Bava Kamma

Where both of them [plaintiff and defendant] had a right [to be where they were]  or where both of them [on the other hand] had no right [to be where they were],  if either of them injured the other, he would be liable, but if either suffered injury through the other, there would be no liability. This is so only where both of them had a right to be where they were  or where both of them [on the other hand] had no right to be where they were,  but where one of them had a right and the other had no right, the one who had a right would be exempt,  whereas the one who had no right would be liable. IF IT FALLS [THERE] INTO A PIT OF THE OWNER AND MAKES THE WATER IN IT FOUL, THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY. Raba said: This ruling applies only where the ox makes the water foul at the moment of its falling into the pit.  For where the water became foul [only] after it fell in, there would be exemption on the ground that [the damage done by] the ox  should then be [subject to the law applicable in the case of] Pit, and water is an inanimate object, and we never find Pit entailing liability for damage done to inanimate objects.  Now this is correct if we accept the view of Samuel who said  that all kinds of nuisances are subject to the law of Pit. But on the view of Rab who held  [that this is not so] unless they have been abandoned,  what are we to say? — We must therefore suppose that if the statement was made at all, it was made in this form: Raba said: The ruling [of the Mishnah] applies only where the ox made the water foul by [the dirt of] its body.  But where it made the water foul by the smell of its carcass there would be no liability, the reason being that the ox [in this case] was only a [secondary] cause [of the damage], and for a mere [secondary] cause there is no liability. WHERE [IT KILLS] THE OWNER'S FATHER OR HIS SON [WHO] WAS INSIDE THE PIT, THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY TO PAY KOFER. But why? Was the ox not Tam?  — Rab thereupon said: We are dealing with a case where the ox was Mu'ad to fall upon people in pits. But if so, should it not have already been killed [on the first occasion]?  — R. Joseph thereupon said: The ox was looking at some grass [growing near the opening of the pit] and thus fell [into it].  Samuel, however, said: This ruling is in accordance with R. Jose the Galilean, who held  that [killing by] Tam entails the payment of half kofer. 'Ulla, however, said: It accords with the ruling laid down by R. Jose the Galilean in accordance with R. Tarfon, who said  that Horn doing damage in the plaintiff's premises entails the payment of full damages.  So here the liability is for the payment of full kofer.  'Ulla's answer satisfactorily explains why the text [of the Mishnah] says, IF HIS FATHER OR HIS SON WAS INSIDE THE PIT.  But if we take the answer of Samuel, why [is the ruling stated] only with reference to his father and his son?  Why not with reference to any other person? — The Mishnah took the most usual case. IF HE BROUGHT THEM IN WITH PERMISSION, THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD BE LIABLE etc. It was stated: Rab said: 'The law  is in accordance with the first Tanna,' whereas Samuel said, 'The law  is in accordance with the view of Rabbi.' Our Rabbis taught: [If the owner of the premises says:] 'Bring in your ox and watch it,' should the ox then damage, there would be liability,  but should the ox suffer injury there would be no liability.  If, however, [the owner says], 'Bring in your ox and I will watch it,' should the ox suffer injury there would be liability,  but should it do damage  there would be no liability.  Does not this statement contain a contradiction? You say that [where the owner of the premises said:] 'Bring in your ox and watch it,' should the ox do damage there would be liability,  but should the ox suffer injury there would be no liability.  Now the reason for this is that he expressly said to the owner of the ox 'watch it' — [the reason, I mean,] that the owner of the ox will be liable and the owner of the premises exempt; from which I infer that if no explicit mention was made [as to the watching] the owner of the premises would be liable, and the owner of the ox exempt, indicating that without express stipulation to the contrary the former takes it upon himself to safeguard [the ox].  Now read the concluding clause: But [if he said]: 'Bring in your ox and I will watch it', should the ox suffer injury there would be liability,  but should it do damage there would be no liability, [the reason being that] he expressly said to him 'and I will watch it' — [the reason,] I mean, that the owner of the premises would be liable and the owner of the ox exempt; from which I infer that if there is no express stipulation, the owner of the ox would be liable and the owner of the premises exempt, as in such a case the owner of the premises does not take it upon himself to safeguard [the ox]. This brings us round to the view of Rabbi, who laid down [there would be no liability upon him]  unless where the owner of the premises had taken upon himself to safeguard. Is then the opening clause in accordance with the Rabbis, and the concluding clause in accordance with Rabbi? — R. Eleazar thereupon said: The contradiction [is obvious]; he who taught one clause cannot have taught the other clause.  Raba, however, said: The whole [of the Baraitha] can be explained as being in accordance with the Rabbis; since the opening clause required the insertion of the words, 'watch it',  there were correspondingly inserted in the concluding clause the words 'And I will take care of it'. R. Papa, however, said: The whole [of the Baraitha] is in accordance with Rabbi;  for he concurred in the view of R. Tarfon who stated  that Horn doing damage in the plaintiff's premises would entail the payment of full damages. It therefore follows that where he expressly said to him, 'Watch it', he certainly did not transfer a legal right to him to any place in the premises, so that the case  becomes one of Horn doing damage in the plaintiff's premises, and [as already explained]  where Horn does damage in the plaintiff's premises the payment must be for full damages. Where, however, he did not expressly say, 'Watch it', he surely granted him a legal right to place in the premises, so that the case is one of [damage done on] premises of joint owners and [as we know] where Horn does damage on premises of owners in common, there is no liability to pay anything but half damages. MISHNAH. IF AN OX WHILE CHARGING ANOTHER OX [INCIDENTALLY] INJURES A WOMAN WHO [AS A RESULT] MISCARRIES, NO COMPENSATION NEED BE MADE FOR THE LOSS OF THE EMBRYOS. BUT IF A MAN WHILE MEANING TO STRIKE ANOTHER MAN [INCIDENTALLY] STRUCK A WOMAN WHO THUS MISCARRIED HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS OF THE EMBRYOS.  HOW IS THE COMPENSATION FOR [THE LOSS OF] EMBRYOS FIXED? THE ESTIMATED VALUE OF THE WOMAN BEFORE HER MISCARRIAGE IS COMPARED WITH HER VALUE AFTER MISCARRIAGE.