include anything save what is similar to the specification. As therefore the specification [here]  mentions products obtained from products  and which spring from the soil  there may also be included all kinds of products obtained from products  and which spring from the soil.  [Does this not prove that the expression 'all' was taken as a generalisation, and not as an amplification?]  — I might say that [the expression] 'for all'  is but a generalisation, whereas 'all' would be an amplification. Or if you wish I may say that [the term] 'all' is also a generalisation, but in this case  'all' is an amplification. For why was it not written And thy cattle just as in the first Decalogue? Why did Scripture insert here 'and all thy cattle' unless it was meant to be an amplification? — Now that you decide that 'all' is an amplification  why was it necessary to have 'thy cattle' in the first Decalogue and 'ox and ass' in the second Decalogue? — I may reply that 'ox' was inserted [to provide a basis] for comparison of 'ox' with [the term] 'ox' [used in connection] with muzzling; so also 'ass' [to provide a basis] for comparison of 'ass' with the term 'ass' [used in connection] with unloading; so again 'thy cattle' [to provide a basis] for comparison of 'thy cattle' with [the expression] 'thy cattle' [occurring in connection] with heterogeneity. If that is the case [that heterogeneity is compared with Sabbath breaking] why should even human beings not be forbidden  [to plough together with an animal]? Why have we learnt; A human being is allowed to plough [the field] and to pull [a waggon] with any of the beasts?  — R. Papa thereupon said: The reason of this matter was known to the Papunean,  that is R. Aha b. Jacob [who said that as] Scripture says that thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest as well as thou  [it is only] in respect of the law of rest that I should compare them [to cattle] but not of any other matter. R. Hanina b. 'Agil asked R. Hiyya b. Abba: Why in the first Decalogue is there no mention of wellbeing,  whereas in the second Decalogue