Bava Kamma

but read in the text 'she would become entitled to it'. May we say that there is on this point  a difference between Tannaitic authorities? [For it was taught:] If a daughter of an Israelite was married to a proselyte and became pregnant by him, and a blow was given her during the lifetime of the proselyte,  the compensation for the loss of the embryos will be given to the proselyte. But if after the death of the proselyte!  — One Baraitha teaches that there would be liability, whereas another Baraitha teaches that there would be no liability. Now, does this not show that Tannaim differ on this [point]?  According to Rabbah there is certainly a difference between Tannaim on this matter.  But what of R. Hisda?  Must he also hold that Tannaim were divided on it? — [No; he may argue that] there is no difficulty,  as one [Baraitha] accepts the view of the Rabbis  whereas the other follows that of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.  But if [the Baraitha which says that there is liability follows the view of] R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, why speak only of compensation after the death [of the proselyte]? Would she even during [his] lifetime not have [a half of the payment]? — During [his] lifetime she would have only a half, whereas after death she would have the whole.  Or if you wish you may say that both this [Baraitha]  and the other follow the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel,  but while one  deals with the increase in the value [of the woman caused] by the embryos, the other  refers to the compensation for the loss of the value of the embryos [themselves].  I would here ask, why not derive from the rule  regarding the increased value due to the embryos the other rule regarding the value of the embryos themselves?  And again, why not derive from the ruling  of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel also the ruling of the Rabbis?  — It may, however, be said that this could not be done. For as regards the increased value [of the woman due] to the embryos, seeing that she has some hold upon it,  she can acquire a title to the whole of it,  whereas in regard to the compensation for the embryos themselves, on which she has no hold,  she can acquire no title to them at all. R. Yeba the Elder enquired of R. Nahman: If a man has taken possession of the deeds of a proselyte,  what is the legal position? [Shall we say that] a man who takes possession of a deed does so with intent to acquire the land [specified in the document], but has thereby not taken possession of the land, nor does he even acquire title to the deed, since his intent was not to obtain the deed?  Or [shall we] perhaps [say] that his intent was to obtain the deed also?  — He  said to him: Tell me, Sir, could he need it to cover the mouth of his flask? — He  replied: Yes indeed, [he could need it] to cover[ the flask]. Rabbah stated: If the pledge of an Israelite is in the hands of a proselyte [creditor], and the proselyte dies [without any legal issue] and another Israelite comes along and takes possession of it,  it would be taken away from him, the reason being that as the proselyte has died, the lien he had upon the pledge has disappeared. But if a pledge of a proselyte [debtor] is in the hands of an Israelite, and the proselyte dies and another Israelite comes along and takes possession of it, the creditor would become owner of the pledge to the extent of the amount due to him, while the one who took possession of it would own the balance. Why should the premises [of the creditor where the pledge was kept] not render him the owner [of the whole pledge]? Did not R. Jose b. Hanina say that a man's premises effect a legal transfer [of ownerless property placed there] even without his knowledge? — It may be said that we are dealing here with a case where the creditor was not there.  For it is only where he himself  is there,  in which case should he so desire he would be able to take possession of it,  that his premises could [act on his behalf and] effect the transfer, whereas where he himself  was absent, in which case were he to desire to acquire title to it  he would have been unable to take possession of it, his premises could similarly not effect a transfer. But the law is that it is only where it [the pledge] was not [kept] in the [creditor's] premises that he would acquire no title to it. MISHNAH. IF A MAN DIGS A PIT IN PRIVATE GROUND AND OPENS IT ON TO A PUBLIC PLACE, OR IF HE DIGS IT IN PUBLIC GROUND AND OPENS IT ON TO PRIVATE PROPERTY, OR AGAIN, IF HE DIGS IT IN PRIVATE GROUND AND OPENS IT ON TO THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER, HE BECOMES LIABLE  [FOR ANY DAMAGE THAT MAY RESULT]. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: If a man digs a pit on private ground and opens it on to a public place, he becomes liable, and this is the Pit of which the Torah  speaks. So R. Ishmael. R. Akiba, however, says: When a man abandons his premises without, however, abandoning his pit, this is the Pit of which the Torah  speaks. Rabbah thereupon said: In the case of a pit on public ground there is no difference of opinion that there should be liability. What is the reason? — Scripture says, If a man open or if a man dig.  Now, if for mere opening there is liability, should there not be so all the more in the case of digging? [Why then mention digging at all?] Scripture must therefore mean to imply that it is on account of the act of opening and on account of the act of digging that the liability is at all brought upon him.  A difference arises