Bava Kamma

now in the case of Cattle killing man where the law made small cattle [liable] as [it did make] big cattle,  should it not stand to reason that there is liability for little ones as there is for grown-ups?  — No, [for it could have been argued that] if you stated this ruling in the case of Man killing man it was [perhaps] because [where Man injured man] there was liability for the four [additional] items,  but how would you be able to prove the same ruling in the case of Cattle where there could be no liability for the four [additional] items? Hence it is further laid down: Whether it have gored a son or have gored a daughter to impose liability for little ones as for grown-ups. So far I know this only in the case of Mu'ad.  Whence do I know it in the case of Tam? — We infer it by analogy: Since there is liability for killing Man or Woman and there is similarly liability for killing Son or Daughter, just as regarding the liability for Man or Woman you made no discrimination between Tam and Mu'ad,  so also regarding the liability for Son or Daughter you should make no discrimination between Tam and Mu'ad. Moreover there is an a fortiori argument [to the same effect]; for if in the case of Man and Woman who are in a disadvantageous position when damages had been done by them,  you have nevertheless made there no discrimination between Tam and Mu'ad, in the case of Son and Daughter who are in an advantageous position when damage has Been done by them,  should it not stand to reason that you should make no discrimination between Tam and Mu'ad? — [No,] you cannot argue thus. Can we draw an analogy from a more serious to a lighter case so as to be more severe [with regard to the latter]? If  the law is strict with Mu'ad which is a more serious case, how can you argue that it ought to be [equally] strict with Tam which is a lighter case? Moreover, [you could also argue that] the case of Man and Woman [is graver] since they are under obligation to observe the commandments [of the Law],  but how draw therefrom an analogy to the case of Son and Daughter seeing that they are exempt from the commandments?  It was therefore necessary to state [further]: Whether it have gored a son, or have gored a daughter; [the repetition of the word 'gored' indicating that no discrimination should be made between] goring in the case of Tam and goring in the case of Mu'ad, between goring in the case of killing and goring in the case of mere injury. MISHNAH. IF AN OX BY RUBBING ITSELF AGAINST A WALL CAUSED IT TO FALL UPON A PERSON [AND KILL HIM], OR IF AN OX WHILE TRYING TO KILL A BEAST [BY ACCIDENT] KILLED A HUMAN BEING, OR WHILE AIMING AT A HEATHEN  KILLED AN ISRAELITE, OR WHILE AIMING AT NON-VIABLE INFANTS KILLED A VIABLE CHILD, THERE IS NO LIABILITY. GEMARA. Samuel said: There is exemption [for the ox in these cases] only from [the penalty of being stoned to] death, but there is lability [for the owner] to pay kofer.  Rab, however, said: There is exemption here from both liabilities.  But why [kofer]?  Was not the ox Tam?  — Just as [in an analogous case] Rab said that the ox was Mu'ad to fall upon human beings in pits,  so also [in this case we say that] the ox was Mu'ad to rub itself against walls [which thus fell] upon human beings. But if so, why should the ox not be liable to [be stoned to] death? It is correct in this other case where we can explain that the ox was looking at some vegetables and so came to fall [into a pit],  but here what ground could we give [for assuming otherwise than an intention to kill on the part of the ox]? — Here also [we may suppose that] the ox had been rubbing itself against the wall for its own gratification.  But how can we know this?  — [By noticing that] even after the wall had fallen the ox was still rubbing itself against it.