Bava Kamma

Are we to say that the former statement  follows the view of Rabbi  whereas the latter  follows that of the Rabbis?  — R. Zebid thereupon said that the one statement as well as the other could be regarded as following the view of the Rabbis.  For even there [in their own case] the Rabbis would not say that the last digger should be liable, save in a case where the first digger did not make the pit of the minimum depth capable of killing, whereas [in this case] where the first digger made the pit of the minimum depth capable of killing even the Rabbis would agree that all the diggers should be liable.  But, [what of] the case of [the second] lining it with plaster and cementing it,  where the first digger made the pit of the minimum depth capable of killing, and yet it was said that the second would be liable? — It may be answered that the case there was where the unhealthy air was not sufficient to kill,  and it was the other person who, by diminishing the size of the pit increased the dangerous effect of the air so as to make it capable of killing. Some report that R. Zebid said that the one statement as well as the other could he regarded as following the view of Rabbi.  About the statement that they would all be liable there is [on this supposition] no difficulty. And as for the other statement that the second digger would be liable, this refers to a case where e.g., the unhealthy air was sufficient neither to kill nor to injure, and it was the other person who by diminishing the size of the pit increased the dangerous effect of the air so as to make it capable of both killing and injuring. Raba said: The case of a man putting a stone round the mouth of a pit and thereby completing it to a depth of ten handbreadths is one which brings us face to face with the difference of opinion between Rabbi and the Rabbis.  Is this not obvious? — You might perhaps think that [the difference of opinion] was only where the increase in depth was made at the bottom, in which case it was the unhealthy air added by the second digger that caused death, whereas where the increase was made from the top,  in which case it was not the unhealthy air added by him that caused the death, it might have been said that there was no difference of opinion.  We are therefore told  [that this is not the case]. Raba raised the question: Where [the second comer] filled in the one handbreadth [which he had previously dug] with earth, or where he removed the stones [which he had previously put round the mouth of the pit], what would be the legal position? Are we to say that he has undone what he had previously done,  or rather perhaps that the act of the first digger had already been merged [in the act of the second] and the whole pit had since then been in the charge of the second? — Let this remain undecided. Rabbab b. Bar Hanah said that Samuel b. Martha stated: Where a pit is eight handbreadths deep, but two handbreadths out of these are [full] of water, there would be liability,  the reason being that each handbreadth [full] of water is equivalent [in its capacity to cause death] to two handbreadths without water. The question was thereupon raised: Where a pit is of nine handbreadths but one of these is full of water, what should be the law? Should we say that since there is not so much water there, there is not [so much] unhealthy air,  or rather that since the pit is deeper there is there [a quantity of] unhealthy air?  [Again], where the pit is of seven handbreadths and out of these three handbreadths are full of water, what would be the legal position? Should we say that since there is much water there, the unhealthy air is there [in proportion],  or rather that since it is not deep, there is no [great quantity of] unhealthy air there?  — Let these queries remain undecided. R. Shezbi inquired of Rabbah: If the second digger makes it wider, what would be the law? — He replied: Does he not thereby diminish the unhealthy air?  Said the other to him: On the contrary, does he not increase the risk of injury?  — R. Ashi thereupon said: We have to consider whether [the animal] died through bad air, in which case [the second digger could not be responsible as] he diminished the unhealthy air, or whether it died through the fall, in which case [the second digger should be responsible as] he increased the risk of injury. Some report that R. Ashi said: We have to see whether [the animal] fell from this side [which was extended], in which [case the second digger would be responsible as] he increased the risk of injury, or whether it fell from the other side, in which case [the second digger would not be to blame, as] he diminished the unhealthy air in the pit. It was stated: In regard to a pit as deep as it is wide [there is a difference of opinion between] Rabbah and R. Joseph, both of whom made their respective statements in the name of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah who said it in the name of R. Mani. One said that there is always unhealthy air in a pit unless where its width is greater than its depth,  the other said that there could never be unhealthy air in a pit unless where its depth was greater than its width. IF THE FIRST ONE  PASSED BY AND DID NOT COVER IT … From what point of time will the first one  be exempt from responsibility? — [There was a difference of opinion here between] Rabbah and R. Joseph, both of whom made their respective statements in the name of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah who said it in the name of R. Mani. One said, from the moment when the first partner leaves the second in the act of using the well; the other, from the moment when he hands over the cover of the well to him. [The same difference  is found] between the following Tannaim: If one [partner] was drawing water from a well and the other came along and said to him, 'Leave it to me as I will also draw water', as soon as the first left the second in the act of using it he would become exempt [from any responsibility]. R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: [The exemption commences] from the time that the first hands over the cover to the second. In regard to what principle do they differ? — R. Eliezer b. Jacob held that there is bererah  [so that] the one [partner] was drawing water from his own  and so also the other [partner] was drawing the water from his own,  whereas the Rabbis maintained that there is no bererah.  Rabina thereupon said: They  have followed here the same line of reasoning as elsewhere, as we have learnt, Where partners have vowed not to derive benefit from one another they would not be allowed to enter premises jointly owned by them. R. Eliezer b. Jacob, however, says: The one partner enters his own and the other partner enters his own.  [Now, it was asked there,] in regard to what principle did they differ? — R. Eliezer b. Jacob held that there is bererah so that the one partner would thus be entering his own and the other partner would similarly be entering his own, whereas the Rabbis maintained that there is no bererah. R. Eleazar said: If a man sells a pit to another, as soon as he hands over the cover of the pit to him, the conveyance is complete. What are the circumstances? If money was paid, why was the conveyance not completed by the money?  If possession was taken [of the pit], why was the conveyance not completed by possession?  — In fact, we suppose possession to have been taken [of the pit], and it was still requisite for the seller to say to the buyer, 'Go forth, take possession and become the owner',  but as soon as he handed over the cover to him, this was equivalent [in the eyes of the law] to his saying to him, 'Go forth, take possession and complete the conveyance.' R. Joshua b. Levi said: If a person sells a house to another